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In March 1995, Governor Roy Romer, through the Colorado Department of Natural
p Resources and the Colorado State Land Board, asked a Steering Committee consisting of
Department of Natural Resources Executive Director James S. Lochhead, Land Board
P Commissioner John S. Wilkes El, State Senator Don Ament, State Representative Lewis Entz,
and Commissioner of Education William T. Randall to oversee a review by outside
^ consultants of the policies and practices of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners
(SLB, or State Land Board or Board). The review is Phase I of a study of the future
P management options for the State Land Board. The purpose of Phase I is to outline a range
of legal and procedural options available to the State Land Board, and to recommend a
^ process for Phase JJ, during which the State Land Board will seek broad constituent and
citizen input in analyzing the options outlined in Phase I.
i The Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado School of Law (the
Center) was awarded a contract to conduct the review. Specifically, the Center was asked to
j examine current policies and practices of the SLB, to outline issues facing the Board, and to
suggest options for addressing these issues. The Center was also asked to recommend an
! appropriate format for the next phase, Phase n of the SLB study, including a public process
for responding to the options recommended for dealing with issues identified in Phase I.
1 The Center initiated its review in June 1995, and completed its report in October 1995.
During this time it held a public meeting announcing the review and conducted extensive
I interviews with approximately 60 people, including SLB and Department of Natural Resources
personnel, other state and federal agency representatives, trust land beneficiaries, and several
i representatives of trust land user groups, including agricultural and other industry
representatives. The Center also interviewed selected members of the Colorado Legislature
I and other knowledgeable representatives of public interest organizations. A list of those
_ interviewed is attached to this report as Appendix A. In addition, the Center reviewed
< background materials describing Board policies, programs, and practices, and examined trust
p law relevant to the management of Colorado trust lands, including the Colorado Constitution,
the Enabling Act, the common law of trusts, state and federal statutes, court cases, and
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practices from other western states.
State trust lands are a unique form of public lands. Most of Colorado trust lands
originated as land grants under the 1876 Enabling Act from the United States to the new State
of Colorado. The largest Enabling Act grant, comprising over 80 percent of the original total
of 4.6 million acres, was for the support of the common schools. Common schools received
sections 16 and 36 of each township, except where these sections were unavailable for
selection because they were identified as mineral lands, were part of the Ute Indian
Reservation as then defined, or had been granted by the federal government to another person
or entity. Colorado selected approximately l.S million acres "in lieu" of the unavailable
sections. Mineral lands were not eligible for in lieu selection and, consequently, most in lieu
lands are located in eastern Colorado.
Today, 4,038,593 mineral acres and 2,917,677 surface acres of Colorado state lands
are held in trust and managed by the State Land Board for beneficiaries that include the public
schools, state colleges and universities, the state penitentiary, state parks, and public
buildings. Trust lands must be managed for the trust beneficiaries. In the opinion of the
Center, the State is trustee of the lands and the SLB is the manager of the trust, according to
statutory direction provided by the Colorado General Assembly. The SLB was created in
1876 under the original state constitution, and in 1968 was located within the Department of
Natural Resources "subject to the state constitution."
The SLB consists of three full-time Commissioners who serve as Board members and
also perfonn administrative and other staff functions; they are appointed by the Governor with
the consent of the Senate. The Colorado Constitution and implementing statutes require the
Board to include one civil engineer, one member designated as register, and one member
designated as president. The SLB operates with 26 full-time staff members, including a staff
director.
The Center's review found that the SLB has made efforts over the past decade to
increase revenue production and to respond to growing public demands for recreational use of
state trust lands. It has worked to increase agricultural lease rates. It has implemented a
multiple use program that provides additional income from wildlife-related recreation leases
that are negotiated for specific tracts of trust land in addition to existing agricultural leases. It
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has sought to diversify its portfolio and to capture the increasing values of lands in the path of
development. Operations have suffered, however, from the lack of a land management
strategy and from the lack of clarity in both the process and criteria under which SLB
activities are carried out. The study concludes that the agency should undertake a
comprehensive organizational review. The agency should also pursue new strategies to fulfill
the trust purposes. Its weaknesses have been more accentuated in recent years as land
management issues become increasingly complex in light of a growing population and shifting
public values.
Section 4 of the report identifies issues confronting the SLB, along with
recommendations for addressing the issues, which are summarized below. Factual and legal
background and support for the issues and options are more fully set out in the material found
in sections 1 through 3. The Center believes the options offered in the report provide
opportunities through which the Colorado State Land Board may improve its operations and
better carry out its fiduciary responsibilities.
Section 5 suggests a format for Phase n of the State Land Board study with an
appropriate public involvement process designed to facilitate presentation, discussion, and
evaluation of the recommendations in this report. Interviews conducted under this study
reveal a high level of interest in State Land Board policies and practices, and support
involving the public in a meaningful manner during Phase n.
The Center concludes that the major options suggested by this report can be achieved
without a constitutional change. The SLB has sufficient discretion to provide a variety of
r collateral public benefits within its mandate to achieve paramount benefits for public
education. Following is a summary of our principal conclusions and recommendations.
The State Land Board needs a comprehensive land management strategy.
• The State Land Board should develop a revised statement of mission and policy that
P reflects its approach to asset management, consistent with its trust duties.
Management of trust assets in perpetuity requires that the trustee conserve the corpus
P of the trust as a sustainable source of benefits. In our view, the programs of the SLB suffer
from a lack of consistent themes and coherence. While the SLB has developed a five-year
plan, the plan does not provide sufficient guidance to the SLB. Neither does the SLB mission m
statement clearly address its approach to asset management. A revised mission statement
should be developed in conjunction with the several other policies that are suggested in this ""
report and might include a general statement that relates to each such policy.
• The trust should be managed conservatively, to produce benefitsforpublic education
in perpetuity. ^
The constitutional mandate to secure the maximum amount of revenue for trust
beneficiaries should not be read to elevate production of current income over all other goals. "-7
The overriding purpose of the trust is to provide a perpetual source of benefits for Colorado's
public schools. Within its general mandate, the Board has considerable latitude. Like any n
trust, the land and funds held by SLB should be managed for the use, benefit, and support of
the trust beneficiaries. Since most of these beneficiaries have not yet been born, the """>
perspective of the SLB and its policies must be long-range and intergenerational — one that is
not typically reflected in political or private business decisions. The intergenerational nature H
of the trust supports the conclusion that short-term profits must be subordinated to the long-
range security and preservation of trust assets. This means that trust investment and asset m
management policy should generally be conservative, favoring long-term investments and
protecting the productivity and health of the lands. ^
• Some laws pertaining to the State Land Board should be revised. ""'
The laws pertaining to the SLB should be reviewed and amendments to revise or repeal
antiquated or outmoded laws proposed to the General Assembly. Any such package of
proposed amendments should include new or amended statutes that are necessary to implement
the proposals for change resulting from the acceptance of any recommendations arising out of
this report or a Phase n study and the further discussion it generates.
• The State Land Board should allow additional uses of trust lands to the extent that
uses and rights under existing leases are not impaired.
In order to increase revenues to the trust or provide incidental public benefits, the SLB
can and should permit a multiplicity of uses on the same lands. Ordinarily the SLB should
obtain fair market value for the additional uses of these lands. Incidental public benefits
should be allowed when there is no significant reduction in the return to the trust.
• Agricultural lessees should be assured that the permission for additional uses under
the multiple use program will not be abused.
The multiple use program implemented since 1992 involves a cooperative agreement
with another state agency, the Colorado Division of Wildlife. Interviews revealed that there
may be real or anticipated impacts on grazing lessees. The Department of Natural Resources
should attempt to mediate the issues that arise. To the extent that the fund set aside to
compensate for damages is inadequate, the agreement may have to be revised. If there are
problems that fall short of compensable claims, further measures may be appropriate. The
multiple use program should be evaluated soon — in any case no later than its fifth year of
implementation.
• The State Land Board should adopt a policy forpublic use of state lands.
The assumption behind the multiple use policy is that value is received for allowing
hunting access thereby increasing revenues to the trust. Other public uses on leased and other
lands that generate little or no revenue, such as hiking or scientific research, may not conflict
with lease purposes and may not threaten the long-term productivity or health of the land.
The SLB should consider what other states as well as many large private landowners have
done in this area, and adopt a policy regarding additional uses of trust lands that specifies the
circumstances and conditions under which state trust lands can be used to provide public
benefits where little or no revenue is realized. This could result in a modification of the
multiple use policy or a separately stated policy.
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• The State Land Board public participation process should be discussed and developed
further simultaneously with the institutional reorganization plan. ^
Many decisions of the SLB, especially policy matters, involve issues of public
concern. These matters deserve scrutiny and now receive it mostly in the context of site m
specific decisions. Staff decisions and deliberations need not have public input as a matter of
law, though they may be opened to public comment as necessary. In July 1995, the SLB _,
issued a draft public participation process document and asked for comment. This is a major
stride forward. However, it is important to recognize that some matters, at least in the early ^
stages of consideration, may be best treated privately. The level and type of public
participation that is appropriate will depend on the institutional arrangement that comes out of ,-,
the study process.
The State Land Board needs to make organizational changes. '
i
• A comprehensive institutional management study of the State Land Board should be
made.
The institutional arrangement of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners '
should be examined and proposals made for the appropriate board and staff structure, duties,
and qualifications necessary to perform the SLB's fiduciary obligations. Colorado is unique
in having three full-time commissioners who sit as Land Board members, and also do work ^
that in other states is performed by staff. Specific matters to be studied include: (1) number
and type of staff positions; (2) types of professional expertise needed; (3) composition, role, „,
and duties of the SLB; and (4) protection of SLB functions from political influence. Three
options for restructuring the SLB to enhance its focus on policy issues should be considered: a ^
policy board model; a corporate board model; and an advisory board model.
• A proposalfor independent, performance-basedfunding should be submitted to the
legislature.
Although the SLB produces over $8 million in rents and nearly $13 million in mineral \
revenues per year, it must seek annual appropriations to fund its operations, with no assurance
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that it will receive a particular amount of money. Now, performance is only indirectly tied to
the amount of appropriations. It would be more business-like, less susceptible to political
influence, and more consistent with promoting trust goals to guarantee the SLB a fixed
-, percentage of its total revenues. A proposal for secure annual funding linked to performance,
i.e., measured in terms of revenues, should be presented to the legislature. Options can be
m drawn from other states and from pension funds some of which use a management fee
approach.
The State Land Board must pursue new strategies to fulfill the trust purposes.
• The State Land Board should develop a comprehensive inventory oftrust assets.
p An overriding concern that emerged throughout our study was the need for more and
1 better information about the portfolio of the SLB. The SLB's present inventory lacks the
p complete and up-to-date information needed to make planning and business decisions
i
concerning its vast portfolio. The lack of adequate information inhibits the Board and the
p state in planning for and making wise investments and decisions concerning the far-flung,
diverse, and complex assets that are held in trust. Although portions of the inventory, such as
T appraisals and incorporating appraised values, will be costly and time-consuming, a
comprehensive inventory is a basic necessity for responsible trust management and should pay
P for itself by enabling more fruitful decisions to be made.
P • The State Land Board should inventory urban and transitional lands.
The SLB should continue to identify all trust lands that, because of their location near
P developing areas, are potentially valuable and suitable for commercial development. These
lands can be further classified as suitable for sale or for retention and leasing according to the
guidelines discussed below.
■ • The State Land Board should establish guidelinesfor development, leasing, and
disposition of its urban and transitional lands.




In an effort to improve returns to the trust, the Colorado SLB, like many western state land
managers, has considered opportunities to sell, exchange, or develop such lands. Potential n
returns from commercial development are high, and there is no reason that the SLB should
not participate in the fruits of commercial development in a growing state; other western H
states engage in this type of activity. The SLB, however, operates with motives and restraints
that make its responses in the marketplace different from private landowners. A clear policy "^
and guidelines are needed to direct the classification and management of commercially
developable lands in the context of the state land trust's perpetual nature. The policy should ^
address: (1) criteria for allowing or undertaking development; (2) financing guidelines to
assure all financial arrangements meet the SLB's trust responsibilities; (3) options for limiting "^
risk while participating in development; (4) staffing needs; and (5) coordination with local
land planning and growth management. Rational development and security of values depend ^
on strong plans with a long-term and comprehensive vision.
• The State Land Board should develop procedures andpolicies for sales and
exchanges. ^
Procedures and policies are needed that set forth broad goals and criteria and translate
general considerations into practical steps to be taken in proposing or responding to proposals n
for sales or exchanges. These guidelines would regularize SLB procedures and make the sale
and exchange process clearer to those dealing with the SLB and to the general public. The "1
following requirements, to be undertaken prior to a sale or exchange, are recommended for
inclusion in any policy: (1) a comparative analysis of the proceeds from sale of a trust land "*]
parcel versus the proceeds from retention and management of the parcel; (2) consideration of
the potential long-term uses of the land in connection with other trust lands; (3) an assessment ^
of management burdens; and (4) an evaluation of the impacts of the decision on local
government and the public generally. "*!
Procedures and policies should identify both the purposes to be achieved by a sale or
exchange and the conditions under which a sale or exchange should or should not be used. "*"'
Exchanges should be used to enhance long-term productivity and value and to reduce
management burdens. They are not appropriate when administrative and other costs are too H
i
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I high relative to the value of the land or benefits to be achieved. Sales should be used rarely
unless new legislation makes permanent fund benefits more attractive. Circumstances that
' might warrant a sale under current law include avoiding difficult or costly management of
small, isolated parcels and eliminating especially unproductive lands from the SLB portfolio.
• Legislation should be sought to increase flexibility in permanentfund investments.
Options to be considered by the legislature should include authorizing the State
^ Treasurer, perhaps with advice from an investment committee, to: (1) invest a portion of the
fund in financing projects undertaken on SLB lands; and (2) invest in partnerships with state
p, and local government agencies to acquire and hold temporarily potential recreational, wildlife,
and open space lands. So long as such transactions comport with sound business judgment




• A lawful andflexible process for using exchanges to dispose of land should be
developed.
i Although the current escrow system has been found to be lawful under an Attorney
General's opinion, doubts continue to be expressed about its legality. Therefore, a more
i definitive Attorney General's opinion or authorizing legislation may be desirable. In practice,
p, after depositing funds in escrow, a purchaser may not receive the purchased property for
several years, until suitable replacement property is found. A system more attractive to
P sellers would encourage more transactions and potentially result in greater value to the trust.
r> * Market value should be obtainedfor agricultural leases.
Over 90 percent of the surface acreage of Colorado's trust lands are managed for
r*> grazing and agricultural leases. Revenues from these leasing activities are about $6 million
annually, or about 25 percent of all revenues earned from state trust lands. The SLB has
F" implemented a major policy of increasing fees for all agricultural uses, with grazing fees to
' increase gradually to market rates. Already this has raised income from agricultural leases by
P a significant percentage. The SLB should continue its efforts to bring agricultural leasing in
«* xv
line with market prices, recognizing the differences in improvements associated with the
leased land and the long-term sustainability of trust lands. The SLB's efforts with the ™
irrigated lessees, which take into consideration local conditions, is a procedural model for
how this might be accomplished with other types of agricultural lessees. In addition, ~*r
competitive bidding should be used more widely. The highest bidder should generally prevail
even if the bidder proposes a new or different use such as wildlife or recreation, provided -*]
sufficient provisions are included in the lease to protect the land.
• The standard grazing lease should include termsfor protecting the long-term health
ofthe land. „,
To protect the trust investment, clear, scientifically based standards, conditions, and
restrictions should be included in all leases. The federal Natural Resources Conservation „,
Service has standards that have been used in New Mexico's rural stewardship program.
Incentives should be included for good management practices. Given limited SLB staffing and «*,
the fluctuating need for range experts, the SLB should consider using the private sector for
the necessary expertise. ™
• The State Land Board should consider selling or exchanging grazing lands that do «j
not produce, over the long-term, returns comparable to investment of the same assets
in the permanentfund.
In FY 1995, grazing leases produced income of $4,629,554. Additional value may be ^
accruing from land appreciation. Adding these two sources together, more income might be
produced over the long-term from some of these grazing lands if the lands were sold for as
little as $27 per acre and the proceeds invested in the permanent fund at 7 percent. This
conclusion recognizes but has not clearly quantified the appreciation value associated with
some of these lands where the SLB has determined it to be wise to hold them for profitable
future uses or disposition, even if current rents are low. Though it may be imprudent to sell
all these lands, it seems likely that there are some lands among the SLB's 2.47 million acres
now under grazing leases that might be liquidated for prices that would secure greater annual
revenues without disrupting a long-range investment strategy.
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• The State Land Board should consider a share-crop leasing arrangement to be used
in selected situations.
A share-crop leasing arrangement carries greater risks than a normal lease and may
require additional accounting and oversight. At the same time, it offers the potential for
greater returns to the trust on the limited acreage (113,576 acres) now under agricultural
lease.
• The State Land Board should seek an Attorney General's opinion on the ownership
of rights to water appropriated and used on state trust lands.
The SLB is bound by trust law to claim fully all of its rights and not to dispose of or
waive its rights without receiving full compensation or having a sound business reason for
failing to do so. It should determine whether its present lease conditions are adequate and
what measures can be taken to correct any alleged waivers of rights in the past. The SLB
should also seek advice on the best way to monitor claims to water rights so that it may assert
its own rights and claims in a timely and effective manner.
• The State Land Board should review and revise as necessary the mineral leasing
process and lease terms considering the perpetual nature ofthe trust.
The development of minerals including oil and gas resources on Colorado trust lands
accounts for almost 60 percent of annual trust land revenues — over $12 million. This
revenue is generated by leases covering less than one million acres of trust lands (less than
one-fourth of the total mineral acres). A major issue for the SLB is the determination of the
circumstances under which it should permit extraction of non-renewable resources and
whether new mineral leases should be withheld during depressed markets. A review is needed
to determine whether the process for opening lands to mineral development and the terms and
conditions in any resulting lease comport with the goal of the Colorado state land trust — to
provide benefits to the public schools in perpetuity. The review must also address the
independent but related concerns of optimizing long-term returns and protecting public values.
f xvii
• The State Land Board should establish a task force to study and provide advice to the
Board on the opportunities and advisability of developing and marketing non-
tributary groundwater. *H
The enterprise of marketing developed groundwater is sufficiently new that it is
difficult to assess the economics and wisdom of a transaction without considerable study. "^
The SLB should refrain from entering any further transactions in non-tributary groundwater
without an assessment of the economics and legalities of extracting this resource. The m
Department and the Board should select a task force with strong and diverse relevant expertise
and whose members are capable of embracing the SLB's long-term mission and obligations.
• The State Land Board has wide discretion to protect its land and resources and \
withhold them from development, but it may not do so purely in response to public
opinion or to serve the public welfare. ^
The SLB has a duty to manage its assets to benefit present and future users of public
schools in Colorado. Within this duty the SLB has wide discretion in the types of activities it ~,
undertakes to accomplish its mandate, but the mandate implies that income will be produced.
The SLB also has discretion to produce corollary benefits from lands and resources where it ^
i
can be done without imposing a significant burden on the trust. This discretion extends to
withholding land from development, production, or use under circumstances where it «i
comports with sound business judgment and is otherwise consistent with the purposes of the
trust. Where the only justification for non-development is the public interest, however, it is n
best for the SLB to seek to exchange or sell the lands to an entity that is dedicated to
preserving the special values and willing to pay fair market value to acquire the lands. ^
I
• The State Land Board land inventory should identify parcels with significantfeatures "*'
that may deserve special protection.
The SLB comprehensive inventory of trust lands should identify parcels that have ^
significant resources and classify them for three categories of protection: protection for greater
future value; protection to comply with laws and strong indicators of public policy; protection «i
for other public values. The first classification recognizes that it may be prudent to preserve
the land in the long run because it could generate greater benefits for the trust. The second m
xvni
classification recognizes that a decision to preserve trust lands may be made in response to
legal requirements or, in the exercise of sound business judgment, in response to requests
from government agencies or, occasionally, clear and strong expressions of public opinion.
The third classification embraces lands where preservation may be desirable but there is no
law requiring it, and the SLB has no other business justification for forgoing development to
preserve non-economic values.
Phase n
The format suggested by the Center for Phase II of the State Land Board study
includes a process for considering and acting upon the recommendations presented in Phase I.
Phase n includes an analysis of the changes in statutes, policies, or guidelines needed to
implement the recommendations, development and implementation of public involvement
activities, action by the Board on the recommendations and implementation of the Board's
decisions. Essential to this process is defining the items requiring State Land Board action,
additional budget resources, or legislative consideration.
The public involvement process should be an integral part of all efforts undertaken
during Phase n. In designing the process, it is important to consider the goals to be achieved
by the process which may include: presentation of the report's recommendations to
stakeholders and the general public in a variety of forums designed to solicit candid, creative,
and useful ideas and responses; provision of opportunities for the stakeholders to interact in a
meaningful fashion with Board members, SLB and DNR staff and perhaps an advisory group;
and use of small group forums to provide focused responses by key stakeholder groups.
Analysis during Phase II of each of the substantive components identified in Section 4
should include identification of statutes, policies, and guidelines that need revision in order to
undertake any proposed reforms or repeal or revision of antiquated portions of the law.
Actions necessary to implement the results of Phase II include, where applicable, developing














1.1 The Subject: State Trust Lands in Colorado
f The Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners (SLB or State Land Board)
manages approximately 3 million acres of land in Colorado, comprising about 4.5 percent of
f all lands in the state.1 Nearly 2.7 million acres originated as federal grants to the State of
i
Colorado for support of the common schools. These grants were made at the time Colorado
P attained statehood. These lands will be referred to as school trust lands. The total acreage
held in trust for all purposes will be referred to as trust lands.
f* Trust lands are managed by the Commissioners under eight distinct trusts, each with
different beneficiaries. In addition to the public school trust fund, Commissioners manage
j lands for the benefit of the University of Colorado trust, the Colorado State University trust,
the penitentiary trust, the public buildings trust, the Hesperus trust (Fort Lewis College), and
I the two state parks trusts.2
Revenues generated from school trust lands are directed to one of two accounts,
I depending on how they are generated. Revenues from surface land and mineral leasing,
timber harvest contracts, and the interest portion of land purchase contracts provide income
: for the support of Colorado public schools. Monies derived from the sale of trust lands,
rights of way, grants, and mineral resource royalty payments are directed to the permanent
fund.
_ In Fiscal Year 1995, ending June 30, 1995, total revenue generated from all trust lands
was $23.6 million. School trust lands were the source of about 97 percent of the total trust
p, income. Ten percent of the revenues, or about $2.36 million, will be available to the State
Land Board administration fund, from which appropriations are made.3 Expenditures during
r*» Fiscal Year 1995 for management of trust lands totaled $2.2 million. Of the net revenue, $9.5
'William C. Patric, Trust Land Administration in the Western United States 22 (1981) [hereinafter Patric].
:Annual Report of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners 12 (Fiscal Year 1994) [hereinafter all
Annual Reports of the State Land Board will be referred to as Annual Report followed by the appropriate Fiscal
Year].
'This fund was established under C.R.S. § 36-l-145(2)(a).
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million is income and will be distributed to school and other beneficiaries,4 and $12 million n
is from sales of and royalties on non-renewable resources and will go to the school permanent
fund. This $9.5 million contribution represents less than 1 percent of the State's 1995-96 "1
appropriation for public schools.3
The Colorado SLB Commissioners supervise the management of all trust lands. The n,
three Commissioners oversee a staff of 26 full-time employees managed by a Director.
Compared to other western states, the staff is modest in size (see Table 3.1 in section 3.2). H
Staff include a mineral program manager, a surface use program manger, an urban lands
program manager, a revenue officer, five district managers, and support and clerical I
personnel.
Public land management in general is in a period of strong debate and rapid change. ;
Lessons from historical practices and shifting public values have fueled this debate. Once-
accepted land management strategies are changing in response to these emerging ;
understandings. The debate surrounding management of state trust lands in Colorado
t-H>::f
illustrates the range of issues confronting land managers today.
In early 1995, Governor Roy Romer requested the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) to initiate a review of the policies and practices of the Colorado State Land Board.
The study process developed to respond to this request is set out in the next section, followed „,
by a description of the scope of this report. '
i
1.2 The State Land Board Study Process
On January 4, 1995, Governor Roy Romer, along with Jim Lochhead, the Executive ««,
t
Director of the Department of Natural Resources and the State Board of Land Commissioners,
announced a two-phase study of state land policies and practices to be undertaken by the State ^
Board of Land Commissioners. Jim Lochhead and SLB Commissioner John Wilkes together
selected a Steering Committee for the study. The Colorado Division of Purchasing directed ^
4Of the total $9.5 million, S8.7 million will be directed to schools and $800,000 to other beneficiaries.
Telephone Interview with Ruth Kary, SLB Comptroller (Aug. 9, 1995).
'Telephone Interview with Joanne Vondracek, Accountant, State Dept. of Treasury (Aug. 14, 1995).
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an open, competitive request for proposals for completion of Phase I of the study. The
Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado School of Law (the Center or
NRLC) was selected to undertake Phase I of the study. Specifically, the Center was asked to
examine current policies and practices of the State Land Board, outline issues facing the
Board, and suggest options for addressing these issues. The Center was also asked to
recommend an appropriate format for Phase II of the study, including a public process for
responding to the issues and options identified in Phase I. At the April 19, 1995 public
meeting of the State Board of Land Commissioners, members of the public were briefed on
the study and invited to present testimony. Representatives of developers, agricultural lessees,
preservation groups, and others attended the public meeting.
The Center began work in April. Center staff involved in the study included David H.
Getches, former NRLC Acting Director and now Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law, Teresa A. Rice, NRLC Senior Staff Attorney, and Larry MacDonnell, former
NRLC Director and now a consultant with Sustainability Initiatives. Center Director Betsy
Rieke was involved in the writing of the draft and final reports. Center research assistants
Robert Barrett, Nicole DeFever and Mark Held also contributed to the project investigations
and writing. Professor Jon Souder of Northern Arizona University and Professor Sally
Fairfax of the University of California, Berkeley were consultants to the Center for the study.
Rice attended the public meeting in April and Getches and Rice participated in April
10 and May 9 meetings with the Steering Committee. Rice and Souder met with DNR staff
in early May to design a survey process. Also in May, the DNR began providing documents
for review. Many documents were sent to the Center, and others were made available at
DNR and SLB offices for Center review. These included SLB annual reports and meeting
minutes, SLB program documents, a collection of media articles on SLB transactions, and
materials gathered concerning the programs of other states. Board orders and other policy
documents were also provided to the Center.
In June and July, Rice and MacDonnell conducted over 40 interviews involving a total
of 60 people. The interviews were conducted so as to obtain representative views regarding
SLB policies and practices and to elicit suggestions for improvements. These included
interviews with all SLB Commissioners and several of the staff, representatives of DNR, and
select legislators. They also met with representatives of state land lessees, including ^
I
agricultural and grazing interests and mineral and oil and gas organizations. Other groups
interviewed included federal agencies and other state agencies including the Division of «~j
Wildlife, environmental organizations, and land consultants. A complete list of those
interviewed is attached as Appendix A. ""*,
Also during June and July, Center research assistants began summarizing study
investigations and conducted legal research on state land management issues raised during the "*]
investigations.
On July 11, Getches and Rice briefed members of the Steering Committee on the "I
progress of the study. Preliminary findings were presented along with a draft list of issues
developed from the investigations to date. Based on the Center's investigations and comments ""1
received from Committee members at this meeting, the Center prepared a preliminary draft
report Consultants Fairfax and Souder provided comments as the report was developed.
On August 16, the Center provided a draft report to the DNR for comment by
members of the Steering Committee. Committee members provided comments on the draft ]
report to the Center. The Center considered the Committee's comments in revising and
finalising the report, which was presented to the DNR on October 10, 1995.
1.3 Scope of the Report
This report contains the results of the investigation conducted by the Center. Section
i
1.2 above describes the process followed by the Center in its investigations and analysis. In '
section 2, the report discusses the legal framework and current practices of trust land m
management in Colorado. Section 3 provides a summary of relevant trust law and
management practices, policies and programs in other western states. In section 4, the report ^
sets out issues facing the State Board of Land Commissioners along with conclusions and
recommendations for addressing these issues. Section 5 presents a proposed format for Phase .*,

















2.0 Trust Land Management in Colorado
This section of the report examines federal and state laws affecting the use and
management of trust lands in Colorado.1 It also looks at SLB policies and practices within
selected program areas, and provides financial information relating to trust land management.
Current issues and problems, drawn from interviews and other study investigations, are
discussed. Finally, the section examines recent SLB initiatives to improve trust land
management in Colorado.
P 2.1 The Enabling Act
At the time of statehood, Congress granted lands to states to be used as a base for
generating funds to support the public school system. Prior to statehood, the federal
government held most of the lands within states. Land grants to states furthered
i Congressional objectives of maintaining control over the distribution of public domain while
covering the costs associated with the settlement of the West The original assumption was
' that both federal and state lands would be leased or sold to settlers, thereby encouraging rapid
settlement while raising funds for education and other necessary infrastructure.2
j In the 1861 act establishing the Colorado Territory, Congress reserved certain lands to
^ be granted by the federal government to the future state for the support of common schools.3
I Lands previously disposed of by the United States and lands included in Indian reservations
p, were not included in the congressional reservation.
Colorado was admitted to the Union under the Enabling Act of 1876.4 The Act
m granted certain lands to the state and, in return for the grant and as a condition of statehood,
Colorado was required to "disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands"
'The nature and meaning of the trust relationship is more fully addressed in section 3.
2See Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax, State Trust Lands: A Guide to Their Management and Use (pending
1995), at 2-3 [hereinafter Souder and Fairfax].
'U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 12 p. 172.
*U.S. Statutes at Large, vol.18, p.474 [hereinafter Enabling Act].
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within its borders.1 In this Act, Congress granted 4.6 million acres of land to the state. Over "1
80 percent of this land, or 3.75 million acres, was granted "for the support of the common
schools."6 The 3.75 million acres consisted of sections 16 and 36 in every township, except H
where such parcels had already been granted or disposed of by Congress and land selections
Colorado was authorized to make "in lieu" of the unavailable sections. In addition to the 1
school lands, the Enabling Act also granted to Colorado approximately 500,000 acres under
the Internal Improvement Act of 1841, 46,080 acres for a state university, 32,000 acres for a H
state penitentiary, and 46,080 acres under an earlier Congressional act dealing with salt spring
land.7 Colorado also received 90,000 acres for an agricultural and mechanical college under
the 1862 Morrill Act8
Three provisions in the Colorado Enabling Act defined the terms of the land grants. •
The first, providing for substitute selections, was typical of federal land grants to new states.
This concept, that states may select substitute lands in lieu of the designated sections (sections
16 and 36 in Colorado) that were unavailable because they had been previously granted or
occupied, originated with the earliest federal grants in the 1803 Ohio Enabling Act.9 Prior !
reservations in Colorado had the effect of limiting the number of granted acres of state land in
certain areas of the state, for example in west-central Colorado, where there was a large Ute \
Indian Reservation at the time of statehood. ^
The second provision excluded mineral lands from availability for state selection. In
1866, consistent with a policy of disposing of minerals to miners according to federal mining ^
laws, Congress exempted known mineral lands from school grants.10 Colorado's Enabling
Act therefore specifically removed all mineral lands "from the operation and grants of this *™
'Enabling Act, §4.
'Enabling Act, § 7.
/TTf
I
'Enabling Act, §§8-11; see also Patric, at 22. :
*U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 12, p. 503. "*[
I
'Souder and Fairfax, at 2-14.
"Souder and Fairfax, at 2-14 '
i
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act."" Some states unsuccessfully challenged the mineral reservation. In 1927, Congress
I lifted this limitation when it granted all states the right to receive designated sections that
_ were known to have minerals. The states were required, in any transfers of state land, to
reserve for themselves the coal and other minerals associated with the lands.12
P Congress added some restrictions on what the recipient states could do with the
i
' granted lands. In Colorado's Enabling Act Congress first imposed sales restrictions as a
p condition of the grant Section 14 expressly provides that lands granted for the support of the
' common schools "shall be disposed of only at public sale and at a price not less than two
r dollars and fifty cents per acre, the proceeds to constitute a permanent school fund."13 Sales
restrictions were imposed on all subsequently entering states.14 Colorado and most western
p states actually retained a majority of the granted lands rather than selling them to settlers as
originally anticipated.
j
22 The Colorado Constitution
H Colorado's Constitution as originally enacted established a State Board of Land
i
Commissioners made up of four state officials: the Governor, the Superintendent of Public
j Instruction, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General." Article X of the Constitution
set out the scope of the Board's duties with respect to federally granted lands, pending their
I disposal. Section 9 provides that the Board "shall have the direction, control and disposition
of the public lands ... under such regulations as are and may be prescribed by law."16
Section 10 states that "the state board of land commissioners [shall] provide for the location,
"Enabling Act, § IS.
"Souder and Fairfax, at 2-15, citing William W. Robinson, Land in California 190-91 (1948).
"Enabling Act, § 14.
"Still, Congress did not provide more guidancethrough restrictions and directions regarding disposition ofschool
lands until the New Mexico Enabling Act in 1910. Prior to this, state constitutions were the principal source of
restrictions on transfers of grant lands. Souder and Fairfax, at 2-17.
"Colo. Const, art. IX, § 9.





protection, sale or other disposition of all the lands ... under such regulations as may be ^
prescribed by law; and in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount
therefor."17 The Constitution also directs the Colorado Legislature to "provide by law that "1
the several grants of land made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and
carefully preserved and held in trust subject to disposal, for the use and benefit of [the ™
beneficiaries] ... and shall provide for the sale of said lands from time to time."18 It should
be noted that the Constitution adds the words "for the use and benefit of to the Enabling 1
Act's "for the support of and adds "educational purposes" to the Enabling Act's "common
schools."
As discussed below, the school permanent fund was established in 1919 by the General
Assembly to receive and hold funds from sales of school trust lands.19 The Constitution,
however, directs the management of the fund. Under the Constitution, the public school fund
shall "forever remain inviolate and intact; the interest thereon, only, shall be expended in the
maintenance of the schools of the state, and shall be distributed amongst the several counties
and school districts of the state." The Constitution makes the state treasurer the custodian of j
the fund, which "shall be securely and profitably invested as may be by law directed"20
In 1909, the Constitution was amended to create the current structure of three
commissioners, president, register, and engineer, who are appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the Senate. The commissioners serve staggered six-year terms and share most
duties and responsibilities.21 The designated engineer must be a professional civil _
engineer.22 According to Donald Lindemann, the change was sought because the duties of :
"Colo. Const art. DC, § 10.
"Colo. Const art. IX, § 10
"1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 650, § 27.
"Colo. Const, art. IX, §3. It also directs the state to "supply all losses [of the fund] that may in any manner
occur."
211909 Colo. Sess. Laws 322; Colo. Const, art. IX, § 9. See C.R.S. § 36-1-102 (setting out some specific duties
of the register).
*Colo. Const, art IX, § 9.
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the Board were deemed too important to be left to a group of officials having other significant
responsibilities.23
p The basic constitutional provisions governing management of state trust lands have
been altered somewhat over the past century but the fundamental mandates to the SLB and
p the legislature have not changed.
r 23 Statutory Framework
The Colorado General Assembly, although it established a framework for trust land
H management early on, has had limited involvement in directing the management of state trust
lands, and there has been little change over time. This may be in part due to a recurring
H question throughout Colorado's early history about the relative roles prescribed by the
Constitution for the General Assembly and the SLB in the management of state trust lands.24
23.1 Historical Development
I Between 1909 and 1920, nearly 1 million acres of Colorado's grant lands were sold.25
Legislation adopted in 1919 slowed sales by imposing a minimum sale size of 160 acres and
! by requiring that sales be "for the best interests of the state and the promotion of the
settlement thereof."26 In 1967 the minimum sale size was increased to 640 acres or one
section of land.27
i
As discussed above, the Enabling Act exempted mineral lands from selection in the
; statehood land grants to Colorado. In 1927, Congress removed that restriction, allowing
211909 Colo. Sess. Laws 322; Lindemann, Donald E., Stewardship of State Lands in the Western United States:
A Comparative Analysis (Master's Thesis, Colorado State University, 1987), at p. 21.
24See Briggs v. People, 21 Colo. App. 85, 121 P. 127, 128-29 (1912) (Board must comply with legislature's
regulations when selling trust lands); In re Canal Certificates, 19 Colo. 63, 34 P. 274,276 (1893) (legislative power
to regulate sales is limited).
"Panic, at 22, citing Stanley M. Cole, Relative Merits of the Sale or Retention Under Lease of Public Lands
in Colorado (Colorado State University Cooperative Research Project No. S-446, 1965-66), at 2.
561919 Colo. Sess. Laws 637, § 17.
"1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 50.
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selection of mineral sections within the original grant, subject to the condition that states ;
reserve minerals in any subsequent conveyance of state land. In 1917, the General Assembly
authorized the SLB to "reserve to the State of Colorado all rights to any and all minerals" j
when disposing of such lands.28 This language was subsequently changed to make state
reservation of minerals mandatory in land sales.29
The General Assembly established the permanent school fund in 1919, directing that
"[t]he funds arising from the sale of public school [and university lands] shall be held intact |
for the benefit of [the granted purposes] and shall be known as permanent funds, and the
interest and rentals only shall be expended for the purpose of the grant."30 As discussed
above, Constitutional provisions guide the management of the fund. .
Perhaps because of the potential significance of revenues from mineral lands and the .
difficulty in accurately appraising mineral lands, in 1919 the General Assembly authorized the ™
SLB Commissioners to establish a mineral section "under the jurisdiction of the register" of '
the Board.31 The statute also provides for a superintendent of the mineral section, who must ^
be "a mining man of known ability for at least ten years, and who shall be thoroughly
familiar with mining and the underground workings of mines."32 This provision, which ™
remains in effect today, requires the superintendent to inspect in person all mines and other
works operated under mineral leases from the state.33 "
i
In 1931, the legislature established the Colorado State Forest, comprised of lands
subsequently acquired by the SLB through exchange with the U.S. Forest Service and other "]
trust lands.34 Funds for administration and improvement of the forest were to be provided
"1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 495, § 18.
M1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1622, C.R.S. § 36-1-125(1).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-134. -.
"C.R.S. § 36-1-138(1).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-138(1). "1
"C.R.S § 36-1-138(1).
n
141931 Colo. Sess. Laws 350, 351.
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r "from time to time" by the General Assembly. Once identified, the land making up the forest
could not be sold. However, leasing was expressly authorized and later changes to the law
P provided that 25 percent of the lease revenues be directed to the county public school fund of
the county in which the lands are located.35
r Provisions adopted in 1957 established a "Land Commissioners' Expense Fund"
i
(Expense Fund) generated through diverting ten percent of annual proceeds from trust land
P management activities. Deductions were to be made by the SLB from several sources
including royalties and rentals from mineral leases, rights-of-way fees, and rentals from
I surface leases.36 All administrative expenses were to be covered by the fund including
salaries, subject to an annual appropriation by the General Assembly. The Expense Fund
I replaced two funds established in 1953, the mineral land expense fund and the land
commissioners' cash fund.37 In 1971 the Expense Fund was repealed and replaced with a
similar "ten percent of proceeds" fund but the ten percent of proceeds was directed into the
state's general fund, with appropriations made from the general fund.38 Finally, in 1983, the
State Land Board Administration Fund (Administration Fund) was established, at first with
five percent and in 1985 with ten percent of land management proceeds.39 As before,
! appropriations by the General Assembly are required before the SLB may use the funds in the
p Administration Fund. In 1989, the General Assembly created within the Administration Fund
I an emergency reserve fund of up to $300,000/°
P In 1968, the SLB was included as a division of the newly established Department of
Natural Resources. Under the transfer, the SLB retained all statutory powers but any
p authorities not specifically vested in the SLB, including budgeting and other management
"C.R.S § 36-7-201, 202.
"1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 592.
"See 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 592.
"1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1096.
"1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 1380; 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1143.
*°1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 1415.
r-r,
functions, became subject to the supervision by the Executive Director of DNR.41 H
In 1977, the legislature adopted a law concerning the political affiliations of the SLB
commissioners, requiring that no more than two commissioners be from one major party. The ™|
third commissioner must be a member of the other major party.42
The Land and Water Management Fund was established in 1979.43 The fund, "^
generated through filing and application fees, is administered by the SLB for the management
and improvement of state lands. Expenditures from the fund are limited to $75,000 per year.
23.2 Current Statutory Guidelines
This section describes the existing statutory direction for trust land management
activities carried out by the SLB. The discussion focuses on five crucial areas: trust land
sales and exchanges; surface leasing; resource extraction; commercial leasing; and revenue
management Case law relevant to interpreting the statutes is incorporated into the discussion.
23.2.1 Sales and Exchanges
In the area of sales and exchanges of trust land, the legislature has limited its guidance ^
primarily to procedural requirements. The legislature may not prohibit sales of trust lands
because the Constitution specifically requires the legislature to "provide for the sale of said „,
lands from time to time."44 An early Colorado Supreme Court decision confirmed that the
Legislature may provide reasonable rules for state trust land disposition.45 However, the ™
Legislature may not attempt to take away the Board's power, for example, by delegating ■
disposition authority to another entity: n
i
Should the legislature, under guise of regulations, attempt to take away all
"'1968 Colo. Sess. Laws 89; C.R.S. § 24-1-124 (2.1Xd).
<21977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1619.
411979 Colo. Sess. Laws 1346.
"Colo. Const, art. IX § 10.
45Briggs v. People, 21 Colo. App. 85, 121 P. 127, 128-29 (1912).
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power of disposition of the state lands from the state board, ... such acts would
be manifestly in violation of the constitution, and void.46
The legislature has authorized the SLB to direct the sale of any trust lands "in such
parcels as they shall deem for the best interest of the state and the promotion of the settlement
thereof."47 Lands within the service area of federal reclamation projects have to conform
with the U.S. classification of farm units.48
Land offered for sale must be in parcels of no more than one section (640 acres).49
Notice of proposed sales must be given in four consecutive weekly issues of a local
newspaper, and must include the details of when and where the sale will take place, the
parcels to be offered, and the minimum price fixed by the Board for each parcel.50. In cases
where the land has been under lease prior to the sale, the purchaser is required to compensate
the former lessee for the appraised value of any authorized improvements.31
Statutes also give the SLB authority to issue "certificates of purchase" that allow a
successful bidder to pay for land over a specified period of time at a specified interest rate,
but the SLB rarely uses this option. When auction notices for land sold at public auction
include the language "cash on day of sale," SLB policy provides that full payment must be
tendered on the day of the auction.
When trust lands are sold, all mineral rights must be reserved. The SLB may also
reserve rights of ways for irrigation and drainage ditches, canals, reservoir, other structures,
and roads and highways.52 Mineral reservations include the right of ingress and egress for
"In re Canal Certificates, 19 Colo. 63, 34 P. 274, 276 (1893).
47C.R.S. § 36-1-124(1).
4JC.R.S. § 36-1-124 (1).
4'C.R.S. § 36-1-124(2).
"C.R.S § 36-1-124(1), (2).
5IC.R.S. § 36-1-124(2). The SLB has also adopted for sales generally several of the procedures set out in article
5, which refers to sales to veterans.
"C.R.S. § 36-1-125(1).
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the purpose of mining, together with enough of the surface of the same as may be necessary •"*]
for the proper and convenient working of such minerals and substances."
Under the statutes, upon completion of a sale the SLB is to deliver to the purchaser a """!
certificate of purchase setting out, among other information, the sum paid and the dates on
which any deferred payments are due. The certificate must be signed by the president of the "'
SLB and countersigned by the Register, who must keep a record of certificates "in a suitable
book."54 Other statutory provisions address delinquent payments and forfeiture." Once all
payments have been made and all sale conditions have been satisfied, the purchaser receives a
patent for the land signed by the Governor, attested by the Secretary of State, and
countersigned by the register.36
Early statutory provisions regarding appraisals, first adopted in 1917, contemplate a
comprehensive classification and appraisal of all trust lands, with permanent but regularly
updated records. The Board is directed to "provide proper books" setting out "the legal
description, general character, and adaptability, and appraised valuation" of the lands.37
Further, the board is given express authority to "reclassify and reappraise" trust lands and I
"shall make the necessary notations or changes on its existing records."58
There are several exceptions to the public sale requirement for transfers of trust land.
First, sales to the United States of trust lands needed for irrigation works, other than rights of n
way for roads, bridges, canals, ditches, tunnels, pipelines, and telephone and transmission
lines, must be made without a public auction59 In addition, under case law transfers of trust ^
"Interview with Mark Davis, Minerals Manager, SLB (Sept. 1995).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-125(2).
"C.R.S. §§ 36-1-126 (delinquent payment will result in forfeiture of the certificate of purchase); 36-1-127 (after
notice of forfeiture, board may sell the land again); and 36-5-108 (SLB may cancel a certificate of purchase for one
of several reasons upon adequate notice).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-125(2). See also C.R.S. § 36-1-104.




property to another public entity in exchange for land of equivalent value are not sales, and
thus, do not trigger the statutory sale requirements such as allowing cancellation of the
lease.60 Third, sales to certain servicemen are exempted." Finally, the Department of
Natural Resources is authorized to acquire, outside of the statutory sale requirements, any trust
lands with unique economic or environmental public value.62 Sections added in 1973
provide a mechanism for the DNR Executive Director to halt the sale of any lands "alleged to
have a unique economic or environmental value to the public."63 If the land is subsequently
sold to the DNR as permitted under the statute, the statutory requirements on the manner and
terms of trust land sales are deemed met.64
Only one statutory provision refers to trust land exchanges. The SLB is expressly
authorized to exchange any trust lands for "unappropriated federal lands."63 Exchanges other
than those with the federal government are carried out under the SLB's constitutional
authority to provide for the "sale or other disposition" of lands.66
Provisions governing timber disposition are set out in the forestry code sections. The
SLB is authorized to "sell and otherwise dispose of timber on state lands; to secure the
maximum possible amount therefrom" based on several factors to issue permits" for timber
cutting."67 Timber within appraised value exceeding $5,000 may be sold only under a
competitive bidding. Other provisions direct the SLB to issue rules regulating timber sales,
"Sorenson v. Regional Transportation District, 745 P.2d 1047 (Colo. App. 1987).
"C.R.S. § 36-5-101.
"C.R.S. § 24-33-107(2).
"C.R.S. §§ 36-1-124 (3); 24-33-107(2).
"CR-S. § 36-1-124(3).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-141. Unappropriated federal lands, in general, refers to public lands not set aside by Congress
for a specific purpose, nor claimed under a law allowing private parties to acquire rights in public lands.
"Colo. Const, art. IX, § 10.
47C.R.S. § 36-7-103.
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the protection of non-harvested timber, leasing for other uses, and other related activities.68
The 71,000 acres comprising the Colorado State Forest, discussed earlier, may also be leased
for grazing, agricultural, mineral, and other uses.69
2.3.2.2 Surface Leasing
The terms and procedures for surface leases are addressed by several statutory
provisions. Most leasing provisions apply to all surface leases. The SLB is authorized to
lease trust lands "in such manner and to such persons as will produce an optimum long-term
revenue."70 Rental rates are to be determined by the Board and must be paid in advance.71
Rental rates may be adjusted at any time to "secure the maximum possible revenue," and the
SLB may accept payments on delinquent rentals under such adjustments.72
Existing surface leases have no absolute preference with respect to renewal of a
surface lease. With respect to lease renewal, the statutes allow for consideration of factors
other than returns to the trust The SLB is to assess the expiring lease in terms of the
"optimum long-term revenue" considering, among other factors, "the care and use given the
land and the development work done by the lessee in conserving and promoting the [land's]
productivity ... and in promoting optimum long-term revenue for school purposes."73 Six
months before the expiration of a lease, the SLB must provide public notice.74 Although
anyone may file an application to lease the parcel, the existing lessee has rights which may
limit the openness of the process to competitive bidding. The existing lessee must be given
notice and an opportunity to negotiate with the SLB for a new lease. The statutes do not
"C.R.S. §§ 36-7-104 and -201(5).
"C.R.S. § 36-7-201(4). "|
70C.R.S.§ 36-1-118(lXa).





require the SLB to accept a higher competing bid.75 If a lease is issued to a new lessee, the
existing lessee must be compensated for any improvements made.76
Some statutory provisions apply only to agricultural and grazing leases. The terms of
these types of leases are limited to ten years.77 In addition, the SLB is required to provide
counties with a list every quarter of all leases expiring during the following quarter.78 All
agricultural and grazing lease applicants are required to submit a statement setting out the
total acreage of the operation (private and public), and the intended use of state lands.
Applicants for lease renewals must submit a history of operations.79 There is also a
prohibition on the conversion of native grasslands to cropland under state land leases while
the federal government is providing incentives to reduce lands under cultivation.80 .Finally,
at the end of each year, the SLB must submit a report to the State Board of Agriculture
regarding only agricultural college trust lands, setting out an account of lease revenues paid
and owed, and a summary of leased land conditions and management practices. The report
must also include information on trust land sales.81
The Colorado Supreme Court struck down a legislative attempt to delegate authority
for lease approval to an entity other than the SLB.12 Colorado courts have also addressed
the circumstances under which a lease may be canceled. In Sorenson v. Regional
Transportation District,83 the Colorado Supreme Court found that the SLB improperly
canceled a lease for the purpose of exchanging lands with the RTD because the lease clause







MSunray Mid-Continent Oil Company v. Colorado, 149 Colo. 159, 368 P.2d 563, 566 (Colo. 1961).
"745 P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1987).
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upon which the action was based allowed cancellation for sales of trust land, but did not ^
mention exchanges or other dispositions. In another case involving a surface grazing lease
and an overlapping mineral lease, the court upheld the authority of the SLB to cancel the m
grazing lease to allow the mineral development to proceed.84 The court has clarified that the
legislature may regulate the terms of leases, even if the terms might reduce the amount of ""I
revenue that may be realized under the lease.85 Consistent with such legislative regulation,
the SLB may enter any lease arrangements deemed beneficial to the trust86 ^
23.2.3 Resource Extraction ""
Statutory provisions specifically address oil and gas and mineral leasing on trust lands.
Lease fees including royalties are not specified except for coal for which the legislature has
set a minimum price depending on the annual tonnage mined.87 On coal leases, a minimum
payment which constitutes an advance royalty payment, is required annually, whether or not
coal is actually mined.88 Under provisions that fail to reflect modern reality the "mining
superintendent must carry out specific responsibilities including the supervision of all mining i
activities on state trust lands to assure they comport "with the best methods of mining." To
provide an incentive for "faithful discharge of his duties," the mining superintendent must ;
deposit a $10,000 personal bond with the state.89
Lands leased for agricultural and grazing uses may also be leased for mineral
extraction, including oil and gas, geothermal, stone, coal and other resources. In the case of
MEvans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426, 547 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1976).
"In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 3S9, 32 P. 986 (Colo. 1893).
"Evans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426. 430. 547 P.2d 931, 934 (1976), referring to articles IX and X of the -^
Colorado Constitution.
"C.R.S. § 36-1-139(1). n
"C.R.S. § 36-1-139(2).
MC.R.S. § 36-1-138(2). "1
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geothermal leasing, public notice is required before the lease may be issued.90 The SLB is
expressly authorized to enter agreements for the cooperative development of oil, gas or
geothermal resources, and may modify existing leases to conform with the terms of any such
development agreement."
Many of the early court decisions on mineral and trust lands dealt with attempts by the
SLB to reserve or transfer minerals prior to 1927 when federal law was changed to include
minerals with the earlier land grants. A legislative attempt to give the State Board of
Agriculture the authority to approve oil and gas leases on agricultural trust lands was struck
down by the court as a violation of the Constitutional authority delegated to the SLB.92 The
recent Conda decision confirmed that mineral lessees are required to comply with local zoning
and land use requirements, even if the local requirements prohibit the intended development
activity.93
23.2.4 Commercial Development
In 1987, the legislature adopted provisions regarding the management of lands "within
the path of impending development," recognizing the "unique economic value" of these lands
for the funding of public schools.94 All leases of trust land "subject to development" must
follow the statutory guidelines. Lands subject to development are defined as "land which,
because of its location or other characteristics, is determined by the [SLB] to be suitable for
commercial, industrial, or residential uses." Trust lands being used for other types of uses,
r
WC.R.S. § 36-1-113(2).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-1 IS. Statutes also provide express authority for issuing rights of way across or upon trust lands
to anyone for several listed services or utilities including ditches, reservoirs, communication systems, electric power
lines, and pipelines. Rights of ways may also be granted to any federal, state or local public agency for "building
schoolhouses or public roads or highways or for any public use or purpose." The Board has the authority to set the
terms of the grant, and to execute the right of way instrument on behalf of the state. The grant reverts to the state
when it ceases to be used for the uses specified in the grant. C.R.S. § 36-1-136.
"Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company v. Colorado, 149 Colo. 159, 368 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1961). The lands in
question were Fort Lewis College trust lands but the court found it unnecessary to distinguish the various trusts.
"Conda v. Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners, 782 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1989).
''C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(1).
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including agriculture, grazing, mining, forestry and oil and gas development, are excepted ^
from this definition until such time as these lands are first leased by the SLB for development
purposes.95 <**\
The 1987 statutory provisions expressly require the lessee to meet all federal, state,
and local land use regulations. At the same time, the statute prohibits local land use and other '"''
i
regulation from being applied to trust lands in a discriminatory manner. Water appropriation
and development on trust lands must follow state and federal law.96 ""
Other statutory provisions address compensation to the trust and payment in lieu of
taxes to local government. Lease terms must encourage the lessee to obtain the maximum ""
economic recovery from the development of the trust lands.97 In addition, the lessee is
obligated to pay an affected local government the amount that would be owed for property tax "^
if the land were privately owned.98
A 1919 law, addressing leases of land within city limits, limits these leases to terms of
50 years.99 In addition, any lands within city limits under lease must be reappraised and
classified at least every five years." Upon expiration of the lease term, the lessees may renew ;
the lease N[i]f the lessee and the [SLB] agree as to the valuation of the land."100 The
statute expressly provides for competitive bidding and prescribes that "[n]othing in this section |
shall prohibit the [SLB] from leasing any of the state lands to such party who secures to the
state the greatest annual revenue."101 In addition, the SLB is authorized to offer the land for
sale at the end of any five-year period.102
9SC.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(6). „,
**C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(3) and (4).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(3). H
"C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(5).
"C.R.S. § 36-1-120. !
IOOC.R.S. § 36-1-120.
""C.R.S. § 36-1-120. !
IOJC.R.S. § 36-1-120. ™|
]
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P 2.3.2.5 Revenue Management
Revenues generated from state trust land are managed under two separate funds created
p> by statute: the Trust Permanent Fund and the Trust Income Fund. These two funds can be
differentiated by the kinds of revenues placed in each one.
f™ One major revenue stream — income from non-renewable resources — is placed in
the Trust Permanent Fund. The following monies are placed in this fund: income from land
p sales and income from mineral and oil and gas royalties and bonuses.
A second major revenue stream — mostly rental income — is channeled into the Trust
P Income Fund. Its sources are: income from crop production; income from mineral rents;
i
income from rights-of-way; income from forest-product sales; and other income.
[™ Together, the annual revenue from the Trust Income Fund and the annual interest
earned by the State Treasurer from investment of the School Trust Permanent Fund make up
the income from school trust lands that the legislature allocates each year to public education
($25 million in Fiscal Year 1994-1995) (see Figure 2-1).
I The other, smaller trusts administered by the SLB each receive funding from trust
lands that have been designated to earn income for them. Revenue is allocated to these trusts
according to the formula discussed above. In Fiscal Year 1994-1995, these small trusts
received a total of $850.000.IM
Until July 1, 1995, the legislature appropriated funds for the SLB's annual operating
budget based on a statutory formula that allowed the agency to receive no more than 10
percent of total annual revenues for administration. In Fiscal Year 1994-1995, the actual
pn percentage was 9 percent. Beginning July 1, 1995, the SLB's annual expenditures can be no
! more than 106 percent of the previous year's allocation — regardless of the amount of
p revenue generated.104
The SLB also has its own Land and Water Management Fund that is used for special
r1 projects and improvements on state trust land. Statutory fees for filing applications for and




activities related to trust lands are credited to this fund.105 Each fiscal year the SLB is
allowed to spend up to $75,000 from the Land and Water Management Fund; any cash
balance over $75,000 is credited to the state general fund at the end of the fiscal year.106




'"Telephone Interview with Ruth Kary, SLB Comptroller (Aug. 10, I99S).
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Mineral Royalties and Bonuses




($12.0 million in FY-T99S)
$$ INTEREST
($16.3 million in FY 1995)









($8.7 million in FY 1995)
ANNUAL CASH FUNDING
($25.0 million in FY 1995)
Direct benefit to
school children
Source: adapted from table prepared by Ruth Kary, Comptroller, SLB (as of June 30, 1995).
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2.4 Programs and Policies m,
This subsection describes selected programs and policies of the Colorado State Board
of Land Commissioners regarding the management of trust lands. The programs and policies «^
discussed here, chosen for their relevance to the issues presented in section 4, are sales and
exchanges, surface leasing, resource extraction, urban lands program, multiple use program, ^
and water resource management.
2.4.1 Sales and Exchanges
State trust lands may be transferred out of the trust through a sale, a direct exchange, 1
or an escrow exchange. Trust lands were originally granted to states with the expectation
they would be sold to encourage settlement That purpose was gradually abandoned in "1
practice by the states in the wake of a national move toward retention of publicly-owned
lands.108 In modern times disposal of trust lands occurs primarily under the Board's "*?
program for identification and disposition of unusually small and scattered land parcels whose
management costs exceed potential revenues.109 Sales may also be initiated by an interested 1
buyer, sometimes an existing lessee. Between July 1, 1990 and June 30, 1994, 9,901 acres
of trust land were sold, returning approximately $2.8 million to the permanent fund, at an
average price of $284.25 per acre.110
XT),
Offers to purchase state trust lands must be accompanied by the appropriate application i
fees and 25 percent of the appraised value of the land All sales must go to a public auction,
following statutory requirements including notice. As noted in section 2.3.2.1, full payment is
required on the day of the auction when noticed as "cash on day of sale." Purchases may be
financed by the SLB under a certificate of purchase as allowed by statute, although, as
discussed earlier, the Board rarely uses this mechanism. Unlike most bank transactions where
a deed is conditionally transferred, under a certificate of purchase the deed does not pass until
""See Souder and Fairfax, at 2-18.
""Report of President of State Board of Land Commissioners, (April 3, 1995), at 4 [hereinafter President's .
Report]. '■■
""Annual Reports, Fiscal Years 1992 through 1994. ""!
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all contract terms are met, including full payment."1
The SLB has been actively working on land exchanges for several years. Between
July of 1992 and June of 1993, the Board considered nearly 35 land exchange proposals."2
It has also been working with federal agencies to consider exchange opportunities. In
1987 the SLB signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Bureau of Land Management and
the U.S. Forest Service to establish working partnerships to facilitate land exchanges.
Exchanges must be on an equal value basis, and to avoid a "battle of the appraisers" value is
to be determined by an appraiser agreed upon by both parties before the land is appraised.
An interesting facet is that there can be no cash equalizations for parcels of different values:
the only way to meet the equal value requirements is to add or subtract acreage. A land
adjustment record is maintained, establishing a pool of acreage that has been left behind from
different exchanges that can be used in future equalizations. Also, surface and mineral estates
are to be left unsevered wherever possible. These restrictions indicate the challenges of
effecting land exchanges with the federal government113
The SLB also has a policy for escrow account exchanges. A 1991 Attorney General's
opinion, which was revised in 1992, supports the legality of this procedure. The opinion
finds that the use of an escrow account is an acceptable method for the SLB to use in
conducting exchanges. Under this procedure, a deed for the state lands is placed in an escrow
account along with the compensation for the transferred trust land. The SLB then has two
years to select replacement property. Under current board policy, the SLB receives the
appraised value plus 10 percent for trust lands that are exchanged. This is an attempt to
approximate in a general way the conditions of an auction, in which bidding begins at the
appraised price and may go above it. This policy is also designed to ensure that the SLB's
'"See Letter from John R. Kennedy, Director, Management Services, to David H. Getches, Executive Director,
DepamnentofNaturalResouix»s,transinittingstudyoftheStateBoanlofLandComniissioners,datedJune 18,1984.
at 52 [hereinafter Management Service Report to DNR].
'"Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1993, at 5.
'"Memorandum of Understanding Between Board of Land Commissioners, State of Colorado and U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management,
Colorado (Nov. 12, 1987).
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transaction costs associated with an exchange are covered.
In January 1995, the SLB adopted land exchange procedures. Applicants are required
to submit to the appropriate district manager an application specifying an offered dollar
amount. At a public meeting, the Board makes a preliminary determination whether to begin
the exchange process or reject the application, considering among other factors: (1) the
estimated market value of the trust property; (2) the value offered in relation to the
proponent's need for or intended use of the property; (3) non-qualitative values; and (4) an
assessment of the income to the trust from transfer versus the long-term value. If the Board
agrees to initiate the land exchange process, the proposal goes out for 45 days of public
comment before the Board makes a final decision at a public meeting.114
In recent years, the SLB has unsuccessfully sought increased legislative authority to
sell small, non-economic properties and to establish a land-banking mechanism, similar to that
.practiced in the State of Washington, to replace the current escrow exchange process. The
land bank allows proceeds from the sale of trust parcels to be deposited into a land bank
account, rather than to the permanent fund as would otherwise be required. The proceeds can
then be used to purchase replacement property that meets the goals of the SLB. Unlike the
escrow exchange process, a land bank would free up the trust land deed right away rather than
having to wait until the appropriate replacement property is found.
2.4.2 Surface Leasing
Leasing for grazing is the predominant surface use activity, covering about 2.5 million
acres, or 83 percent of trust land, and accounting for about 19 percent of trust land revenues.
Cropland leases cover an additional approximate 127,000 acres, or 4 percent of trust land, and
provide 9 percent of revenues.115
Most trust lands suitable for surface leasing for grazing or crop production are already
under lease, and the focus of management activity for these lands involves processing lease
renewals. The renewal process begins six months prior to expiration of a lease with
"'Board Order 95-11, Jan. 4, 1995.
'"Souder and Fairfax, at Table 3-4, p. 3-19; revenue figures from Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, at 10.
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p notification to the lessee and the general public. Anyone wishing to offer a higher rental may
do so prior to the lease expiring. The existing lessee is given the opportunity to match the
e™ higher bid.
Grazing lease fees have been increasing overall since 1974. In 1974, Animal Unit
p Month (AUM) rates were dropped from $3.00 to $2.50 because of a drop in cattle prices of
over 50 percent within twelve months. AUM rates were $3.00 in 1978 and $4.00 in 1983. In
P 1989, the AUM rate was $4.00, and in 1991 it was increased to $4.70.
Colorado now uses the "Comparable Appraisal" method of setting lease fees, which is
P a method that looks at the price across the market, adjusts for differences in services, and sets
a base grazing fee. Colorado sets just one state-wide fee from this method."6 Before 1994,
I the measure of the fee was 50 percent of the average private fee over the previous 5 years. In
1994 the percentage was increased to 65 percent and, in 1995, to 75 percent or $6.42 per
AUM."7 An additional 75 percent increase is anticipated for Fiscal Year 1996.118 The
state is considering a regional appraisal-based system.
' In the early 1990s, the Board undertook a review of dryland and irrigated cropland
rental rates, to bring them in line with market prices. In January 1993, the Board adopted a
resolution directing agricultural lease rates to be raised to market value over a period of three
years, following a short survey to determine the prevailing market rate. The SLB has been
reviewing and updating agricultural rental rates since this time. In December of 1993, the
Colorado Irrigated Lessees Association (CILA) was formed to work with the SLB to reach a
' consensus on a way to get lease rates "as close as possible" to market rates.
™ Because many state acres are landlocked or without access — wholly enclosed like a
donut hole within some other land ownership — not all leasing could be expected to be
rw competitive. Board minutes show that a typical ratio is to have two competitive bids for 40
"'Souder and Fairfax, at 5-39.
p '"Souder and Fairfax, at 5-55. According to the authors, this suggests that the SLB has decided that the services
provided on private land in contrast to those provided on state lands comprise 25 percent of the comparable private
lease rate.
f '"Telephone Interview with John Wilkes, SLB (Sept. 1995).
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leases up for renewal.
The Board also has begun requiring range management plans any time a surface lease
agreement is approved. During Fiscal Year 1992, the Board completed a field study of a
statistical sample of nearly 40,000 acres of state trust land confirming that lessees have
generally followed good range stewardship practices."9 All improvements on cropland and
grazing leases except fences belong to the lessee, as approved by the Board.120
In May of 1983, the SLB lifted a previously imposed moratorium on conversions of
state land to agricultural use. Instead they adopted a more flexible plan based on the
individual merits of a proposed conversion. However, "wholesale plowing of fragile grassland
will not be permitted.121" As noted above, the legislature specifically addressed this, issue in
1987, limiting land conversions as long as a federal programs provide incentives for reducing
land under cultivation.122
2.43 Resource Extraction Program
Programs involving the removal of resources from trust lands.include mineral
development and timber harvesting. Revenues from mineral leasing activities, including oil
and gas, account for over SO percent of all trust land revenues. Coal leasing alone generated
nearly $4.4 million in rents and royalties in Fiscal Year 1994. An additional $137,000 was
generated through timber sales.123 Bonus payments and lease rents are treated as trust
income and directed to the income fund for the appropriate trust Royalty payments and
payments in lieu of royalty represent a conversion of the trust corpus and so are placed in the
appropriate trust's permanent fund.
Mineral revenues are generated from oil and gas, coal, and construction materials (e.g.
'"Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1992, at 4.
""Telephone Interview with John Wilkes, SLB (Sept. 1995).
"'Board Order, May 16, 1983.
IMC.R.S. § 36-1-149(1).
'"Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, at 10.
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p sand, gravel, stone).124 Oil and gas leases are offered on particular tracts of trust land at an
oral auction. Offerings are often triggered by nomination to lease the parcel, which triggers
<"* an auction. In addition, parcels are identified and auctioned by the SLB for lease even though
no request has been received. The highest bidder pays a bonus and enters 5-year lease
r agreement with an initial term of 5 years. Rents, royalties, and other terms are set out in the
lease. The period of a lease may be extended by production.
\ The policy for development of solid minerals is to issue a lease for a ten-year period.
The first five years of the period is to identify a mineral occurrence usually by surface
I exploration including drilling and sampling. The second five-year term of the lease
anticipates development and production and requires the payment of an advance minimum
royalty usually $10.00 per acre. These leases are generally held by production. In addition,
there is competitive leasing in known mineral areas.123 The annual rental fee is a flat $2 per
, acre throughout the life of the lease; the fee does not escalate over time. Once there is
production, net royalties are assessed on extracted materials at a variable rate. The royalty
\ rate for base and precious metals such as lead, zinc, and copper as well as gold, silver and
platinum is 4 to 7 percent depending on the value of material per ton or ore. The rate for
1 Uranium is 6 to 10 percent. Construction materials royalties are negotiated on a per-ton basis
„ for each lease.126 Rental payments are not credited against royalty payments.127
1 For oil and gas operations in Colorado, an applicant may obtain an exploration permit
p, to conduct seismic operations on state land. If the applicant is also the oil and gas lessee
' there is no charge. If the property is not subject to a lease, a charge commensurate with the
m amount demanded by the surrounding fee owners is assessed along with a surface damage
bond.
p The net royalty percentage for oil and gas, as well as for surface-mined coal, is 12.5
1 '"Souder and Fairfax, at Table 7-2, 7-24.
p IMSouder and Fairfax, at Table 7A-1, 7-62.
'"Interview with Mark Davis, Minerals Manager, SLB (June 1995).
/IF!
; "'Souder and Fairfax, at Table 7A-2, 7-65.
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percent. For underground-mined coal, the rate is 8 percent.128 There is some variability in
the actual royalty percentage for oil and gas for a particular property as it may have been
unitized or communitized with additional non-state acreage to create a larger block of land all
under similar lease terms. Where there is such unitization or communitization, the royalty
percentage is a function of the area of the unit. In many cases, the royalty percentage is
reduced but overall production is enhanced, thus increasing the total royalty dollars to the
state.
Colorado law requires that mining operations comply with all applicable laws, and
provide land reclamation. The SLB works with the State Mined Land Reclamation Board in
ensuring that lessees meet these requirements.
The state land board also collects rentals and royalties from carbon dioxide production
and from natural gas liquids such as butane, propane, and natural gasoline.
The timber program, covering 428,000 acres, is relatively small. All trust land timber
resources are managed under a 1991 cooperative agreement with the Colorado State Forest
Service (Service). All resources including timber within the Colorado State Forest, located in
Jackson County, are managed by one forester with the Service.
Because of the large size of the state forest in Jackson County, the Colorado State
Forest Service has one individual in charge of all activities related to the forest The State
Forest Service either contracts with a private entity or acts as its own contractor. In either
event, administrative costs and a 20 percent fee for the State Land Improvement Fund are
deducted from gross harvest income. The proceeds are paid to the SLB for deposit in trust
income accounts. Net revenues to the income accounts have been about SO percent of the
gross income.129 Timber harvests have resulted in revenues of about $48,000 in Fiscal Year
1991, increasing to over $137,000 in Fiscal Year 1994.130
IMSouder and Fairfax, at Tables 7A-3 and 7A-4 and notes, 7-68 to 7-72.
'"Management Services Report to DNR.
'"Annual Reports, Fiscal Yeare 1991 and 1994.
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2.4.4 Urban Lands Program
In the mid 1980s, the SLB began looking at urban lands as an opportunity to increase
revenue production. In 1987 the state legislature passed a bill directing the SLB to look at
lands that are valuable for development.131 Since this time, the Board has continued to
acquire more urban land properties and position these lands to capture private-sector initiatives
to bring more revenue to the trusts.132
The SLB has one staff person for the urban lands program, a position created in 1981.
As a result of staff limitations, most urban development projects are initiated by outside
proposals. However, the SLB would like to market its own ideas to developers.133
Currently there are six subprograms within the urban lands program area: (1) land planning;
(2) ground leasing; (3)land exchanges; (4) marketing; (S) land sales; and (6) governmental
liaisons.134 Land planning includes identification of parcels for the program.
The program includes an inventory process that divides urban land into two types: (1)
the urban lands account which includes land likely to develop in the next ten years; and (2)
the transitional land account for long-term development planning. Field staff, Board
members, or others may recommend that specific trust lands be moved into one of the urban
lands program accounts. Lands may also be identified through a specific proposal.
Once identified, the planning process includes an evaluation of environmental
opportunities and constraints, an evaluation of available transportation; and determination of
the highest and best use of the property considering local land use regulations.135 In
considering development proposals, the SLB policy is to work with county officials.
Leasing for long-term revenue streams is generally the preferred strategy for
disposition of commercially valuable urban lands. Indeed, a large part of the urban lands
'"C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(1).
'"Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1993, at 3, 5, 6; Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, at 3, 6.
'"Interview with Scott Price, Urban Lands Program Manager, SLB (June 1995).
1"Urban Lands Program summary document prepared by SLB staff for NRLC review, at 1 [hereinafter SLB
Urban Lands Program summary].
'"SLB Urban Lands Program summary, at 1.
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IJ6SLB Urban Lands Program summary, at 1.
'"C.R.S. § 36-1-120.5(5).
"'Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners, Urban Lands Program, Internal Framework Document (June
1991), at 18-19; The Western States Land Commissioners Association, Summary Report, Urban Lands Programs of
the WSLCA States, Summer Meeting, July 23-28, 1994.
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program effort has been focused on negotiating ground leases. This includes renegotiation of
existing leases where economic factors have changed since development of the initial lease
provisions.116 Statutory provisions require that lessees meet all federal, state and local land
use regulations. Lessees must submit to local governments a payment in lieu of taxes that
would be owed if the lands were private.137
Lands identified as urban lands may also be disposed of through sale or exchange,
particularly where a lease for a particular purpose, e.g. residential use, is not a viable market
alternative. Sales of unimproved urban lands are not favored because sales diminish the asset
base and do not maximize value. Exchanges allow the SLB to obtain lands more suitable for
leasing. Exchanges are also used to trade agricultural or grazing lands with lower revenue
generating potential for higher income producing urban lands. \
Developers are required to submit proposals to the SLB which may or may not be bid
at public auction. An example of a recent development contract accepted by the SLB is a i
residential subdivision on 160 acres of land near Monument The parcel is surrounded on
three sides by residential development; on the fourth side is U.S. Forest Service land. !
A development proposal recently rejected by the SLB is the Seven Utes Resort
proposal. It involved a four-season resort with a ski area, golf course, and condominiums.
The resort was to be partially on land that would become private after an exchange, and ^
partially on land leased from the SLB within the Colorado State Forest The proposal was
controversial, in part because it was to be located in a relatively pristine area in the Colorado m
' i
i
mountains. However, some local interests favored the proposal because it would have brought
significant tax revenue to a rural county with a shrinking tax base. „
Over the past few years, several exchange proposals have been considered as part of
the urban lands program. For example, in 1994, as part of a four-way land exchange, the ,*,
p SLB acquired an office building in downtown Fort Collins. This complex transaction was
orchestrated by one of the proponents, and took over two years to complete. The building is
<* currently leased by state and county agencies and will result in a $200,000 increase in annual
SLB income. The acquisition marked the SLB's first undertaking as a commercial lessor.
2.4.5 Multiple Use Program
P Historically, access and hunting on state lands was limited by a "longstanding policy of
delegating to its surface lessees the right to post or not... provided that the lessees do not
P derive income from hunting on state land."139 During Fiscal Year 1991, the SLB began to
allow public access to state lands for hunting and recreation while balancing the rights of
' lessees on the lands with the need for sound land management and the public good.
A multiple use policy was officially adopted in 1992. The new policy is being phased
pi
j in over a 10-year period beginning January 1, 1993 under the multiple use program. It is
expected to generate $1 million annually when fully implemented, thereby increasing revenues
I from surface uses while accommodating both recreationists and agricultural land users.
The multiple use policy is being implemented by separating the access or use lease
from any agricultural lease on the land so that the agricultural lessee no longer has
exclusionary rights. Lands are brought into the program only as agricultural leases come up
for renewal. Only legally accessible land is affected by the new policy. Trust land
n surrounded by private land or legally inaccessible due to contractual obligations will not be
managed for multiple use. Consequently, 25 to 30 percent of all trust land is not eligible for
p-, consideration for multiple use.
Revenues are generated through some type of access fee. Access is available through
p leases which are subject to fees or by paying access fees to the holder of the recreation lease.
Under the multiple use program, existing agricultural lessees are to be involved in the
c* management of the additional uses. In addition, there is to be one primary manager, and in
'"Board Order, Sept. 22. 1986.
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'"Document outlining the Multiple Use Program, Nov. 25, 1992. Where the dominant use is recreation, or the
agricultural lessee does not wish to be involved, the recreational lessee may be the primary manager.
"'Telephone Interview with John Wilkes, SLB Commissioner (Sept. 22, 1995).
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most cases this will be the agricultural lessee.140 .-,
A subsequent memorandum of understanding with the Division of Wildlife (DOW)
calls for the eventual leasing of about 500,000 acres of state trust land at $1 per acre per year ^
for wildlife-related public recreation. In the first year of the program, most of the leases were
for big-game hunting. In Fiscal Year 1994, more parcels of trust land were enrolled in the •~1
multiple use program with the DOW, opening more acreage for public wildlife-related access.
Recreational values for which lands may be nominated for program enrollment include """*
hunting, wildlife viewing, and fishing. Lands nominated are brought to the SLB for approval.
SLB staff reviews DOW nominations and may also recommend that vacant lands that are not """'
under lease be added to the nomination list141 The DOW will eventually nominate a total
of 500,000 acres. For state lands that are not nominated, agricultural lessees will be allowed "I
to seek a recreational lease from the SLB and then regulate recreational use.
A multiple-use management plan (MMP) is required for any parcel of land covered by ,
an multiple use lease, and is viewed as critical to the success of the multiple use program.
The MMP is to include: (1) overall management goals for the tract; (2) recommendations for ;■
habitat improvement practices; (3) sources and estimated amounts of revenues and other forms
of production; (4) a description of how the plan will contribute to overall quality of life of the
on-site property manager and the community; (5) a list of the tools to be used to achieve the
desired results; and (6) a description of how the MMP will be monitored and evaluated to
ensure its goals are achieved, especially in the areas of revenue production and resource
protection.
In the development of the multiple use program, the SLB has worked with agricultural
lessees to address their concerns. Conflicts with the lessees will be minimized in part by
prohibiting camping, and public use of private ranch roads. In addition, the DOW contributes
$0.25 per acre per year to a compensation fund. Lessees may submit claims for damages
caused by the additional uses. Monies remaining in the fund at the end of the fiscal year are
i
I** used for range improvement projects.
A few recreational leases have led to problems. On the Squaw Creek parcel on the
Eagle River, for example, neighboring property owners have complained that public access is
destroying a healthy fishery. On the Lake Gulch property, residents of the adjoining
! neighborhood have complained of too many users and uses they believe are inappropriate near
a residential area such as rapid firing weapons and dog training. This property subsequently
! became the first parcel to be removed from the multiple use program.
The SLB has taken the position that agreements with the DOW for public access do
I not limit the Board's ability to later use the land later for better economic returns. Thus,
when trust property near Toponas and Gunnison is sold to private interests, the sale will result
! in the public losing access to these lands. A transaction which raised some public concerns
about this policy is a parcel near Rocky Mountain National Park that was transferred by
i exchange to the American Honda Corporation to build an alternative high school. Elk hunting
was popular on the parcel in question. Some argue that, without hunting, the elk population
1 will grow too large and result in harm to the animals and the environment
/im In addition to its formal multiple use policy and program, the SLB is currently
conducting a pilot project on ecosystem management in the Colorado State Forest designed to
r> aid in the development of a procedure for addressing multiple use issues.
i
^ 2.4.6 Water Resource Management
In the past, the SLB has been reluctant to claim water rights due to political
P pressure.142 From the SLB's perspective, there are two types of water rights on state trust
lands: (1) collateral water stock; and (2) closed water stock. Collateral water stock are rights
P held by the lessee that are considered an improvement for which the SLB believes it should
i
pay the lessee at the end of the lease or allow the lessee to keep and sell. Closed water stock
j* are rights held by SLB through an adjudication, purchase from a prior lessee, or claim by
lessee in the state's name. On irrigated trust land, 65 percent of rights are collateral, and 35
I percent closed.
"'Elizabeth A. Soderstrom & Sally K. Fairfax, Water Survey, at 11 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Water Survey].
'"Water Survey, at 12.
'"Water Survey, at 12, 13.
In recent years, the SLB has added a clause on all new leases requiring the lessee to
name the state as holder of any water rights developed on trust lands. The lessee will be
compensated for a well and other improvements, but not for the water right. Because most
surface water has long been appropriated, most rights that have come into SLB hands are for
wells.10
When a landowner adjoining trust land applies for rights to water that originates on
trust land but is diverted and used off state land, the state must undertake a significant effort
to protect its interest. The SLB attempts to review water court resumes and then cross-files
applications for the water that originates on state land with the intent to participate in any
resulting adjudications to preserve the state's right144
Currently, the SLB has limited information on its water rights holdings. A consultant
has performed a hydrogeological survey to locate groundwater resources. The SLB receives
little direct compensation for the water developed on state lands. The SLB believes some
compensation comes indirectly from lease fees paid by agricultural lessee that irrigate their .
crops. In addition, where the SLB owns the water rights, the water is leased directly to the
user. In some cases, where SLB owns groundwater rights, it leases the water as an
undeveloped resource, similar to mineral leasing practices, and collects royalties. Often, the
compensation for water from state land not owned by SLB is merely a payment by the holder
of the right for a right-of-way over state land to access the right That practice generally
results in an economic return that is far less than the value of the water to the state.
2.5 Revenues, Receipts and Disbursements m
The SLB manages the receipt and disposition of revenues from state trust lands and
operating revenues appropriated by the legislature for trust land management. Revenues are —
generated from several trust land activities including leasing, sales, and interest on various
accounts. As discussed above, statutory provisions direct the disposition of these revenues. -*,
Revenues from trust land activities are allocated to one of eight distinct land trusts: (1)
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_ the school trust, for the support of the common schools; (2) the University of Colorado trust;
(3) the Colorado State University trust; (4) the Hesperus trust (Fort Lewis College); (5) the
p* penitentiary trust; (6) the public buildings trust for legislative and judicial buildings; (7) the
internal improvements trust (for state parks, subject to appropriation) and (8) the saline land
P trust (for state parks, subject to appropriation).145
Proceeds from lease rentals, timber sales and interest on land sales contracts are
p directed to the trust income fund account for the appropriate trust. Revenues from the sale of
trust lands, rights of way grants, and mineral royalties and bonuses are directed to the
P permanent fund account for the appropriate trust. This fund is invested by the State
Department of Treasury. Income for Fiscal Year 1995 averaged about 7 percent; over the
T past 15 years it has averaged about 8.5 percent146
Administrative costs for the SLB come from the State Land Board fund. Ten percent
■"" of annual revenues are deposited into this account annually. Annual appropriations are made
from this account to cover administrative expenses.
r
2.6 Summary of Information Produced by Interviews and Publicity Review
1 This section presents a summary of interviews with persons listed in Appendix A, as
well as a review of recent and older publicity regarding Colorado SLB activities.
Interviewees were selected by the SLB, SLB staff, DNR, and members of the Steering
Committee. While these 60 people represent many perspectives and share in common some
! familiarity with the State Land Board, they do not necessarily represent the views of the
^ general public.
The information drawn from the interviews and presented here is organized around
^ selected trust land management issues. There are widely divergent views on most issues,
including the critical issues of the purposes for which trust lands should be managed and how
rm the value of trust land and fees for its use are established. A relatively broad consensus exists
' "'Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, at 10; Telephone Interview with, and Facsimile Transmission from Ruth
Kary, SLB Comptroller (Aug. II, 1995).
<"* '"Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, at 11.
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on only a few issues, such as: (1) the need for identification and protection of trust lands ""]
with unique values and appropriate compensation to the trust for any loss of income; (2) the
desirability of providing incentives to encourage good stewardship of trust lands by
agricultural lessees; and (3) the desirability of increasing the size of the SLB staff.
2.6.1 General Manner in Which the State Land Board Carries Out
Responsibilities "j
Several comments were directed to a need for improved communication and
interactions with beneficiaries, the legislature, user groups, and other interested parties. Some """;
state officials suggest the SLB should be building partnerships with other agencies.
Environmental groups and others encourage the Board to seek expertise and resources through
partnerships with public and private entities.
A number of interviewees suggest the SLB needs to do a better job of keeping the
legislature informed. Educational groups recommend that the SLB be an advocate for state
lands, and provide information on the implications of pending bills on state trust lands. '
Educational groups would welcome increased communication with the Board, and some
suggested scheduling annual or semi-annual meetings between the groups and the Board.
The interviews revealed a divergence of opinion on how the SLB should fulfill its
constitutional mandate. Educational groups urge that trust lands be managed for the sole
benefit of the state's public schools. One public official who was interviewed agrees. The
interviews revealed a significant difference of opinion on the purpose for which trust lands
should be managed. The two polar positions in the debate are: 1) trust lands should be ^
managed as open space, and 2) trust lands should be used to produce maximum income.
Some groups recommend that the SLB consider factors besides revenue generation in its ^
decisions, stressing that the SLB should be looking at the long-term revenue stream on lands
overall, and not maximum revenue on each parcel. Additionally, they say the SLB activities —,
should protect resources for long-term revenue productivity.
2.6.2 Disposal of Trust Lands Through Sale or Exchange
Issues regarding the disposal of trust lands include: how to value the land, what "^
m
exchanges are appropriate, if any, and the Board's practices in carrying out land exchanges.
Disposal of scattered trust lands is also a concern.
Many parties interviewed questioned the current approach to valuation of state lands.
The SLB always sets a value for trust property, and appraisals are required on sales over
$25,000. However, one interviewee felt that the appraisals are not always accurate. The SLB
policy of setting the sale price at 10 percent above appraised value was questioned. Some
people criticized the practice of mixing the appraisal process into the negotiation process,
which would ordinarily be segregated in private transactions. Some parties suggested the
Board should evaluate market prices prior to making a disposal decision so that sales are not
made while the market is low. A common opinion was that the SLB needs a uniform
procedure for evaluating lands for sale or exchange.
Another area of concern is exchanges with federal agencies. Under the in lieu
program, 7,000 acres remain to be selected. There were 20,000 acres remaining in the
1970's; one federal agency recognizes that considerable progress has been made on in lieu
selections. The SLB has a list of lands for selection.
Escrow exchanges are an area of SLB land transactions that received a lot of
comment A number of interviewees questioned the legality of these transactions. One public
official maintains there is no statutory authority for escrow exchanges. An experienced land
transaction group believes the SLB disguises sales as exchanges. Another public official
considers exchanges an inappropriate type of transaction. An SLB representative agrees,
\ indicating that escrow exchanges were adopted to circumvent statutory public auction
requirements. The representative also indicates that funds from the escrow exchange account
are also being used to make capital improvements. Others, including agricultural groups,
believe escrow exchanges are a good practice.
An SLB representative indicated that in almost every case an escrow exchange results
^ in the SLB owning less acres, while receiving land with a higher per acre value. For
I example, in April 1995 the SLB acquired a 30,000 square foot building, which will be turned
fn into a visitors center. This was part of a large escrow exchange where.the SLB exchanged
1,280 acres of lands that were surrounded by a private ranch, plus a controversial parcel near
r* Telluride, in order to purchase the building for $1.1 million. The SLB will spend an
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additional $750,000 remodeling the building. Clearly the exchange results in the SLB owning H
less acreage. Possible center lessees include Colorado State Parks, the U.S. Forest Service,
and the City of Fort Collins. Fort Collins officials are pleased with the center project, and "1
want the center to act as a gateway to the city and surrounding national parks and forests.
One interviewee suggested that shortening the escrow period would improve the ■
escrow exchange process. One group indicated they have no interest in exchanges that tie up
their property for two years.
Adoption of a land banking system was recommended by many as a more efficient and
better way to reposition the land base than the current escrow exchange program. Land
banking would allow for immediate release of the deed. One SLB representative would like
to have land banking as a tool to give the SLB flexibility in repositioning lands.
Approximately 30 percent of SLB lands are landlocked. One SLB staff member
suggests the SLB should compile an inventory of all lands that are landlocked and set up a
program of disposition by sale or exchange. Many other parcels are scattered and isolated. A
public official believes the SLB needs to block up land and figure out what kind of use is
ideal for each parcel. Environmental groups also support consolidating scattered holdings
because blocks of land can be managed more effectively and efficiently. One interviewee said <
the SLB should consider consolidating lands in specific areas, for example, in eastern ^
Colorado. Agricultural groups presented varying opinions on the issue of consolidation.
While one group believes the SLB should open up leases to more property owners rather than rm
consolidate holdings, another advocates consolidation. Taking a different stance, one
agricultural group suggests that the trust lands should be sold into private ownership. «*i
By law, the SLB may not sell the mineral estate. Federal agencies do not want to
buy a split estate, especially since they are interested in acquiring wilderness inholdings and "*i
do not want such land to be open to mineral development. One SLB representative believes
the SLB should not always sever the surface and mineral estates in sales. There should be a "^
complete analysis of the implications of severing the two estates.
The depletion of the permanent fund has a significant impact on land disposal '"1
activities. The SLB has proposed legislation requiring three to four percent of the interest
from the permanent fund to be reinvested. This might change the SLB attitude toward "^
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m outright sales that place proceeds in the permanent fund, which is being depleted because the
interest is being distributed. A large number of interviewees agreed that putting money into
*» the fund to keep up with inflation is a good idea. Educational groups, who are staunch
1 supporters of revenue maximization, agree that reinvesting interest is a good idea.
2.63 Leasing Activities
p The main issue arising out of leasing activities involves the balancing of revenue
maximization and long-term stewardship of the land. Sub-issues under revenue maximization
p include how to determine a fair market value for state trust leases, and how to structure an
i
appropriate bidding process.
r Agricultural groups indicate one of the main problems in setting fees for agricultural
and grazing leases is determining fair market value. They believe the current SLB
; Commissioners overemphasize revenue production and sacrifice long-term productivity. How
to determine fair market value is a recurrent issue; news articles since 1960 show that below
J market rate agricultural leases long have been a major concern, but ranchers have always
defended the lease rates as fair.
j Currently, lease prices are uniform throughout the state. The SLB uses one yield in
the state as the model on which to base all other leases in the state. One agricultural group
suggests that this pricing strategy results in some overpriced leases; the group indicates that
others are probably underpriced. The group suggested that the SLB evaluate the program to
i be sure lease prices are in line with the market, for the sake of both the beneficiaries and the
_ lessees.
! The agricultural group stated that the SLB does not take into account a farmer's full
p, expenses, such as weed control and drought protection. Pricing is based on the national
i commodity price when the local price may be lower. The agricultural groups believe there
fm, are hidden values which are not being taken into account in the desire to increase revenues.
1 They point out that the resident lessees are really managers, and that the SLB is not
f* recognizing this asset. These groups view the lessees themselves as an asset, not a burden.
The agricultural groups believe that absentee lessees would not be concerned with impacts of
r their operations on the community.
2-37
t-WA
Lessee groups commented that while SLB proposes to move closer to the market rate, "*»,
they provide no funds for asset enhancement. An agricultural group indicated that the SLB
has not provided any improvements: no water and no fencing. "^
The bidding process affects the amount of revenue generated from sales. In 1961, a
former legislator called for open bidding, and gave examples of higher bid offers being ""]
rejected by the State Land Board. These issues are still active. One news article stated that
even some farmers have taken issue with the SLB for not being required to take the highest )
bid. Farmers who make a higher bid, only to see the lease go to a lower bidder, criticized the
current procedures. The SLB may weigh other factors besides price, including the quality of
the stewardship of the land and continuing a positive relationship with an existing lessee.
But, the article indicates, the SLB generally takes the highest bid. The particular incident
complained of took place under an earlier Board. According to a number of interviewees,
lease policies have not been consistent For example, grazing lessees are not able to bid
against the Division of Wildlife for a recreation or wildlife lease.
Educational groups in general are concerned about the influence on the SLB of special >
interest groups, including recreationists, ranchers, and farmers. They see the cattle grower ^
interests as too dominant and the SLB as beholden to the agricultural community. An
agricultural group insists the scales get tipped too far toward recreation, and maintains that the _
economy of Colorado depends on a viable farming industry.
Educational groups suggested that lease procedures should be tightened up and _
enforced. They also believe compliance with lease provisions needs to be more aggressively
supervised. The SLB counters that the majority of lessees take good care of the land. This ^
view was shared by other interviewees.
Representatives of some lessee groups contend that as costs go up, farmers and ^
ranchers are forced to reduce good stewardship practices so they can break even. They
believe there is a fallacy in the argument of SLB Commissioners that grazing fees should be -*i
raised because some ranchers are offering to pay higher fees. The fallacy as they see it is:
someone who can bid higher may not be concerned with the long-term sustainability of the H
land. While the State, and not the lessee, controls the amount of grazing on state lands, these
representatives argue that competitive bidding encourages heavier grazing and in the long run "^
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will deplete grasses.
A public official states that legislators who want higher rates do not understand
agriculture; the return is not there to absorb the higher costs. An agricultural group suggests
the SLB should either get out of the agricultural business or make a conscious decision that
part of the agriculture program needs to be long-term stability of land's health. A public
official believes ranch land should be left as ranch land.
A wide range of interest groups, including public officials, environmental groups,
agricultural groups, and the SLB, all want to provide incentives for good stewardship. An
agricultural group says that good stewardship would be encouraged by coming up with a fair
figure. Some public officials want to preserve agriculture, and reward lessees for good
stewardship. The New Mexico grazing incentive plan was suggested as a model. An
agricultural group recommends that the SLB expand the current resource preservation and
enhancement study.
2.6.4 Commercial Development
Issues regarding the urban lands program include the increased risks and increased
responsibilities of commercial development Commercial development by the SLB has been
controversial. SLB staff noted that 95 percent of all their complaints come from the urban
lands program activities. A public official believes the SLB needs a process for including
lands in the program and clear criteria for how it operates. Standards are needed to indicate
the SLB policy on commercial development.
A number of interviewees questioned the SLB's qualifications to handle commercial
transactions. One SLB representative believes the SLB does not have the expertise or
experience to manage property. A possible solution to this problem, suggested by a state
agency, is a technical advisory board to help the SLB with urban lands and commercial
development A public official also proposed using professionals under contract.
Urban lands have the potential for generating increased revenue. As previously
discussed, the SLB has acquired an office building in downtown Fort Collins that will result
in a $200,000 increase in annual SLB income. Educational groups, however, question the
wisdom of SLB's commercial activities. They believe the SLB should not get into long-term
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commercial deals, but should stick with land, which is a slow and steady but solid investment. ■
Other groups would also like the SLB to get out of high-risk investments.
Joint ventures are viewed as risky investments by the majority of groups interviewed. \
One public official, who thinks that commercial activity is good for revenue, still believes the
SLB should not be involved in joint ventures. One educational group interviewee indicates
that ski areas should be managed on a long-term basis similar to U.S. Forest Service
management practices, not as joint ventures. The group also questioned what happens if a '
joint venture fails. A suggested alternative to joint ventures is to allow the developer to take
the risk, while paying the SLB a yearly fee plus a percentage of the revenue generated by the
development
The Seven Utes Resort controversy centered on several policy questions. Many were
concerned that the development would be in a relatively pristine area in the Colorado ^
mountains; others believed it might help the economic viability of a rural county with a
shrinking tax base. *»
In some instances, the SLB's continuing expansion of its commercial and development
activities can coincide with community well-being. A plan to change the former Wheat Ridge <*,
Regional Center, a home for the developmentally disabled, into a multiple use development
includes an annex to the Red Rocks Community College, a retail district, and office space for ~*i
governmental agencies. Roads and other infrastructure will be built The City of Arvada has
loaned the SLB $150,000 to conduct a development study. Most groups are enthusiastic "*?
about the plans; some local residents have concerns about traffic and noise.
2.6.5 Resource Extraction Activities
Resource extraction activities, including oil and gas, coal, timber, and sand and gravel "1
extractions, have resulted in less controversy than other SLB activities. One interviewee,
however, said that a surface owner reported that an oil and gas company drilled adjacent to a ^
building and never gave notice. The Oil and Gas Commission requires posting notice prior to
drilling. Another interviewee suggested the SLB should require surface damage payments for
oil and gas drilling on state lands similar to the practice on private lands. A common
question more generally is whether revenues generated and terms of agreements are
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comparable to those typical of private transactions.
^ 2.6.6 Multiple Use of Trust Lands
The SLB has attempted to respond to the demand for recreational opportunities on
rm trust lands. One response is the multiple use program (program). In general, most groups
favor the program, although some have concerns with how it is being implemented.
<w Educational groups have no problem with public use, so long as there is no decrease in
revenue generation. One representative acknowledged the importance of environmental and
<*■ recreational interests, but asserts that these interests should not interfere with the constitutional
mandate, which is to maximize revenues for school purposes, not provide low-cost'
r recreational opportunities.
The level and type of demand for access and recreation was questioned. Agricultural
^ groups feel the demand is not there for 500,000 acres, the number of acres to be selected for
the program by the Division of Wildlife (DOW). They indicate demand exists only for the
T "crown jewels" near Denver and prime elk hunting in the northwest A public official stated
that the recreational opportunities on state lands will be almost entirely limited to hunting,
I unless there are streams or lakes on the land. Environmental groups suggested the need to
look beyond the "hook and bullet" community in identifying multiple use lands.
The importance of economics in relation to state trust lands was stressed by a number
of interviewees. One person suggests the SLB should consider what impact its actions will
have on adjacent properties. Agricultural groups believe the SLB needs to remember that
agricultural users are important In their opinion the scale gets tipped too far toward
recreation while the economy of state depends on a viable fanning industry. In contrast, a
public official stated that the SLB should keep the lands for hunting; hunting and elk are
important to the state's economy. Some interviewees suggested that users should pay fair
^ market value for wildlife and recreation uses as well as for traditional uses.
' The question of how well the program is being operated by the SLB and DOW
p, received widely divergent responses from the groups interviewed. Agricultural groups
emphasized problems with the public, trash, and weeds. One group commented that they do
r not know any lessees who have access leases without significant problems. Some agricultural
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groups believe public access to state lands leased for agricultural purposes should be granted
only by the agricultural lessee. Other interviewees suggested access is not appropriate for
every location, and that the lessees need to be involved in multiple use decisions. Other
interviewees indicated DOW personnel are not qualified as land managers. An SLB
representative commented that the DOW field staff have not always worked well with SLB
grazing lessees. An SLB member believes the program has become very biased towards the
Division of Wildlife's interests.
Agricultural groups disagree with the policy prohibiting private landowners from
competing for DOW leases. These groups and some SLB representatives have identified
inequities in the multiple use program, as implemented. For example, under the program, the
DOW receives a ten year lease, but if land is not nominated for the MUP, the grazing lessee
or other member of the public may obtain only a three year lease to use the land for
recreational purposes. Another problem is the need for liability insurance for multiple uses on
private lands, but not on DOW lands, which eliminates a private lessee's ability to compete.
An SLB representative suggests that, under the program, the DOW receives for the MUP the
cream of the crop, the best lands. For example, the DOW has leased the riparian areas on the
Platte River.
2.6.7 Protection of Sensitive Trust Lands
Almost every group interviewed agrees the SLB should look at state trust lands and
separate out those lands that are special, and identify sensitive resource issues. The SLB
agrees. The natural areas program (NAP) of the Department of Natural Resources has been
cataloging rare plants on state lands, and the SLB is paying the NAP staff to do this.
Although some interviewees are deeply concerned that trust lands may be managed too
much for environmental protection or preservation purposes because such purposes are non
productive, a wide range of interest groups agree that some areas need to be protected. One
public official wants to see trust lands managed for the long-term and believes many areas
should be preserved, not developed. Another official is concerned that a lot of land is leaving
the caretakership of the SLB. Environmental groups stated that there is a need for
mechanisms to provide specific lands with permanent protection against sale or exchange with
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p compensation to the trust for the value of those lands. One resource use group interviewee
believes the SLB needs to come up with tools for taking certain lands out of production.
*"* Most other groups also agree that the trust should be compensated for any special
lands that are removed from normal SLB leases, sales, or exchanges. An environmental
P group suggests using non-bid, fair market value disposition of state trust lands to cities or
qualified conservation organizations. Examples of how to protect sensitive trust lands without
T loss of income are two SLB leases with The Nature Conservancy. On one parcel, the SLB
has entered into an agreement allowing the Conservancy to study grasses. On the other
parcel, the Conservancy has a non-development lease from the SLB, which holds the mineral
rights. Both conservation leases are for 99 years, and are close to market value.
| A public official stated that Colorado has finite resources, and recommended that when
developing a management plan, the SLB should recognize the importance of sustaining
i resources, and allow a broader range of investments, including undeveloped land. Another
person suggested that the SLB could do exchanges with the federal government so that the
! federal agency would own the sensitive properties. A group with experience in land
transactions proposed letting the SLB use land banking to facilitate transfers of sensitive lands
by exchange to the counties.
A proposed complex exchange between the Crested Butte Mountain Resort, the SLB,
! _ and the U.S. Forest Service should result in protecting sensitive lands. The U.S. Forest
*, Service is hoping to acquire a wilderness inholding, among other parcels. However, the
exchange is in the early stages, and the SLB has yet to identify the lands they would like to
pm acquire.
A state agency suggested the SLB should reposition their land base in order to provide
p open space areas for Colorado towns and cities. A public official proposed that local
governments should have a right of first refusal for open space leases in their jurisdictions.
f" There is general agreement, however, that the SLB may not simply give away open space. A
public official stated that if the land is to stay as open space, then the community, DNR, or
P someone else should pay the full potential value. Educational groups strongly believe that
price should not be minimized for open space purchases.
r A public official suggests that the SLB work with Great Outdoors Colorado (GOCO)
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to identify opportunities to use GOCO funds for purchasing development rights. Such an H
approach could be used to keep land in agricultural production. Another suggestion is to
develop a list of ranchers and fanners desiring to sell, but willing to preserve the land if T
compensated. There are sources of funding for compensating the trust for open space.
Jefferson, Boulder, Douglas, Pitkin, and Summit Counties all have earmarked tax revenues for i
the purchase of open space.
An example of the public pressure to preserve trust lands as open space is the
controversy surrounding the proposed exchange of a section near Manitou Springs, which had
been used by the county parks department for over 20 years. The SLB wanted to exchange
this parcel for another near Table Mountain, in order to block up state holdings in the Table
Mountain area. In a news article, a city council member suggests that, in addressing this ■
situation, the SLB needs to consider other factors besides making money. As a result of
public concern over the proposed exchange, the SLB has leased the section to the county as
park land for five years at $5 per acre for recreational uses, which is considerably below
market level lease rates for some other uses such as commercial use. The lease is designed to \
give the county time to purchase the section.
i
2.6.8 Management Structure and Staffing ^
There is a broad and strong consensus that the State Land Board is not adequately
staffed to perform all its functions. The SLB has repeatedly requested new FTEs, but those **,
requests have been denied. For example, of three positions proposed for the urban lands
program, two have not been funded. An SLB staff member indicates that with the current ^
staff limits, most urban lands proposals are initiated from outside the SLB. SLB
representatives expressed frustration at the lack of staffing for the program, and one person "^
suggested either dropping the program, or giving the SLB the staff to do it well. A public
official said that the legislature has not adequately funded the SLB to be good managers, and ~*)
suggested that an ideal level of management lies somewhere between the SLB wish list and
no new FTEs. "]
Staffing concerns also affect the Multiple Use Program. According to an SLB staff
member, multiple use leases are not supposed to be under the surface leasing program area. "^
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m, Rather, such leases are supposed to be in a stand-alone program. Because the FTE requested
for the program was denied, multiple uses are handled by the surface leasing unit. The SLB
*» recognizes that it does not have adequate staff to handle the increased workload due to the
increased acreage under multiple use leases.
F« Even the SLB's oldest program, the agricultural leasing program, is viewed as
understaffed. Agricultural leases involve the largest acreage. Each of five district managers
** must cover a large portion of the state. An agricultural user group commented that SLB staff
no longer visit the leased properties; the renewal check is done by phone because district
^ managers have too many administrative duties. An SLB staff member corroborates this
concern, saying the district managers used to do more field work, but now must concentrate
I on office work, generally paperwork. SLB staff estimate the district managers travel to no
more than one out of each ten leases that are up for renewal. They indicate district managers
are spending an increasing proportion of their time working in the Denver office.
An agricultural group suggested there should be more SLB staff in the field, to take
' into account local conditions. A number of SLB staff recognize the need to get more people
into the field to administer the SLB lands and deal with specialized problems. By contrast,
' one agricultural group feels that the SLB really does not need staff to oversee uses of trust
land and would like to see the money go into the land instead of personnel. The group
believes lessees already perform the stewardship role.
^ Many different opinions and options were presented on how and whether to restructure
■ the SLB Board. The majority of suggestions came from SLB representatives. Some
^ suggested the Board should not be full-time. One person suggested it would be good to have
a part-time citizen board, but another suggested that a part-time Board typically only rubber
p stamps staff recommendations. One person felt that a full-time Board may be more likely to
micro-manage. Others proposed more drastic changes, suggesting a restructuring of the
(m Commissioners' roles. Under one view, the three person commission is archaic and should be
replaced by one full-time director and a five person advisory panel or investment committee,
f including an investment banker. New Mexico has such a board. Another person
recommends considering a Board headed by an elected official with a 4-year term so the SLB
<*** can get closer to the populace and be more accountable.
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An agricultural group suggested that with the large impact that agriculture has in the "*'
state, another agricultural representative should be on the board. According to an SLB staff
member, the prescribed qualifications of the Commissioners do not match some of the issues *"*
confronting the Board today, particularly in the area of urban lands program.
The Board's position in the state government structure was also questioned. Both the
SLB and educational groups asked why the legislative oversight committee is the agricultural
committee. Many groups interviewed also questioned the SLB's placement under the i
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). One interviewee said, "Get the Land Board out of
the DNR." Areas of conflict with the DNR that were mentioned included: budget, denied
Fits, different goals and missions, and shared staff with conflicts of interest. An educational
group asked whether the SLB and DNR really have an independent relationship, and whether,
under the current structure, the SLB is able to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities. Educational
groups suggested that the missions of the two organizations are different, and the location of
the SLB in the DNR results in an inappropriate emphasis by the Board on environmental m
protection. An educational group suggested putting the SLB under the Department of ]
Education, or making it a separate agency. ^
Another critical issue addressed by interviewees is whether the Board is managing at
an appropriate level and in an appropriate manner. Some of those interviewed believe the -^
SLB Commissioners need to focus on a long-term vision. An SLB representative says the
Board currently functions as both a policy setter and as a hands on overseer of operational ^
issues. The SLB representative sees this dual role as appropriate. An agricultural group says
the Board is getting more and more into the detail of the Board's activities; this means they ^
are not dedicating sufficient time developing policy. The same group likes the fact that the
Board members are accessible to the lessees. 1
One SLB representative believes the Board should make policy and not micro-manage.
According to one public official, policymakers should not be getting into the details, but they """
do need to be informed. It is crucial to have a highly qualified staff who will provide the
Board with informed recommendations. According to one resource group, the SLB needs ^
additional expertise to deal with land use planning, in the context of growth issues. For
example, the Board approves staff-recommended lease renewals and small acreage sales in
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batches. However, in other areas, such as waiver decisions, the Board gets tied up in details.
If the Board were to establish clear criteria for waiver decisions, waiver requests could be
handled by senior staff. The lack of standard procedures and the large number of exceptions
granted make it difficult for the staff to handle these details for the Board.
One interviewee indicates the SLB is also inconsistent when dealing with prospective
buyers, and may change a deal multiple times. An agricultural user group maintains there is
not a clear understanding regarding whom they should deal with on a given issue. Sometimes
after they believe they have an agreement, the SLB changes its mind. For example, the
Archdiocese wanted to purchase SLB land for a school and day care center. The SLB
changed its mind a number of times as to the acreage that would need to be purchased, and
the tentative purchase prices varied from $300,000 to over $900,000. The Archdiocese was
flexible and willing to buy the number of acres specified by the SLB at the appraised value.
2.6.9 Policy and Planning
*" The SLB needs a big vision according to one interviewee. An SLB representative
indicates the SLB's five-year plan provides some long-term guidance for decisions. The plan,
P however, has not been formally adopted by the Board and it does not identify long-term goals
in terms of desired future conditions. Also, the five-year plan contains only broad guidelines.
■"" One interviewee believes the SLB should develop a long-range comprehensive plan for trust
lands.
| The large majority of interviewees agreed that the SLB needs to make a good
inventory of its assets. An environmental group suggests that the inventory include a ranking
I of wildlife values of trust lands. One public official wants the SLB to bite the bullet and
expend the dollars to undertake the inventory. Another official recommends a comprehensive
I inventory of assets, performed by a consultant, not by SLB staff. One state agency
recommends looking beyond wildlife values, especially game species. One environmental
I group supporting an inventory believes that only after the Board fully understands its
^ resources can it truly act in the best interest of the citizens of the state. An SLB
representative recommends a good, multi-layered inventory of assets, followed by
^ identification of priorities, including areas important to cities and counties.
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An environmental group suggests SLB planning efforts should address how specific
parcels fit in with regional plans for managing growth, including the availability of open
space, wildlife habitat, and recreational opportunities. It sees a critical need to link the
management of state lands to the Governor's "Smart Growth" initiative. Others also
recommend a greater emphasis on planning. A resource group suggests that any plans
developed by the SLB should be based on broad criteria to maintain SLB decisionmaking
flexibility. The group likes the current SLB management style, saying that right now the SLB
can be creative in trying to make individual deals work; the interviewee felt that all you get
with public planning is plans.
2.6.10 Public Communication and Involvement
According to several people interviewed, the purposes for which trust lands were
established are not well understood. An educational group believes that people are generally
unaware of the existence of trust lands and that the agricultural community prefers this
situation. Educational groups believe the SLB is too isolated and is susceptible to special
interest pressure.
Interviewees have a variety of suggestions on how the SLB might improve its
relationships with the public and other state agencies. One resource group suggests the need
for consistent guidelines on the role of the public in decision making and other rules of the
game. A public official advocates more effective coordination with other state agencies.
According to one agricultural group, the SLB needs to work more closely with its partners,
the lessees, on proposed changes in payment terms. One interviewee states that the public
should include those adjacent to where activities are proposed and those in urban areas
concerned with generating income for schools. Other suggestions include improved
communication, fair treatment of individuals, and better use of public input in
decisionmaking.
Some improvements in SLB communication efforts were mentioned by interviewees.
SLB has begun to hold public meetings across the state. The Board went through public
process training in the spring of 199S and then adopted a statewide policy which is being
publicly discussed.
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Some interviewees believe that requiring all decisions to be made in public is not
r realistic. Others criticize the Board for the fact that in many cases it appears a decision has
already been made by the staff and commissioners before the public meetings are held.
A public official says the big problem is communication between the Board and the
public and between the Board and other public officials. The SLB and the legislature are
1 trying to accomplish the same things; they should establish a more collaborative working
relationship. Public officials criticize the SLB for not adequately involving local governments
1 in SLB decisions. Various interviewees suggested the need for a higher level education effort
by the SLB for the public and especially for the legislature and educational groups.
i •
2.7 New State Land Board Initiatives
In the past decade the SLB has made significant strides in improving trust land
^ management—both in terms of procedures and substantive policy. These accomplishments
include the new multiple use policy, the opening up of trust lands for public wildlife and
«r recreation use, the review of trust lands to identify uneconomic parcels and block up scattered
holdings, the establishment of a process to bring agricultural and other lease fees closer to
p market levels, a process for re-evaluation of the classification of trust land parcels, and
i
initiatives to improve communications with the public and other governmental entities and to
P restore public confidence in the Board and its procedures. All of these achievements address
long-held concerns with traditional trust land management.147
p The land classification issue merits further discussion. The SLB periodically
reevaluates the land classification for a parcel of trust land to determine if the existing
f1 classification should be changed. This occurs most commonly with lands traditionally
managed for agriculture and mineral leasing located in areas experiencing growth and
f' development. It may also occur where local government zoning or land use plans are
undergoing revision. Certain types of proposals to the SLB, including requests for a right-of-
; way or an interest in the purchase of trust lands, may also trigger reevaluation. The





To address these concerns and improve public understanding of and participation in the
reclassification process, in July 1995 the Board introduced a proposed formal process for
reevaluation of trust land. The new process is intended to provide local governments, state
and federal agencies, and others with adequate notice of possible Board action and a clear
understanding of the Board's decisionmaking criteria and process. Notice of a proposed
reclassification of a trust land parcel will be provided to local governments, known \
stakeholders, and other interested members of the public. Following the notice, the SLB staff
will monitor and assess public concerns regarding the proposal. If public concerns are
deemed to be significant, added procedures, called the special project procedures, are
triggered. These procedures require the SLB to develop a public information plan, collect !
information on the issues and areas of public concern, identify of all stakeholders affected by ^
the land classification, and assess the positive and negative impacts of the proposed land
classification. Notice is required again of the results of the assessment and of the Board *»
meeting at which the assessment of the proposed reclassification will be considered.148
In addition to the proposed public process, the SLB has developed a set of principles ^
directed toward restoring public confidence in the Board and its process. These include
participation in local planning efforts, working with local governments in planning for growth, -^
and working with entities interested in particular trust lands. The Board will make public the
market values of parcels under consideration for disposition or development and, as needed, ""!
delay development or disposition decisions to allow affected communities the opportunity to
prepare proposals for the lands at issue.149 A development related to these principles is the *m->
articulation of attitude and practice guidelines for all SLB Commissioners and staff: (1) treat
everyone with dignity and respect; (2) be honest and fair; and (3) treat every letter discussion **[
and call as important, returning calls in a timely fashion and answering letters requesting a
'"Agenda from SLB Meeting of July 12, 1995. ;





should alleviate many of the concerns of the public and other governmental agencies.
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3.0 Review of State Trust Land Laws
3.1 Review of the Law Governing Trust Lands
This review focuses on the principles governing school trust lands. An understanding
of basic trust principles is essential to understanding the legal framework guiding the
management and use of the lands.
Courts have defined the relationship created by the Enabling Act and associated state
constitutional and statutory provisions as being in the nature of a trust The terms of the trust
are defined by the trust instruments which in Colorado include the Enabling Act and the
Constitution.1 A trustee must abide by the legal directives in the documents establishing the
trust and by common law trust principles. As long as the trustee is adhering to the'trust
directives, common law trust principles allow the trustee to exercise considerable discretion.
The section begins with a brief discussion of basic trust law and how it applies to the SLB.
3.1.1 The Trust
A trust is a relationship in which one person, called the trustee, holds title to property
which it must keep or use for the benefit of another, called the beneficiary. The relationship
between the trustee and the beneficiary is called a fiduciary relationship, and requires the
trustee to act with strict honesty and candor and solely in the best interests of the beneficiary.
The party creating the trust is called the settlor or the trustor.
A trust instrument usually sets forth the terms under which the assets are to be
managed. It expresses the intent of the settlor and sets out the rights and the duties of the
trustee.2 With regard to Colorado trust lands, the trust instrument may be viewed as all
documents creating trust obligations. Obligations regarding Colorado trust lands are found not
in one document but rather in several, including at least the Enabling Act, the State
'Sally K. Fairfax , John A. Souder, and Gretta Goldenman, "The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at
Conventional Wisdom," 22 Envt'l L. 797 (1992), at 854-55, and sources cited therein [hereinafter Fairfax ct al.].
2A leading treatise providing a good summary of trust law is George T. Bogert, Trusts. Sixth Edition. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1987 [hereinafter Bogert].
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Constitution,3 and various statutory provisions. Of course, if the statutes conflict with the ^
Constitution, the latter prevails.
The nature of the trust created through these instruments is not identical to a private ™]
i
trust. First, many private trusts are administered for a limited term which implies a shorter-
term view of trust returns. Most significantly, state trust assets as a whole are to be managed H
in perpetuity. Second, state trust assets are tracts of land rather than the liquid assets that
characterize many private trusts. Finally, state land managers administering the trust lands are "^
public administrators who are typically granted a broader range of discretion than private
trustees.4 ""j
Although the source, purpose, and management structure of private trusts are quite
different from those of state trust lands, the general principles of private trusts provide helpful ^
analogies for administration of trust lands. Given the differences, it is also important to
recognize the limitations of the analogies.
3.1.2 The Trust Property . [
As described in Section 1, Colorado was officially invited to become a state in the
1876 Enabling Act The invitation promised a grant of sections 16 and 36 of every township >
within each state "for the support of common schools" and additional grants of land for
capital buildings, a university, a penitentiary, agricultural colleges, a scientific school, normal ;
schools, and charitable, educational, penal, and reformatory institutions. The Enabling Act
placed conditions on the several grants. Common school lands, for example, could not be
disposed of except at public sale and for a minimum price of $2.50 per acre. Proceeds are ^
required to go into a permanent school fund, the interest from which was to be used to :
support the schools. ™
'See Fairfax et al., at 853.
'See, e.g., Jeppeson v. State Dept. of Lands, 667 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1983).
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However, Congress did not, either in Colorado's Enabling Act or in any other
Enabling Act prior to 1912, describe its action as establishing a trust.5 The original
expectation was that the states would sell these lands into private ownership and use the
proceeds for the benefit of the described uses. Except for describing the purposes for which
the benefits of the granted lands were to be used and a few other conditions, the federal
grants give considerable discretion to the states as to how they fulfill the understanding
between the federal government and the new state.
The Colorado Constitution requires "the several grants of land made by [CJongress to
the state ... [to] be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust subject to
disposal, for the use and benefit of the respective objects for which said grants of land were
made," adding that the grant lands are to be protected, sold or otherwise disposed of "in such
manner as will secure the maximum possible amount therefor." The Constitution also directs
the legislature to "provide for the sale of said lands from time to time" and to apply the
proceeds in accordance with the terms of the federal grant6
Thus, the newly created State of Colorado received a package of land grants from the
United States. The grants were restricted or conditioned in somewhat different ways. Each
of the grants of land was for a specified purpose, e.g., support of common schools, erecting
public buildings at the state capitol, erecting a penitentiary or state prison, and the use and
support of a state university. Disposal of the common school lands was conditioned by a
minimum price; mineral lands were excepted from all grants.7 Beyond these requirements
the Enabling Act and Constitution provide few specific directives or limitations, leaving
considerable discretion to the state officials who are charged with carrying out the terms of
the federal grant: the legislature, the State Land Board, and other executive branch officials
with related responsibilities.
5In the 1912 legislation authorizing statehood status for New Mexico and Arizona the grant of school lands is
described as a trust. See Fairfax et al, at 851.
'Colo. Const, art. IX, § 10.




A trustee is a person who holds title for the benefit of another. In Colorado's
Enabling Act, the lands are granted "to said state," and thus the state is the trustee.8 The ™
duties of the trustee are shared by the SLB, the legislature, and the executive branch
according to the terms of the instrument which are found in the Enabling Act, the Colorado «*
Constitution, and the statutes. The Constitution created the State Board of Land
Commissioners and gives the Board the power and the obligation to carry out the trust ^
purposes by managing the granted lands.9 It also directs the SLB to manage lands "under
such regulations as may be prescribed by law."10 Some trust duties are spelled out in the "n
Constitution but the legislature has the authority and discretion (and perhaps the obligation) to
act on behalf of the state in establishing the terms and conditions of the trust land ^
i
management It is possible to view both the SLB commissioners and the legislature as the
administrators of the trust, with the state being the trustee. In an early decision, the Colorado ""'
Supreme Court stated that the state was the trustee; more recent rulings have held that the
Board administers the trust subject to regulations promulgated by the legislature." The 1
legislature's role as trustee ceases at the point the Constitution delegates power to the SLB.
Therefore, the legislature may regulate but not prohibit the exercise of the SLB's power of "1
disposition of state lands.12
3.1.4 The Trust Beneficiaries
The federal land grants expressly identify the purposes of the grants. The purpose of \
the school trust land grants is to support the "common schools." Educational institutions are
"U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 18, § 7.
'Colo. Const, art. IX, §§ 9, 10.
l0Colo. Const, art. IX, § 10.
"See Colorado Farm and Livestock Co. v. Beerbohm, 43 Colo. 464, 96 P. 443, 446-47 (1908); Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Company v. State, 149 Colo. 159, 368 P.2d 563, 566 (1962); Evans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426,
547 P.2d 931, 934(1976).
"In re Leasing of State Lands, 32 P. 986, 988 (Colo. 1983).
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,*„ sometimes considered beneficiaries, yet these institutions did not exist at the time of
' statehood. Thus, it is difficult to specify a particular beneficiary in common law trust terms.
t» It may be more accurate to call the citizens of the state the beneficiaries whose interest in
i
public education may be represented by institutions that carry out the purposes for which the
p> trust is to be managed.
Since the federal lands were granted for named purposes, revenues generated from
f1 their use and disposition are limited to serving the interest of the beneficiaries in achieving
trust purposes. Consistent with this dominant requirement, however, and with the
f constitutional command that lands be protected and be sold or disposed of in a manner that
secures the maximum possible amount of revenue, the trustee has a range of discretion in
P deciding what uses can be made of the lands. The state public schools now receive income
from the common school lands. Monies generated from the management of other trust lands
f are directed to funds for state universities (Colorado State University and the University of
Colorado) and state prisons through the Department of Corrections.13
fin?
j In addition to identifying to whom the revenues should go, the definition of
beneficiaries is significant because beneficiaries stand in a special position with respect to
j enforcing the manner in which the trust is administered. In a recent Idaho case, the court
held that two environmental groups lacked standing as beneficiaries of the trusts because they
did not represent the interests of public schools or school districts.14 The groups had
attempted to argue that, as an association formed for other purposes but incidentally including
' school children and others, they had standing to bring the suit. For an organization to have
^ standing to sue, individual members of the organization must allege harm, and the interests
I the organization seeks to protect must be germane to the organization's purpose. In this case,
the organizations did not include education in their purposes and alleged their interest to be
such general purposes as promoting sustainable economies and protection of biological
<*, resources. The court noted that the beneficiaries are the schools, not individual school
"C.R.S. § 36-1-116(2).
uSelkirk-Priest Basin Association, Inc. v. State of Idaho, 1995 WL 314893 (Idaho) (Idaho Constitution
intends that the institutional beneficiaries of the school trust lands are the public schools or school districts)
f [hereinafter Selkirk-Priest Basin Association].
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children. In his dissent, Justice Johnson argued that the institutions were "purely a matter of ^
administrative convenience" in carrying out trust duties, and therefore it is the students, not i
the school district, who are the beneficiaries.15 The Arizona Supreme Court similarly found _
that "the interest of the school children beneficiaries are represented by the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction."16 While educational organizations (rather than the «
school children or general citizens) are often referred to as the beneficiaries, the issue as
discussed by very few courts is far from resolved. «t
3.1.5 General Duties and Discretion of the Trustee •*?
First and foremost, the trustee must comply with the terms and conditions of the legal
instruments creating the trust In the case of Colorado trust lands, those instruments include H
the Enabling Act, the State Constitution, and state statutes. Thus, in making decisions
regarding federally granted lands, the State Land Board and the legislature are acting on ""*
behalf of the trustee, the State of Colorado, and are bound by the terms of the 1876 Enabling
Act and the State Constitution. Additionally, the SLB must follow the dictates of the "1
statutory framework established by the legislature in accordance with the constitutional
provision directing the SLB to carry out its duties "under such regulation as may be \
prescribed by law."
Beyond the legal obligation to comply with the particular terms of the trust
instruments and to act within the bounds of its statutory direction, there is the more general
body of common law governing the administration of trusts. There are a number of duties 1
which a trustee is required to perform. These include the duties to diversify investments, to
delegate, to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution, and to minimize administrative costs .
as well as other duties not relevant here.17
"Selkirk-Priest Basin Association, at 7.
"See e.g., Seven Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources, 753 P.2d 161, 165 (Ariz.
1987).
"One comprehensive effort to put together a statement of this body of law is found in the RESTATEMENT
(Third) of Trusts (1992).
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The Bogert treatise on trusts describes the general duty of a trustee as a duty to use
"ordinary skill and prudence."18 This duty is further explained as follows:
In the management of the trust the trustee is bound to display the skill and
prudence which an ordinarily capable and careful man would use in the conduct
of his own business of a like character and with objectives similar to those of
the trust"
Private trustees are obligated to exercise "common skill, common prudence, and common
caution." A trustee, acting in accord with this general standard, is not held responsible "for
errors of judgment."
The Colorado Constitution imposes on the state as trustee the duty to ensure that the
disposal of, or production from, trust lands returns the best possible price. The Constitution
requires the SLB to protect, sell, or otherwise dispose of trust lands "in such manner as will
secure the maximum possible amount therefor."20 This essentially states the duty required of
; an ordinary trustee in disposing of a trust property.21 This duty is usually satisfied by
requiring that all transactions occur in an open, competitive manner so that the market sets the
price. When trust assets are used or sold they must return at least fair market value and the
trustee must accept the highest bid "in the absence of cogent reasons for not so doing."22
' The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the state's fiduciary responsibility toward trust
beneficiaries in Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Department.23 In that case, the
! Supreme Court held that the State of Arizona could not transfer easements for highway
construction across state trust lands without compensation.24 Since then, a considerable
I
P IIBogert, at 334.
"Bogert, at 334.
FTTH
"Colo. Const art IX, § 10.
m "State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 47 N.W.2d 520, S23 (Neb. 1951) [hereinafter
i State ex rel. Ebke].
"State ex rel. Ebke, at 523.
"385 U.S. 458 (1967) [hereinafter Lassen].
/■• MLassen, at 466.
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number of decisions have been similarly protective of the interests of the trust beneflciaries in ""i
the face of state actions intended to use trust assets to benefit others without compensation.25 !
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court struck down legislation allowing purchasers "*!
of timber sales contracts from state lands either to default on the contracts or to obtain
contract modifications to make compliance easier.26 The Court distinguished the general ™
authority of the legislature to act in the state interest and its authority to act with respect to
trust lands. In the words of the Court: "^
Where the statute deals with state trust lands, however, the permissible goals of
the legislation are more limited. The federal land grant trusts were created •*">
specifically to benefit certain named beneficiaries.... Every court that has .
considered the issue has concluded that these are real, enforceable trusts that
impose upon the state the same fiduciary duties applicable to private ^
trustees.27 i
Specifically, the Court identified two duties: the duty of undivided loyalty and the duty "]
to act prudently. The first duty means that the state must act with undivided loyalty to the
trust beneficiaries, to the exclusion of all other interests.28 In the context of the case before ™]
the Court, the duty requires the state to obtain full value for trust assets that are transferred
and it prohibits the state from actions respecting the trust assets that provide benefits to others 1
(here the timber purchasers) at the expense of the trust beneficiaries, no matter how laudable
the reasons for providing other benefits may be. The duty to act prudently and to manage
trust assets prudently means using reasonable diligence in pursuing contract claims, according
to the Court Releasing contract claims unilaterally, without clear benefit for the trust \
"See e.g., Oklahoma Education Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982) (state may not use school land
trust assets to subsidize fanning and ranching) [hereinafter Oklahoma Education Assoc.]; and County of
Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984) (striking legislation allowing purchasers of timber sales contracts
from state lands either to default on the contract or to obtain contract modification to make compliance easier)
[hereinafter County of Skamania].
^County of Skamania, at 576.
"County of Skamania, at 579-80 (citations omitted).
"County of Skamania, at 580-81.
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beneficiaries, is not prudent, in the view of the Court, and again runs afoul of the
! constitutional duty to seek full market value of the interest being sold.29
Under general trust principles, the trustee has the duty to make the trust productive,
! traditionally meaning to generate income. So long as the trustee is acting prudently, however,
the level or amount of that income cannot legally be required to be more than what common
skill can produce consistent with the terms, restrictions, nature, and intent of the trust.
pr, Some state courts have read the trust provisions for school lands to prohibit certain
i
1 legislative actions that seek to subsidize state-favored activity to the detriment of producing
p revenue for trust purposes. When the Oklahoma Legislature set below-market rents and
created uneconomical re-leasing rights for the benefit of farmers and ranchers leasing state
p school lands, it was held to violate the state constitution. Analogizing to the Lassen case, the
court in Oklahoma Education Association. Inc. held:
f* Just as a State may not use school land trust funds to subsidize its highway
construction program, a State may not use school land trust assets to subsidize
farming and ranching. The use of trust fund assets for [this] purpose ...
H interfere^] with the duty of the State as Trustee to maximize the return to the
1 trust estate.30
T The court recognized the ranchers' argument that "considerations of conservation and
waste" were* part of the Legislature's rationale for preferring farmers and ranchers. It
concluded, however, that "[w]hile it is true that reasonable precaution should be taken for the
protection of the property within the trust, this does not mean the question of income becomes
] an unimportant factor."51
The courts generally have dealt with situations in which the trustee has allegedly
exceeded the scope of its discretion. Most activities undertaken by the trustees of school
lands are well within their discretion. Concerns that have arisen have focused on management
practices rather than with disposition of trust lands. Therefore, Constitutional and statutory
"County of Skamania, at S82-83.
"Oklahoma Education Assoc, at 236 (citations omitted).
"Oklahoma Education Assoc., at 237-38.
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guidelines on trust land disposition will be helpful in understanding the scope of a state land
manager's discretion. !
The constitutional directive to "provide for the location, protection, sale or other r*,
disposition" of trust lands relates primarily to the original expectation that lands would be :
sold. But it also shows concern for protection of lands while they remain in the corpus of the «h
trust and so the constitution makes that a function of the Board. Thus, protection of
extraordinarily scenic property through non-development may be justified by a determination ^
that its highest long-term value, perhaps as a future park to be purchased by the state or
federal government, is tied to its beauty. In addition to economic returns to the beneficiaries, "^
the Board may consider non-monetary concerns associated with the land, as more frilly
discussed in the following paragraphs of this report.32 Deciding to hold lands in anticipation "]
of the growing demand for recreational and open space resources seems particularly wise and
appears consistent with prudent management, as annual purchases and funding (e.g., from "%
cities, counties, state agencies, and GOCO) are increasing.
The perception that land is more attractive and valuable overall if some resources are "1
preserved, even at the expense of possible short-term economic benefits, is also defensible.
Like the SLB, many private landowners have decided to allow portions of their lands to be "1
designated as natural areas and agree to manage them accordingly.33 They protect unique
geologic features, endangered species, and plant communities, sometimes resulting in less
immediate income, but presumably preserving special value in the property. This is analogous
to private property owners seeking historic designations that limit their uses and development !
potential but protect and enhance overall value.
There are a number of other circumstances where non-use or protection is supported i
by reasonable business judgment. Thus, the courts have upheld non-renewal of a lease of
"See National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 38-39,
869 P.2d 909, 921 (1993), where the court suggests that a state land manager should consider non-economic
values associated with trust lands. However, the court also suggests that where protection of non-economic
values in incompatible with economic exploitation of the land, it may be appropriate to exchange the parcel for
other lands.
"Designations are carried out under the Colorado Natural Areas Act, C.R.S. § 33-33-101 to -113.
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m state trust land as in the best long-term interest of the trust.34 The SLB therefore may decide
not to develop resources in the short-term because delaying development would produce
f greater benefits to the trust. This is non-development for sound business reasons. And
reasons that may be sound for the SLB because of its perpetual existence may be less
P7 compelling to developers or landowners with shorter-term goals and objectives. Thus, the
SLB, by the nature of its trust purposes, may be less inclined than other owners to develop its
r lands and resources, including minerals.
Withholding land from full development may also occur in response to environmental
F"9 laws or local land use planning, or more generally in response to public pressure to preserve a
specific area. The SLB may wisely cooperate with local, state, tribal, or federal requests
r concerning the timing or extent of development, even where the requested action is not
demanded by state environmental or land use laws.33 The judgment to comply voluntarily
with such requests may be justified by the necessity to have the cooperation of these agencies
in other matters over the long term. It is a judgment that a private owner might make under
similar circumstances.
Furthermore, the SLB may be sensitive to widespread public concern about
development and allow it to influence a decision not to develop. Indeed, the Seven Utes ski
area proposal was rejected by the SLB after a vociferous opposition from broad segments of
the public. This approach does not necessarily mean that political concerns will be allowed to
eclipse business judgment. Strong public reaction to a proposal can indicate that it will be a
i
manifestly unwise, expensive, and ill-fated venture. Heeding public opposition can be
^ justified as a business matter either because the opposition contains substance that casts doubt
on the merits of a proposal or because the opposition appears to be a formidable barrier in
m itself.
MHavasu Heights Ranch Development Corporation v. Desert Valley Wood Products, Inc., 807 P.2d 1119
p, (Ariz. App. 1990).
"SLB must comply with such laws when applicable, even if it causes losses to the trust. See, e.g., Colorado
State Board of Land Commissioners v. Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board, 809 P.2d 974 (Colo. 1991);
Souder and Fairfax, at 8-52.
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More difficult questions arise when the SLB withholds lands from use purely to ^
protect them, without any business reason for doing so. An SLB decision to preserve lands or ;
to allow public use may be motivated by public opinion or by the SLB view of the public ™
welfare. We are of the opinion that, unless the decision can be justified under one of the
business or trust purposes discussed above, it is not proper for the SLB to withhold lands ~i
from use.
3.1.6 Duties Regarding Diversification and Risk
Under the common law of trusts, diversification is a duty, not merely an option. A "i
trustee has a duty to diversify the investments unless it is prudent not to do so.36 /
Diversification in different and unrelated markets safeguards the capital by protecting against m
a downturn in a single area. The duty to diversify ordinarily applies even within a portion of
a trust portfolio that is limited to assets of a particular type or having special characteristics as ""'•
is the case with state trust lands. Diversification is related to the duty to exercise reasonable
caution which, in turn, requires a balancing of the safety of the asset versus a reasonable "1
return on investments.37
Risk management is also closely tied to the issues of diversification and the duty of
caution. There are two kinds of risk, non-market and market Non-market risk can be
reduced through diversification of the investments within a portfolio. Risk is spread out, and
thus reduced. The investments should represent different industries and have other differences
in their qualities so that the ways and degrees in which they respond to economic events tend ,
to cancel or neutralize one another.
Trustees have a duty to minimize non-market risks. Market risk is a non-diversifiable
risk. It is related to the appropriate degree of risk to be undertaken in pursuit of a higher or
lower level of expected return from the trust portfolio — the safety of capital versus the rate
of return.38 A trustee's duties with respect to market risk are not clear. Market risk in
"Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).
"Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).
"restatement (third) of trusts, § 227 (1992). <^
i
3-12
effect returns to the issue of caution, as it relates to the risk level of the investment. Finally,
! any particular characteristics of an investment that affect its risk and effective return, such as
m exposure to tort liability, should be considered by the trustee.39
! There is no objective legal standard for the degree of risk that is or is not prudent. No
percentages of high to low risk investments are given by the Restatement; each trust must be
i managed individually. Further, "[bjeneficiaries can be disserved by undue conservatism as
™ well as by excessive risk-taking."40
Are there any types of investments that are inherently too risky? Real estate is
?m generally considered a high risk investment. Most trusts are more diversified than the state
land trusts, which are comprised exclusively of land assets. In addition, land investments have
r> historically tended to provide long-term protection against inflation. Nevertheless, it would
not be prudent for a trustee to disregard the complexities, burdens, and special risks associated
p with a decision to commit a portion of the trust estate to such investments.41
Risk considerations and the overall duty of caution direct the general emphasis in the
P typical trustee's asset management program toward long-term investment. At the same time,
reasonably sound diversification is central to the management of risk, regardless of the level
r of conservatism or risk appropriate to the trust in question.42
P 3.1.7 The Duty to Delegate
Trustees are to exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution. Sometimes the trustee does
not possess the skills needed to manage the trust. In this case, the trustee must act prudently
in deciding whether and how to delegate, taking "reasonable steps to obtain sufficient
I competent advice, guidance, and assistance in order to meet the standards [of care and
P!TT|
! "restatement (third) of trusts, § 227 (1992).
""Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 227 (1992); Bogett, at 378.
r 42Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).
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skill]"/3 Where the trustee lacks knowledge or experience, there is a clear duty to seek out „-,
the relevant expertise. However, the trustee must evaluate the advice and make an
independent decision.44 This duty to delegate is reiterated many times by the Restatement, —
which adds that the "cost of advice ... may be paid or reimbursed from the trust estate."45
In deciding whether and what to delegate, the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to ^
take account of all relevant circumstances. These include the knowledge, skill, facilities, and
compensation of both the trustee and the prospective agents. Also relevant is the complexity ^
of both the assets to be managed and the strategies to be implemented. Active management
strategies, for example in markets such as real estate and venture capital, may require the n
hiring of agents with special skills not possessed by many trustees.46 Applying these
concepts to Colorado trust land management, the state, the Board, and the Legislature may be 1
under an obligation to modify the SLB staffmg structure so that it is competent to meet the
requisite standards of care and skill. "^
3.1.8 Summary \
The trust status of Colorado grant lands carries with it a set of responsibilities that
distinguishes trust lands from other public lands. Trust lands are managed for specifically
stated purposes on behalf of public beneficiaries. The interests of these beneficiaries and the
fulfillment of the stated purposes are the first consideration of the trustee. The trustee must
follow the terms and conditions of the trust and exercise ordinary skill and prudence. Within
these legal guidelines, the trustee may exercise considerable discretion in carrying out the
provisions of the trust.
The SLB has responsibility for managing the trusts that have been created for the
granted lands. As manager, the SLB must follow the provisions of the various legal
"Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).
"Shriners Hospitals For Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1110, 1111-12 (1987).
''Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 227 (1992).




documents that establish and direct management of the trusts. In addition it must follow the
general common law principles of trust management.
3.2 Summary of Western States Survey
This part of the report summarizes the results of a survey of select western states
conducted by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Center staff and study
consultants assisted in the development of the survey questions. DNR staff summarized the
results which have been edited by study consultants. Tables and a Figure that summarize
some basic trust land information follow this subsection (see Tables 3-1 and 3-2 and Figure
3-1).
As Table 3-1 shows, the SLB has the smallest ratio of staff to amount of surface land
managed of any western state — 26 staff members and three commissioners for 3 million
surface acres. Colorado is also the only state that has a board structure of three full-time
commissioners. Two common structures for trust land boards or commissions are: a single
elected commissioner with an advisory board (New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas and
Washington); and a full-time executive official with a part-time policy and/or advisory board
made up of government officials or citizens (Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
Utah and Wyoming) (see Figure 3-1).
3.2.1 Arizona47
Arizona still has about 9.4 million acres of the 12 million surface acres granted to it
by the federal government at statehood. Partly because much of the land is unsuited to either
agricultural or mineral development and partly because the agency owned land directly in the
path of urban development, in the early 1980s the state turned from management of
undeveloped land to a very aggressive program of developing and marketing its
urban/commercial land. Legislation supporting this effort, the Arizona Urban Lands Act,
was passed in 1981. The program now brings in approximately $100 million a year, mostly
'Telephone Interview with Bill Foster, Director of Land Disposition, Arizona State Land Department (July
1995).
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from land sales, and the Permanent Fund has increased from $100 million to $700 million.
Commercial leasing activities under the Urban Lands Program produce about $7 to 10
million/year. About 64 of the total agency staff of 157 are in the Urban Lands Program.
The Arizona State Land Department is one of the largest developers in the Phoenix
and Tucson area in terms of acreage. They lease land for commercial property, own ^
commercial properties and sell land for residential development. However, they do not
undertake land exchanges, since Arizona voters in two different elections have declined to
give them the necessary authority. They do not develop rural land, but wait until the cities
expand to land the Department manages on the cities' outskirts. „,
When the Department plans for a particular a piece of property, the plan includes
working with local jurisdictions and citizens to identify areas that are not developable or that ^
should be open space or protected because of high natural values. They have been successful
in transferring densities off these areas onto developable areas so the developable value is not -
lost. They are currently working with the City of Phoenix to identify mountain land the city
should buy or lease from the Department. The Department is challenged on almost every «*i
deal by a developer or a citizens' group. They expect this and build litigation costs into their
budget. «,
3.2.2 Idaho48 -
Idaho manages about 2.5 million acres of trust land with a staff of 240. In the last 20
years, the agency has placed major emphasis on sound long-term management practices, "*>
which includes considering all uses and working more closely with other land management
agencies. They balance revenue generation with resource protection for long-term production ^
and revenue.
Idaho uses the exchange process to consolidate trust lands. Sales are considered when ™
a private party is interested in acquiring a tract that is isolated, surrounded by private land,
or difficult to manage, and a successful exchange cannot be developed. The agency has a "^
**Letter from Jay G. Biladeau, Assistant Manager, Lands, Minerals and Range Resources, Idaho Board of
Land Commissioners to Kate Jones, Colorado Department of Natural Resources (July 1995).
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checklist of factors they follow when they sell or exchange land, which does not include a
specific provision for a public process. However, agency staff try to resolve opposition
before an exchange proposal goes to the governing board. Lessees, counties, and various
state and federal agencies are notified of proposed exchanges, and public comments are
gathered through the Realty Notice required for exchanges between the state and the federal
government, and through public hearings concerning private and state exchanges.
The Idaho Code specifically opens state trust land for public recreation. Such use
does not provide the trust with revenue except for a few areas where use is concentrated, and
the agency leases the land to a user group or another agency such as the Idaho Fish and
Game Department.
In January 1991, the agency began identifying and inventorying urban-transitional
lands. About 2/10ths of 1 percent (4,200 acres) of their lands are so classified, and that
figure is not expected to change. Primarily, the agency leases raw land to developers. They
have only recently considered acquiring developed commercial property through exchanges,
and do not undertake joint ventures.
3.2.3 Oklahoma49
Oklahoma manages about 795,000 acres of surface and another 1 million acres of
minerals-only trust land with a staff of about 90, including 16 field people. In 1982, the
Oklahoma Education Association filed a lawsuit charging that the agency was not maximizing
revenue. In OEA v. Nigh, the State Supreme Court agreed. As a result of that case, all
leases on state trust lands are auctioned off publicly. The state makes no distinction between
recreation and agricultural leases; the successful lessee may run cattle or grow wheat or use
the land only for hunting or other recreation — as long as his or her management meets
requirements set out in the agency plan for that particular parcel.30
'Telephone Interview with Keith Kuhlman, Director, Real-Estate Management Division, Oklahoma Land
f* Office (June 1995).
"Because of pressure from the agricultural industry, who have charged that the agency's policies are "taking
r~, the plow out of the ground," Kuhlman expects funding for aggressive advertisement of these auctions to be cut.
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The agency does very little in the way of urban land/commercial development or
leasing — though the few commercial leases they have are "extremely lucrative." They have
a "Transitional lands" portfolio of around 40,000 acres of land that is in the path of ^
development
At the 1994 election, an amendment to the state Constitution that had been proposed ^
by the agency was passed by the voters. This measure gives the office wide authority and
latitude to invest Permanent Fund monies under the "prudent man standard." Prior to the m
amendment, the state was limited to investing in local, state, and federal bonds.
The interviewee indicated that all or a good part of the state's remaining 800,000 ^
acres of trust land might be sold in the relatively near future. This is the result of a new
administration with a strong belief that the state should not own land. <■*!
3.2.4 Oregon51 -i
Oregon manages about 775,000 acres of surface trust land with a staff of 58. A
recent State Attorney General opinion clarified the agency's ability to balance other factors ""i
with revenue generation: "The board may sacrifice present revenue to preserve the property,
if it determines this will enhance income of the future. Non-economic factors may be ^
considered only if they do not adversely affect the potential financial contribution to the
Common School Fund over the long term."52 "1
In the 1970s, the agency completed the largest land exchange ever in the continental
U.S; over 1 million acres changed hands. This resulted in 570,000 "blocked" acres of state ™]
rangeland that can be managed more efficiently than the original scattered parcels.
A question currently before state courts concerns grazing fees in eastern Oregon, with "^
environmentalists arguing that the agency has the responsibility to use open competitive
bidding in issuing their leases. Many eastern Oregonians are arguing that the trust land ^
"Letter from John Lilly, Acting Director, Oregon Division of State Lands, to Kate Jones, Colorado Dept. mT)
of Natural Resources (July 1995). '
"Oregon Attorney General Opinion No. 8223 (July 24, 1992).
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p mandate supports lower grazing fees because higher fees might cause lessees to go out of
business — with a ripple effect ultimately affecting all Oregonians.
p Most of Oregon's trust lands are not considered to hold high natural values. The few
parcels that are recognized for such values are managed under the Oregon Natural Heritage
P Conservation Program.
The agency is now in the final stages of creating an asset management plan due out in
P December 1995. A strategy for urban-transitional lands, including the possibilities for joint
ventures, will be included in this plan. The agency currently has three major urban
P developments completed or under construction.
r 3.2.5 Utah53
Utah manages about 3.7 million acres of surface and about 1 million acres of
minerals-only trust land with a staff of 43. In 1994, after years of strong lobbying by the
trust beneficiaries, the Utah legislature passed an entire new organic act for the agency,
: making it an independent stand-alone agency with a director who reports to a board of
trustees selected by a nominating committee of 11 people — five from user groups and six
; from beneficiaries.
The 1994 legislation states: "As trustee, the state must manage the land and revenue
| generated from the land in the most prudent and profitable manner possible and not for any
purpose inconsistent with the best interest of the trust beneficiaries .... The beneficiaries do
not include other governmental institutions or agencies, the public at large or the general
welfare of the state." The beneficiaries' strong position is that the trust land must be treated
like privately owned land, not state-owned land. However, they have yet to successfully
tackle the issue of bringing agricultural lease rates on state trust land up to market levels.
The agency, under a new director and board of trustees, is now in the midst of a
r major planning effort. The agency is expected to move into an aggressive policy of re
positioning — selling rural land and acquiring developed commercial properties. In the last
telephone Interviews with Kevin Carter, Deputy Director, Utah Division of Land and Forestry (July
P* 1995); and with Margaret Bird, Utah Trust Beneficiaries' Representative (Aug. 1995).
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year, they have also entered the residential development business — platting out subdivisions,
putting in utilities, then selling the land to developers.
The state has a statutory environmental compliance process, with members from ^
almost every state agency and non-voting representation from the federal land management
agencies. The purpose of the group is to ensure that state and federal environmental ^
requirements receive proper consideration. Utah deals with lands holding significant natural
values primarily by trying to complete exchanges to move these lands into federal ownership. ^
They currently have two large state-federal exchanges underway. One example is a package
of inholdings, where they are exchanging out about 200,000 acres of trust land within . ^
national parks, forests, and Indian reservations. In return, the trust will receive about $50
million in cash, plus a large amount of federal mineral resources, mostly coal. «j
3.2.6 Washington54 -*i
The Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) manages 2.9 million acres
of land with a staff of approximately 600.5S Ninety percent of the approximately $275 ^
million in annual revenue from trust lands comes from timber. However, the agency does
have an active urban/transitional lands program, and also leases land for commercial **;
development and owns commercial property. The state's permanent fund balance is around
$400 million. ~!
The agency is proactive in working with citizens and local governments, especially in
its long-range planning efforts. One example: Eight years ago, Washington passed a Growth ^
Management Act that required all lands to be zoned and a statewide plan to be completed.
The agency hired eight new staff members to work closely with county and city government H
planners. This effort was helped by the fact that the agency gets 25 percent of its annual
revenue for operating expenses. 1
"Telephone Interview with Stan Biles, Deputy Supervisor, Washington State Department of Natural
Resources (June 1995). n
55The total staff of DNR is about 1,200 people. About one-half of the total staff, or 600 people, perform
trust land management duties.
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About 10 years ago, the agency was successful in working with the legislature to set
up a program whereby the state buys environmentally sensitive or special trust lands for
protection. So far, the state has spent about $400 to $500 million on this program; these
funds are used to buy replacement lands through its land bank process.
\
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Table 3-1. State Land Management in the Western States:


















































"These figures indicate number of acres where both surface and mineral rights are owned by the
agency. States also manage additional lands where the surface acres have been sold, but mineral rights
have been retained. The Colorado SLB manages approximately 1 million acres of these severed
mineral rights.
Data sources: Directory of the Western States Land Commissioners, July 1994 (all figures accurate as















Leases and sales go to the highest and best bidder at
public auction with at least ten weeks notice in public
newspapers. No lands shall be sold for less than their
appraised value. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that
trust lands are to generate appropriate if not maximum
revenue for support of common schools.
Lands must be managed to produce highest income
possible.
To maximize returns; to sell, at public auction, no more
than one section to individuals; and to manage under such
regulation as may be proposed by law.
Manage in such manner as will secure the maximum long-
term financial return to the institution to which granted.
Direct, control, lease, exchange and sell school lands and
lands granted for support and benefit of various state
educational institutions as provided by law.
Requires granted lands to be held in trust to be disposed of
only in the manner provided by Enabling Act and the
income only to be used for the purposes of the grant.
Maximize revenue and preserve the trust estate. The
administrator shall have charge of sale, rental, disposal,
and management of the school lands and other public lands
and the funds and proceeds derived therefrom to preserve
such land and all monies derived from the sale as a sacred
trust keeping the same for the use and purposes for which
they were granted and donated.
Sources of Authority
Enabling Act, Arizona Revised Statutes; Arizona Supreme Court
(Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 129 Ariz. 516, 520, 633 P.2d 325, 329
(1981))
California Public Resources Code
Enabling Act; Colorado Constitution; Colorado Revised Statutes
Idaho Constitution
Enabling Act of 1889; Montana Constitution; Montana Code Annotated
Enabling Act; New Mexico Constitution; United States Code; New
Mexico Statutes Annotated










Manage lands with the object of obtaining the greatest
benefit for the people of the state, consistent with the
conservation of the resource under sound techniques of
land management.
Use of lands for at least fair market value. Multiple uses
and sustained yield management as consistent with trust
principles. Utah has cultural resource laws.
All the public lands granted to the state are held in trust
for all the people and none of such land, nor any estate or
interest therein, shall ever be disposed of unless the full
market value is paid or safely secured to the state.
The sale of all school grant lands shall be at public auction
at such minimum prices as to realize largest possible
proceeds.
Sources of Authority
Oregon Constitution, Article VII; Oregon Revised Statutes; AG
Opinions
Utah Constitution; Enabling Act; Utah Code (major review of state
statutes from 1994 legislative session clarifying trust mandate)
Enabling Act; Washington Constitution
Wyoming Constitution; Wyoming Statutes
Source: Information compiled from interviews by Colorado Department of Natural Resources during this study, as supplemented by telephone interviews and research by the
Natural Resources Law Center.
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Source: Adapted from Souder and Fairfax, at 3-7, based on Western States Survey Responses and Western States
Land Commissioners' Association Directory (1992). Does not include data on the Executive Officer, who is generally













ISSUES, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.0 Issues, Conclusions and Recommendations
4.1 The State Land Board Needs a Comprehensive Land Management Strategy.
Statement of Issue
Management of trust assets in perpetuity requires that the trustee conserve the corpus
of the trust as a sustainable source of benefits.1 Some of those interviewed had the
impression that the SLB lacked any vision for management of trust lands. Commendably,
the SLB has developed a five-year plan. This document is good so far as it goes, but it does
not provide sufficient guidance to the SLB. In our view, the programs of the SLB suffer
from a lack of consistent themes and coherence.
The SLB is tremendously misunderstood. Views about its proper role and its
performance tend to be polarized. In fact, the SLB had done remarkably well, hampered by
low budgets, small staff, inadequate expertise, and some resources that are inherently
unproductive and locked into low value uses by expectations created by over a century of
practice. Meanwhile, social and economic realities are rapidly changing in Colorado. Its
challenges have never been greater and they can only be met with public support.
Conclusions and Recommendation
• The State Land Board should develop a revised statement ofmission and policy that
reflects Us approach to asset management consistent with its trust duties.
The SLB needs to develop an overall policy to guide day to day decisions so that they
serve the goals of a perpetual trust for the benefit of public schools in Colorado. We
recognize the SLB has a mission statement but it does not clearly address its approach to
asset management. It should be a yardstick against which each decision and action can be
measured and an understandable statement of general approach that will inform the public.
The revised mission statement should be brief, just a page or two. It should be developed in
conjunction with the several other policies that are suggested in this report and might include
a general statement that relates to each such policy.
'Souder and Fairfax, at 8-62.
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4.1.1 Range of discretion within which to fulfill its trust duties to trust
beneficiaries
Statement of Issue
The State Land Board generally views its mandate to be management of Colorado's
trust lands for maximum revenue production. The SLB's performance has not been entirely
consistent with such a mandate, and such an interpretation of the SLB's mandate does not
fully comport with state law. The substantial annual revenues produced ($8.3 million in
surface rents and over $12 million in royalties2) arguably could be greater if the SLB
pursued an aggressive investment and development program. It does not do so, partly in the
exercise of prudence, partly in response to political pressure to continue certain uses like
grazing and to refrain from certain controversial land uses, and partly because it does not
have the staff and other resources at its disposal to pursue such a mission successfully.
Our interviews and other investigations revealed that many people question whether
the SLB is properly exercising its discretion in managing trust lands. It is important to note
that no one suggests that the Board has abused its discretion. Opinions vary widely, however,
over the scope of the Board's discretion and what policies and choices the Board should
make within that scope. Criticisms come largely from the perspective of people with special
interests. The SLB's conduct should bejudged, however, on legal standards and its overall
reasonableness. For instance, some recreational interests and local government officials
think broader public uses of the lands should be emphasized, while representatives of the
state board of education contend that the SLB should not be occupied with considerations
other than producing current income since the lands are not truly public lands but rather
school trust lands.
The purposes of the trust created when these land were donated to the state by the
federal government are discussed in Section 3.1. As we conclude there, the State Land
Board has a range of discretion within which it can fulfill its trust duties.
These are preliminary figures for FY 1995. Revenue from the management of trust lands and the
permanent fund contributes modestly (about .6 percent) to the annual state appropriation for public schools and """)
in less significant ways to funds for other beneficiaries. The state land contribution amounts to less than .4 \
percent, on average, of local school budgets. Telephone interview with Byron Pendley, Director Public School
Finance Unit, Colorado Dept. of Education (Aug. 15, 1995). „«,
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Recurring questions, evident throughout our study, are: What should the relative
balance be in management of trust assets between current income, security, and growth as
objectives? To what extent can or should the SLB be influenced by public interest factors in
managing state lands?
We have considered the suggestion made, sometimes adamantly, by several people
that the constitutional mandate of the SLB should be changed to allow it to consider and
carry out the public interest in the course of managing state school lands. The state of
Oregon amended its constitution in 1968 to change the nature of the trust under which its
state lands are held. The amendment requires that state school lands be managed "with the
object of obtaining the greatest benefit for the people of the state, consistent with the
conservation of this resource under sound techniques of land management."3 This goes
beyond the goal expressed by those who urged a change in Colorado's constitutional
mandate. Here people were concerned that the SLB's hands were tied so that it could not
consider or procure public benefits in the course of its management of state lands.
As we have explained in Section 3.1.5 and elsewhere in this report, there is ample
discretion for the SLB to produce a range of important benefits so long as its paramount
consideration is benefit to public education. At such time as the SLB is constrained by the
limits of its discretion, a constitutional amendment like Oregon's could be considered, along
with the legal question of whether such an amendment would be contrary to the Enabling
Act.4 Courts that have considered the question of changing the state constitutional mandate
for state trust lands have held that the changes must be consistent with valid provisions of the
state Enabling Act.5 If the language of the proposed state constitutional change is
inconsistent with the Enabling Act, the latter must first be amended, which requires
)Ore. Const., ait. VIII, § 5. See Johnson v. Department of Revenue, 639 P.2d 128 (Ore. 1981).
The Oregon Attorney General has interpreted the amended constitutional language as consistent with the
state's Enabling Act. See Oregon Attorney General Opinion No. 8223 (July 24, 1992).
i™ 'Oklahoma v. Commissioners of the Land Office, 301 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla. 1956). In this case, the court
found that provisions regarding the care and disposition of trust lands are within the regulating power of
Congress and therefore valid laws of the United States.
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Congressional approval, after which the state may amend its constitution.6 Since no
constitutional amendment is proposed by this study, it is unnecessary to determine what }
constitutional changes might or might not be permissible under the Colorado Enabling Act.7
While we do not believe that it is necessary to amend the state Constitution, we do
believe that several statutes require revision. In the course of this study we encountered
- many antiquated laws relating to the SLB that are ripe for change, if not repeal. For
instance, one law requires that the mineral manager of the SLB be "a mining man" with
experience underground,8 a curious requirement for a state with virtually no underground
mines on state school land. And the law has not been followed. Another law requires that
sales be held at the state Capitol, and it is not followed.
More difficult are enactments that may be outmoded,in terms of inhibiting flexibility
in a modem business context, but which retain some legal or policy significance. For
instance, the SLB is required to retain mineral title to all land. This makes land exchanges ~
difficult, especially with the United States, but it implements a requirement in federal law
and therefore amendment may require federal consent. It should also be noted that the SLB ^
itself has sought for two years a change in the provision of law that requires all of the
income from the permanent fund to be distributed to the school fund. The change would ^
allow some retention of income to allow growth sufficient to keep up with modest inflation.
As pointed out by the SLB, the existing law effectively erodes the corpus by ignoring ~.
inflation and distributing all income.
<See Deer Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 760 P.2d 537, 539 (Ariz. 1988); Williamson v. "*
Commissioners of the Land Office, 301 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1956). See Fairfax et al., at 873-74.
In Deer Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 760 P.2d 537, 539 (Ariz. 1988) the court suggests „,
that Congressional approval has been repeatedly obtained for changes to the Arizona Enabling Act, which is
more specific and thus more restrictive than the Colorado Enabling Act. As discussed in Section 2.1, Colorado's




rw, Conclusions and Recommendations
I • The trust should be managed conservatively, to produce benefits for public
education in perpetuity.
The mandate to secure the maximum amount of revenue should not be read to elevate
f production of current income over all other goals. It must be remembered that this language
is found in a section of the constitution describing the SLB's duties largely in relation to the
I disposition of the lands for settlement which was, indeed, what the framers expected. The
proceeds were to go into a permanent fund to benefit public schools. Of at least equal
importance to those few words in the state constitution is the overriding purpose of the trust:
^ a perpetual source of benefits for Colorado's public schools.
Within its general mandate, derived from the constitution, enabling act, statutes, and
r general intent, the Board has considerable latitude. Like any trust, the land and funds held
by SLB should be managed for the use, benefit, and support of the trust beneficiaries. Since
p most of these beneficiaries have not yet been born, the perspective of the SLB and its
policies must be long-range and intergenerational — one that is not typically reflected in
^ political or private business decisions. The intergenerational nature of the trust supports the
conclusion that short-term profits must be subordinated to the long-range security and
m preservation of trust assets. This means that trust investment and asset management policy
should generally be conservative.
p» Conservative asset management policy favors long-term investments and protecting
the productivity and health of the lands. Land investments are sometimes considered
<"" inappropriate for trusts because over a short time horizon they may be speculative. Land
was, however, the original corpus of the trust. Furthermore, as history has shown in
f* Colorado, land holding over the long term is a secure and prudent investment in which value
is rarely lost. This fact seems to support not changing the form of investment of the trust
P*1 except in the case of lands that are not likely to appreciate over the long term or that
consistently produce income far below alternative investment of the proceeds through the
^ permanent fund.
The permanence of the trust demands special stewardship that may not be called for
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in other trusts with narrower or shorter term missions. It may be acceptable for a private
trust intended to support a person for life to log off the timber on a parcel over a short
period with the idea that the land could be later sold for other uses. A permanent trust would ^
1
favor sustained yield. It also may be the case that a shorter-term trust would find several
years of high income sufficiently attractive to use land for a toxic waste disposal facility, ^
while a long-term trust would have to balance the short-term income benefits against the
consequences of lost long-term income and potential liability for environmental damage. It _
may be a sound business decision for a landowner to develop and market non-renewable
(i.e., non-tributary) groundwater as fast as the law allows while the trustee of a permanent m
trust may find it prudent to amortize groundwater development over a much longer, period or
to withhold development for a longer period than a non-trust landowner would. ^
• Some laws pertaining to the State Land Board should be revised. «■>
The laws pertaining to the SLB should be reviewed and amendments to revise or
repeal antiquated or outmoded laws proposed to the General Assembly. Any such package of "*\
proposed amendments should include new or amended statutes that are necessary to
implement the proposals for change resulting from the acceptance of any recommendations ***
arising out of this report or a Phase n study and the further discussion it generates.
4.1.2 Authority to make multiple use of state trust lands
Statement of Issue "*\
Colorado trust lands include properties that are leased for more than one purpose.
For example, lands leased for agricultural uses may also be leased for oil and gas "">
development or for recreational use. Providing for additional, compatible uses can bring
higher returns to the trust from the lands or provide incidental public benefits. ^
In our interviews, we heard of problems arising when an oil and gas lessee failed to
provide sufficient notice to the surface user prior to commencing development activities. """
The notice issue appears to have been addressed at least in part by recent changes to rules of
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission discussed in Section 4.3.5. Of ""J
potentially greater concern are actual conflicts between agricultural lessees and mineral
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lessees. Surprisingly, we did not hear of any such conflicts in spite of the long history and
extensive use on nearly 800,000 acres where there are mineral leases underlying agricultural
leases.
The SLB has begun implementing an innovative multiple use policy adopted in 1992
that recognizes the advantages of allowing additional uses on leaseholds, particularly for
hunting and fishing. Interviews and other investigations revealed concerns that these
additional uses, under some conditions, may adversely impact existing land use. Indeed,
some lessees commented it was their understanding that the recreational leases would provide
public access primarily during hunting season. In practice, the lessees indicate, some leases
are issued to allow wildlife viewing, fishing, and other non-hunting season uses so that
access is permitted several months of the year. The result is a greater potential impact on
grazing operations. The number of complaints about these recreational leases is a concern in
that they have existed for less than three years and apply on some 200,000 (of a possible
500,000) acres, only about 8 percent of all grazing lands. Compared to the absence of
complaints about oil and gas and mining activity, the complaints about wildlife viewers and
sportsmen suggest the presence or at least the anticipation of significant abuses. There is a
fund created to pay for damages incurred by the lessee but the level of concern may suggest
it is inadequate.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board should allow additional uses of trust lands to the extent that
uses and rights under existing leases are not impaired.
In order to increase revenues to the trust or provide incidental public benefits, the
SLB can and should permit a multiplicity of uses on the same lands. Ordinarily the SLB
should obtain fair market value for the additional uses of these lands. Incidental public
benefits should be allowed when there is no significant reduction in the return to the trust.
Agricultural lessees should be assured that the permission for additional uses under
the multiple use program will not be abused.
The multiple use program involves a cooperative agreement with another state agency,
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the Colorado Division of Wildlife. Apparently the relationship has encountered difficulties in
its early stages. The Department of Natural Resources should attempt to mediate the issues
that arise. To the extent that the fund set aside to compensate for damages is inadequate, the
agreement may have to be revised. If there are problems that fall short of compensable
claims, further measures may be appropriate. For instance, each lessee could receive a letter
with a hot line number for complaints of abuse. If members of the public are exceeding the
terms of the SLB's permission, DOW's field officers should respond. The multiple use
program should be evaluated soon — in any case no later than its fifth year of
implementation. The evaluation should select a sample of leases where multiple uses have
been allowed and determine whether the new uses are in fact impairing existing uses or
resulting in reduced benefits to the trust. The evaluation should be carried out with advice _
from a committee of representatives of lessees, sportsmen, staff of DOW, SLB and DNR,
and the public. ^
As with other recommendations suggesting increased information gathering,
monitoring, evaluation, and oversight by SLB staff, this recommendation cannot be ,™
implemented with existing staff constraints. Additional staff would not be cost effective
unless the fees received under the MUP are adequate to support the increase. ^
• The State Land Board should adopt a policy forpublic use of state lands. —
The assumption behind the multiple use policy is that value is received for allowing
hunting access thereby increasing revenues to the trust. Other public uses on leased and ^
other lands may not conflict with lease purposes and may not threaten the long-term '
productivity or health of the land. Hiking, cross-country skiing, scientific research, and ^
educational programs are examples of activities that could generate little or no revenue but
which produce benefits for the public. The SLB should consider what other states as well as "*"
many large private landowners have done in this area, and adopt a policy regarding
additional uses of trust lands that specifies the circumstances and conditions under which -1,
state trust lands can be used to provide public benefits with little or no revenue is realized.
This could result in a modification of the multiple use policy or a separately stated policy. H
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4.1.3 Hie public role in state trust land management decisions
Statement of Issue
Many decisions of the SLB, especially policy matters, involve issues of public
concern. These matters deserve scrutiny and now receive it mostly in the context of site
specific decisions. This is because the three-member Board is extremely busy with dozens of
projects and proposals at any one time and rarely has an opportunity to step back and design,
present, and debate an overall policy. An exception was the carefully presented and planned
proposal for a multiple use policy. This was a model of fair, full, and open public
participation.
In July 1995, the SLB issued a draft public participation process document and asked
for comment This is a major stride forward. However, it is important to recognize that
some matters, at least in early stages of consideration, may be best treated privately. For
instance, as a business deal is negotiated or the pros and cons and strategies of a proposal are
being discussed, public knowledge too early in the process may work to the disadvantage of
the trust.
In summary, it appears that the opportunities for public participation are numerous
and improving with respect to individual decisions, but insufficient with respect to serious
policy matters.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board public participation process should be discussed and
developedfurther simultaneously with the State Land Board institutional
reorganization plan.
Policy deliberations should all have the benefit of wide public participation and close
public scrutiny. Staff decisions and deliberations need not have public input as a matter of
law, though they may be opened to public comment as necessary. Consequently, the level
and type of public participation that is appropriate will depend on the institutional
arrangement that comes out of the institutional study and is adopted.
While the discussion of the draft public participation process issued in July 1995 goes
forward, the SLB and Department should keep in mind possible changes in the institutional
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arrangements of the SLB. If the Board confines its future role to issues of policy as
suggested in Section 4.2, all of the Board's work would be policy-related — policy setting '
and oversight of the staffs application of policy. The staff would handle all negotiations and
business dealings. In evaluating the appropriate roles of the Board, the staff, and the public,
it will be important to strive to achieve a proper balance between the need to act efficiently ^
and wisely for the benefit of the trust in a private, business-like manner, and the need to
include the public in all matters of public concern. ^
4.2 The State Land Board Needs to Make Organizational Changes. ^
Statement of Issue
The organization and structure of the SLB is essential to carrying out its trustee ^
obligations of prudent management and the protection of trust lands and resources. We are
struck by the small staff size of the Colorado SLB, given the great geographic extent of lands n
managed and the intensive attention needed for some tasks to be done well (e.g., commercial
development and urban planning). The SLB has unsuccessfully sought appropriations for -i
additional staffing from the legislature. Overall, the argument that more people are needed is
compelling, but we believe that a more thorough review of staff and board allocation is **■,
needed before more FTE are sought. The problem has two dimensions: numbers and
allocation of existing positions, and qualification level of positions. ^
Staff allocation is a problem because under the present arrangement most of the staff
is assigned to the least productive activities of the SLB. Ten people are assigned to cropland ^
and grazing management and two to commercial leasing. On a per acre basis, it seems that
the cropland and grazing staff have far greater responsibility, but in terms of income ""'
generated per staff member, commercial staff is far more productive, producing 3.4 times the
revenue generated per person than the cropland and grazing staff. While we emphasize that H
such crude measures of effectiveness do not tell the whole story, they certainly raise concern
about the staffing pattern. Ultimately, the staffing decision must await a resolution of the ""■
future direction of the grazing program, which is addressed in Section 4.3.4.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
• A comprehensive institutional management study of the State Land Board should be
made.
The institutional arrangement of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners
should be examined and proposals made for the appropriate board and staff structure, duties,
and qualifications necessary to perform the SLB's fiduciary obligations. Colorado is unique
in having a full-time board whose members do work that in other states is performed by
r staff. Studying other states is a starting point for comparison and we have summarized
information about them in Section 3.2. Utah, for example, recently restructured its land
r board to provide more autonomy to trust managers. In addition, private and non-profit land
trusts like those in Hawaii deserve scrutiny. Specific matters to be studied include: (1) the
number and type of staff positions; (2) the types of professional expertise needed; (3) the
composition, role, and duties of the SLB; and (4) protection of the SLB functions from
political influence.
4.2.1 Number and type of staff positions
An assessment should be made to determine the best institutional structure and
: staffing pattern to carry out SLB duties. It should identify the types of permanent staff that
are likely to be needed to perform the changing functions of the SLB which include greater
! involvement in commercial development, more diverse use of lands such as for recreational
purposes, and land use planning. A core of people will undoubtedly continue to be needed to
perform accounting and clerical duties. At present, many executive functions are performed
^ by the Board members themselves. If the Board gives its primary attention to policy as
recommended below, more important executive-level tasks must be performed by the staff.
p, The staff is likely to require more people with business and real estate experience and with
executive decision-making skills. They would command higher salaries than most of the
]m present staff.
As discussed above, the study should address the cost-effectiveness of the present
fr-, allocation of positions. This should be done in coordination with the review of the grazing
lease policy. The study should also examine the allocation of five employees to field
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positions. The original concept was to have people familiar with the lands in contact with
lessees serving as representatives of the SLB and engaged in stewardship of the land. In
fact, most of the field personnel are consumed by paperwork, correspondence and
bookkeeping tasks, that would most efficiently be consolidated in a central location. Field ;
work remains important, but might best be done by people with special expertise related to ^
the particular task or issue (e.g., agronomist, geologist, hydrologist, or planner) Such
experts may be in demand statewide. Thus, current field needs should be evaluated and a
decision made on the best use of those positions.
4.2.2 Types of professional expertise needed
As the SLB enters areas of resource management, such as commercial development, ^
that require specialized expertise, decisions must be made about the type of people to include
on the staff or engage temporarily. n
There is a growing and unmet need for a diversity of professional expertise to advise
and participate in the work of the SLB. The need for expertise is occasionally filled by hiring -:
outside consultants. From time to time, the SLB has also employed professional expertise
from within the Department of Natural Resources. This seems to us to be an underutilized -*•>
i
resource. Divisions of the department have highly qualified experts in geology, hydrology,
wildlife, and recreational management. With appropriate memoranda of understanding *n
within the department, much of the need for professional expertise might be met at a
reasonable cost and without adding employees. ^
4.2.3 Composition, role, and duties of the State Land Board m
For many years, the commissioners served only part time. In the mid-1970s,
legislation that adjusted the salaries of SLB commissioners, and other state officials, also ^
made the positions full time. Since 1984, the three commissioners have been paid an annual
salary of $39,650.9 The Commission on Government Productivity's committee report on the "*'
Department of Natural Resources, completed in January 1989, recommended that the board
•C.R.S. § 24-9-102(l)(c), (2) and (3).
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be reorganized from "three salaried commissioners to six non-paid, part-time appointed
commissioners representing various areas of expertise and public interests."10 This
recommendation was not implemented.
The role of the Commissioners must be considered as part of any major review of the
institutional structure and staffing of the SLB. The state has been fortunate in the recent past
to have political appointees many of whom are qualified as business executives and willing to
work full time for a relatively low salary. Their business expertise has little or nothing to do
with the qualifications set by the Constitution, set out in Section 2.2 of this report.
Executive tasks, however, should be performed by trained, permanent staff. Having three
co-equal Commissioners operating as bosses along with a staff director technically in charge
of operations is unwise and would generally be unworkable but for the gracious and
committed attitudes of current Commissioners and staff members. Participation by the
Commissioners in all parcel-by-parcel decisions prevents the Commissioners from addressing
issues of larger scope and longer time dimension.
Commissioners have been treated as executive staff who are expected to work at least
a 40-hour week. This seems unrealistic, and we believe that a comprehensive management
review should consider redefining the nature of the job to be more consistent with other
boards charged with guiding policy. We believe three options for restructuring the board to
enhance its focus on policy issues, including modification of the current structure, should be
considered: (1) policy board model; (2) corporate board model; and (3) advisory board
model.
4.2.3.1 Policy board model
Under this option, the current board would be restructured to function as a policy
board. It is more typical for a politically appointed Board to set overall policy direction and
generally oversee its implementation. Examples of this model are seen in Nebraska,
'"State of Colorado, Commission on Government Productivity, Department of Natural Resources Committee
Report, January 1989, p. 17. Committee members included Chips Barry, Executive Director, Department of
Natural Resources; JoAnn Thomas, Financial Analyst, Colorado Ute Electric Association; Jerry Daves,
Director, Training and Consulting Services, Department of Personnel; and Adolph Mitterer, retired General
Manager, Technical Services, Union Pacific Resources Company.
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Oklahoma, and Washington. Like the Wildlife Commission, the Board might set official
policy and have a role in hiring the staff director, but leave all administration to the staff. If
a policy-board model were adopted, the Board would be able to delegate full responsibility to
the staff director to approve all or most classes of leases — grazing leases, small acreage
leases, renewals of mineral leases, and many others. The Board itself would perhaps
consider and approve individually only the major leases or dispositions. A process could be
adopted for referring a matter to the Board on action of the staff director or one or more
members of the Board, or the Governor. The Board's role in such cases would be to review
the action to determine if it comported with Board policy and overrule or modify it if it did
not. Freed of their present functions as staff executives, members would not have-to serve
full time. The recent exemplary performance of ambassadorial functions by Board members
who do public outreach and communication work with local governments, lessees, and others
may be a role that would justify more than a part-time commitment.
To implement the policy board model most effectively, it would be desirable, though
not necessary, to modify the constitutional structure prescribing the makeup of the board to
be a president, a register, and a professional engineer. The amendment should allow more
flexibility in the qualifications for board members.
4.2.3.2 Corporate board model
While the Board consists of citizens who are politically appointed, their role is similar
in some respects to a corporate board where outside directors offer diverse backgrounds and
perspectives, and set broad directions for management. A part-time Board, meeting perhaps
two to four times a month, might suffice and could attract high-caliber people who would
view the task like a seat on the board of a major, publicly-held corporation.
4.2.3.3 Advisory board model
Under this model, the Board would serve as a valuable source of citizen input and
expertise, not as a decision making entity. With the increased need for professionalization of
the SLB staff, there may no longer be a need for a Board with formal powers.
Implementation of most of the necessary institutional changes to allow the Board to
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function more like a policy board or a corporate board probably could be effected, at least
j for the interim, by an executive order of the Governor, if he had the full cooperation of his
appointed incumbent Board members. To formalize all aspects of the change would require
legislation. Constitutional changes would be necessary to implement an advisory board
model since it would remove the decision making powers of the Commission.
4.2.4 Protection of State Land Board functions from political influence
P Questions have been raised by Board members about the ability of the SLB to carry
out its fiduciary duties under the general administrative supervision of an executive
r department, and particularly the Department of Natural Resources. Although we did not fmd
any irregularities with respect to intervention in individual lease, sale, or exchange*matters,
?* there have been occasions when the Governor or key legislators took a public position on a
highly controversial matter pending before the Board.
In reality, there is no foolproof method for protecting a decision making process from
undue political influence. Removing the Board from within the DNR would avoid any
appearance of undue DNR influence. However, as previously discussed, we did not hear any
specific complaints about inappropriate intervention in individual cases. Additionally, there
are advantages to locating staff functions within a state agency and maintaining general
oversight within the state executive system. It provides regularity of administration in
matters such as accounting for expenditures, contracting and purchasing, and assurance of
employee rights under the state personnel system.
The budget process remains subject to political review at the executive and legislative
levels. Providing the SLB with a more independent source of funding would help relieve any
1 pressure exerted through this process.
m A greater problem than political influence in the Board's work may be their excessive
independence. They are only nominally under the Department of Natural Resources and
^ responsibility is diffused through the layers of state government. While board members are
appointed by the Governor, his relationship with them is attenuated by the executive
^ department structure, and they are essentially accountable to no one except to the general





within the Department of Natural Resources would be to have the Board report directly to
the Governor. This would provide greater accountability.
• A proposalfor independent, performance-basedfunding should be submitted to the
legislature.
Although the SLB produces over $8 million in rents and nearly $13 million in mineral
revenues per year, it must seek annual appropriations to fund its operations, with no
assurance that it will receive a particular amount of money. Now, performance is only
indirectly tied to the amount of appropriations. Prior to July 1, 1995, ten percent of revenue
was available for appropriation; by statute, the SLB's annual expenditures can now be no ^
more than 106 percent of the previous year's allocation-regardless of the revenue generated.
It would be more business-like, less susceptible to political influence, and more "**,
consistent with promoting trust goals to guarantee the SLB a fixed percentage of its total
revenues. A proposal for secure annual funding linked to performance, i.e., measured in
terms of revenues, should be presented to the legislature. Options can be drawn from other
states and from pension funds some of which use a management fee approach. ■
4.3 The State Land Board Must Pursue New Strategies to Fulfill the Trust Purposes.
In addressing this broad topic, we consider several activities currently carried out by
the SLB, including leasing, sales, and exchanges. We also look at activities such as long-
term planning, which have not traditionally been a significant component of the SLB's
activities. In each issue, we explore how the SLB can produce revenue and compatible :
public benefits while preserving the long-term productivity and health of the resources it
manages.
4.3.1 Comprehensive inventory of trust assets
Statement of Issue
An overriding concern that emerged throughout our study was the need for more and
better information about the portfolio of the SLB. The lack of adequate information inhibits




r* concerning the far-flung, diverse, and complex assets that are held in trust. A
comprehensive inventory is a basic necessity for responsible trust management and should
f pay for itself by enabling more fruitful decisions to be made. Indeed, without it, the SLB is
not equipped to realize full benefit for the trust.
Conclusions and Recommendations
f" • The State Land Board should develop a comprehensive inventory of trust assets.
At present the SLB lacks a complete and up-to-date information data base, which is
T needed to make planning and business decisions concerning its vast portfolio. In order to
achieve the trust purposes as fully as possible it should update its existing inventory and
r categorize all its land and resource assets. Throughout this part of the report we cite the
need for and recommend several of the components of such an inventory in connection with
^ particular land uses and issues.
The inventory should identify all significant uses and values of the lands — minerals,
r range, water, timber, wildlife, recreation — their marketability, and potential conflicts
among them. Current zoning, land use, and environmental concerns should also be identified
; so far as possible. This inventory is a critically important long-range planning and
management tool. It is important that the current inventory be redesigned and executed in an
effective manner. However, portions of it, such as appraisals and incorporating appraised
values, will be costly and time-consuming.
! The next step is to modify the existing inventory, its content, timing, and budget,
before proposing it to the legislature. We urge the use of professional planning expertise in
: improving the inventory design, especially in the area of geographic information systems and
computer program interfacing; we also urge that caution be used in not over-equipping the
SLB with extremely costly systems.
4.3.2 Guidelines for development, leasing, and disposition of urban and
transitional lands
1 Statement of Issue
As urbanization spreads, many state school trust lands are in the path of development.
r
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In an effort to improve returns to the trust, the Colorado SLB, like many western state land
managers, has considered opportunities to sell, exchange, or develop such lands. The land
values are increasing and pressures to develop are sometimes intense.
Potential returns from commercial development are high. But the risks and the need
for capital and involvement in management are also commensurately higher. Developing and
operating commercial properties is subject to cyclical downturns that can be devastating to
investors, especially those who are highly leveraged with debt. The lowest risk in
commercial real estate is in holding and selling commercially developable property. There
are, of course, techniques for limiting risk while participating in the profitability of
commercial development The SLB has evaluated its current holdings to identify urban lands
that are possible candidates for development Many other western states also have special
programs for urban or transition lands. The SLB has also acquired commercial properties'.
For instance, the SLB recently purchased an office building for renovation and leasing.
During our investigation, some people questioned whether active acquisition of commercial
properties was appropriate for the SLB. Some of them doubted the qualifications of the
Board and staff to make prudent decisions in this area. Others questioned whether it is
appropriate for a state agency to become involved in what is perceived as private investment
activities. Some local governments are concerned that the SLB's inclusion of lands in the
urban lands program will clash with local land use planning efforts.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board should inventory urban and transitional lands.
The SLB should continue to identify all trust lands that, because of their location near
developing areas, are potentially valuable and suitable for commercial development. These
lands can be further classified as suitable for sale or for retention and leasing according to
the guidelines discussed below.
• The State Land Board should establish guidelines for development, leasing, and
disposition of its urban and transitional lands.
There is no reason that the SLB should not participate in the fruits of commercial
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development in a growing state. Other western states engage in this type of activity.
' Washington has acquired a shopping center and several states have acquired or constructed
office buildings for lease." The SLB, however, operates with motives and restraints that
make its responses in the marketplace different from private landowners. While speculative
^ investors seek short-term advantages of market volatility, the SLB has an interest in
promoting long-term market stability. Its functions may be more akin to the manager of a
^ pension fund; pension fund management standards, indeed, are an apt example for modelling
SLB investment policy.
n The SLB needs a clear policy and guidelines for holding, disposing, and managing
commercially developable lands in the context of the state land trust's perpetual nature. The
rm policy should address: (1) criteria for allowing or undertaking development; (2) financing
guidelines; (3) options for limiting risk; (4) staffing needs; and (5) coordination with local
p land planning growth and management.
r 4.3.2.1 Criteria for allowing or undertaking development
Criteria should be articulated for meeting the prudent person standard and satisfying
!** the special objectives of the trust. They should address commercial development of existing
properties and the evaluation of commercial property for acquisition. The criteria can be
m used to classify lands for disposition and for short- or long-range development, and to
evaluate development and acquisition proposals.
4.3.2.2 Financing guidelines to assure all financial arrangements
fw> meet the State Land Board's trust responsibilities
State law does not now allow subordination of the SLB's interest. The SLB may
p want to limit further the degree and type of debt financing that is allowed on SLB
commercial lands in order to curtail the level of risk. The SLB, nevertheless, can remain
f competitive, especially if it uses long-term land leases or offers a source of financing such as
that suggested in Section 4.3.3.
"Souder and Fairfax, at 8-3S.
r
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4.3.2.3 Options for limiting risk while participating in development
Given the increased risks of commercial development, it is important for the SLB to "1
identify potential mechanisms that limit its risks. Long-term percentage leases, for instance,
can preserve the SLB's interest in the land over time while giving it the benefit of returns set "*'
by the profitability of the lessee's operation.
4.3.2.4 Staffing needs
The types of staff and consultants needed to deal with acquisition, development, and
management of commercial properties should be identified. This should be done in
connection with carrying out the recommendations in Section 4.2.
4.3.2.5 Coordination with local land planning and growth
Large landowners who expect to maintain a long-term presence in the community are
active contributors to land use planning efforts and ultimately benefit from them. In some
communities where the SLB holds land it may need to exercise leadership in developing or
improving land use plans, especially if the market and planning process is dominated by ^
speculators with an interest in short-term gains and minimal restraints on development. The
SLB's participation may be important in preserving the value of its assets. Rational m
development and security of values depend on strong plans with a long-term and
comprehensive vision. ^
"t
4.3.3 Procedures and policies for the disposition of trust lands through sale or **>
exchange
Statement of Issue
The original expectation of the federal government when it gave lands to new states
was that they would be sold to encourage settlement of the West while producing revenue
that could be put in a permanent fund to generate income for public schools. The only part
of that expectation that retains viability as a sensible policy — and the only part that is
embodied in a legal mandate — is that the proceeds of the land sales be used to benefit
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public schools. Most of the language relating to state lands in the Constitution and Enabling
Act concerns land disposal but does not compel it. Early on, the desirability of retaining the
granted lands became apparent, and the SLB has implicitly decided to continue the long-term
management of the lands that have not been sold. Comparable agencies in most states have
adopted a similar approach as has the federal government.
The SLB has engaged in sale and exchange of trust lands on a limited scale, with the
broad objective of improving revenue production and management of trust lands. As set out
in Section 2.6, some people question whether the SLB should ever dispose of trust land.
Others believe the SLB should not dispose of certain types of land that may hold special
value for a local community or the general public. Still others question whether the SLB is
obtaining appropriate compensation for its disposition of trust land.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board should develop procedures and policies for sales and
exchanges.
1 Procedures and policies are needed that both set forth broad goals and criteria and
translate general considerations into practical steps to be taten in proposing or responding to
proposals for sales or exchanges. These guidelines would regularize SLB procedures and
make the sale and exchange process clearer to those dealing with the SLB and to the general
public. The following requirements, prior to a sale or exchange, are recommended for
inclusion in any policy: (1) a comparative analysis of the proceeds from sale of a trust land
parcel versus the proceeds from retention and management of the parcel; (2) consideration of
the potential long-term uses of the land in connection with other trust lands; (3) an
(I1.1-!-?. I
assessment of management burdens; and (4) an evaluation of the impacts of the decision on
local government and the public generally.
^ 4.3.3.1 A comparative analysis of the proceeds from sale of a trust
land parcel versus the proceeds from retention and
management of the parcel
P The analysis should be performed prior to responding to any sale proposal. It can be
based on approximate values, where those are known, and, therefore, need not ordinarily
4-21
await completion of the required appraisal. The recommended comparison of opportunity
cost will give the Board critical additional information for its decision making.
An important factor in the analysis is an estimate of future asset appreciation. A
parcel that has experienced rapid appreciation may be ripe for exchange or sale if the current
value seems inflated and further growth is less likely. Given the long-term nature of the
trust, though, close judgments based on short-term appreciation performance and projections
rarely should be determinative.
The analysis will depend in part on a consideration of the current and historical
marginal rates of return for the permanent fund. However, a sale removes an asset from the
trust, converting it to funds that will not appreciate but are invested by the State Treasurer in
a legal list of investments with all income distributed annually. A sale decision can have the
\
effect of removing flexibility, capping returns, and curtailing future appreciation in value.
On the other hand, the permanent fund provides a secure repository for the asset.
4.3.3.2 Consideration of the potential long-term uses of the land in
connection with other trust lands •■
Any major land disposal decision, individually or in the aggregate, would benefit
from an overall inventory and classification of lands in a region. Often values can be
increased by blocking up isolated parcels. Furthermore, exchanges can be mutually
beneficial, for example, when the transferee obtains an isolated parcel of state land with a
high per acre value for immediate development and the SLB acquires a greater land area with
more long-term value and lower management burdens. \
4.3.3.3 An assessment of management burdens
Blocking up holdings can reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of
management. Different types of property customarily require more management (e.g., an
urban shopping center) or less (e.g., a producing gas field) management by the owner than ^
by the lessee. The cost and internal capacity of the SLB to deal with these burdens should
be part of the disposal decision.
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4.3.3.4 An evaluation of the impacts of the decision on local
P government and the public generally
1 Although these concerns may not legally dominate the decision process they are of
f importance to any large landowner who expects to maintain, and gain from, a long-term
presence in a community or region. A large landowner can contribute to and benefit from
p participation in a city's or county's land use planning process. Public opposition to a
proposal to dispose or develop may be a bellwether, indicating the expense and difficulty that
p would attend implementation of the proposal.
So that the SLB would be better positioned to participate in land exchanges, its
P inventory of trust lands should show special public values — wildlife habitat, Whitewater,
extraordinary scenery, rare plant communities, and other similar values. This is specifically
<** recommended in Section 4.3.6 below. Where notable public values are present on SLB lands
they will be more attractive for exchanges, especially with public agencies who seek to
^ protect these special public values. Thus, it may be wise to identify such lands and ensure
that current uses do not destroy or harm their exchange value.
P Policies and guidelines should identify both the purposes to be achieved by a sale or
exchange and the conditions under which a sale or exchange should or should not be used.
Exchanges should be used to enhance long-term productivity and value and to reduce
management burdens. The SLB, to its credit, has used exchanges in a number of
I circumstances. They could be more widely used, but should be subject to a strategic plan
with clear goals and objectives. They should not be used when the administrative and other
costs are too high relative to the value of the land or benefits to be achieved.
Sales of land should be used rarely unless new legislation makes permanent fund
benefits more attractive. Sales of land now represent a decision to convert the asset to cash
in an interest-bearing account in perpetuity, and therefore sales should occur only in
extraordinary circumstances. These circumstances include avoiding difficult or costly
management of small, isolated parcels and eliminating especially unproductive lands from the
; SLB portfolio. See the recommendation below in Section 4.3.4 concerning grazing lands.
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• Legislation should be sought to increase flexibility in permanent fund investments. m*
Options to be considered by the legislature should include authorizing the State
Treasurer, perhaps with advice from an investment committee, to: (1) invest a portion of the ^
fund in financing projects undertaken on State Land Board lands; and (2) invest in
partnership with state and local government agencies to acquire and hold temporarily ""'
potential recreational, wildlife, and open space lands;
4.3.3.5 Investment of a portion of the fund in financing projects
undertaken on State Land Board lands m
The Treasurer already invests in mortgaged-backed securities. If the SLB had a
source of capital available to it to finance its own projects and those of lessees, its-own **t
returns from the lands could be increased while still producing market rates of interest for
the permanent fund. Care must be taken to build in safeguards to avoid lessees taking undue "®\
advantage or seeking favoritism; the experiences of Oklahoma and Wyoming are relevant.
4.3.3.6 Investment in partnerships with state and local government
agencies to acquire and hold temporarily potential <**,
recreational, wildlife, and open space lands
The SLB already has the authority under statute to allow local governments, other ""*.
entities, and individuals to purchase state trust land over time at fixed interest rates.12 The
SLB could also consider using funds from escrow exchanges to purchase non-trust lands that ^
have been identified for acquisition by local governments. The government entities could
then buy these lands from the SLB over time. This option has the advantage of both ""*
cooperating with local open space initiatives and generating revenue for the trust. As
discussed in sections 4.1.2 and 4.3.6, so long as such transactions comport with sound
business judgment and do not significantly reduce the return to the trust, they presumably
would be within the SLB's discretion. Experience has shown that profit and non-profit




themselves while meeting an increasing public demand for acquisition of such lands.
• A lawful andflexible process for using exchanges to dispose of land should be
P developed.
Although the current escrow system has been found to be lawful under an Attorney
T General's opinion (dated December 26, 1991, revised May 1992), doubts continue to be
expressed about its legality. Therefore, a more definitive Attorney General's opinion or
r authorizing legislation may be desirable. In practice, after depositing funds in escrow, a
purchaser may not receive the purchased property for several years, until suitable
■ replacement property is found. A system more attractive to sellers would encourage more
transactions and potentially result in greater value to the trust.
The SLB has attempted to obtain legislation allowing the use of land banks. This
device, used in the State of Washington, allows the SLB to sell or exchange trust lands and
hold the proceeds until suitable replacement trust lands may be identified. We recommend
that there be further study and consideration of this tool for the Colorado SLB.
4.3.4 leasing and disposition policies and practices for agricultural trust lands
: Statement of Issue
Over 90 percent of the surface acreage of Colorado's trust lands are managed for
i grazing and agricultural leases. Revenues from these leasing activities are about $6 million
annually, or about 25 percent of all revenues earned from state trust lands. There is a trend
\ in all western states, including Colorado, to examine state trust land agricultural leasing in an
attempt to increase returns. In Colorado, agricultural leasing has come under increasing
) scrutiny by groups representing beneficiaries and by some legislators. In seeking ways to
_», increase revenue production from trust lands, the SLB itself has focused on the low per-acre
revenue from such leases, especially grazing leases. It has implemented a major policy of
m increasing fees for all agricultural uses, with grazing fees to increase gradually to market
rates. Already this has raised income from agricultural leases by a significant percentage.
r The issue has two dimensions: the amount charged for agricultural leases; and the
amount of income the assets could produce in other uses. Plainly, many of the lands held by
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the SLB are optimally utilized for grazing. In such cases, the SLB must determine whether
it is recovering a fair return on the lands leased. Present income from the 2,465,000 acres
of grazing lands averages $1.88 per acre. Lessees have alleged that as leasing fees are
further increased they may be forced to increase the number of cattle they run, threatening
the long-term health of the land. Similar claims have been made in other states, but they do
not appear to be substantiated here or in other states where extensive competitive bidding and
market rates are used. If increasing rents threatens harm to the assets, however, or if
sufficient income cannot be derived from such a significant portion of the trust's assets, the '
SLB must, in the exercise of fiduciary responsibility, consider whether alternative m
investments would produce greater revenues. A ready comparison is with the state
permanent fund which produces current annual income of 7 percent.13
An issue of asset management related to grazing leases is the treatment of water
rights. As set out in Section 2.4.7, the SLB now requires lessees to make water rights ^
claims in the name of the state. However, it considers lessees under prior leases who use
water on state lands to own the rights to the water. This is a major issue of discussion in ^
other states and with respect to federal public land. But it is far from dear that the SLB
conclusion is correct as a matter of water law. m
Conclusions and Recommendations ^
• Market value should be obtainedfor agricultural leases.
The SLB should continue its efforts to bring agricultural leasing in line with market «?
prices, recognizing the differences in improvements associated with the leased land and the
long-term sustainability of trust lands. The SLB's efforts with the irrigated lessees, which «■>
take into consideration local conditions, is a procedural model for how this might be
accomplished with other types of agricultural lessees. "^
Competitive bidding should be used more widely. The SLB has been examining the
way in which fees are determined. A cash rental fee structure is used for all agricultural "">
"FY 1994, based on first half. The fifteen year average FY 1978-1993 was 8.55 percent. Facsimile
transmission from Ruth Kary, Comptroller, SLB (Aug. 11, 1995).
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leases. The highest bidder should generally prevail even if the bidder proposes a new or
I different use such as wildlife or recreation, provided sufficient provisions are included in the
lease to protect the land.
_, • The standard grazing lease should include termsfor protecting the long-term health
; of the land.
To protect the trust investment, clear, scientifically based standards, conditions, and
' restrictions should be included in all leases. The federal Natural Resources Conservation
Service has standards that have been used in New Mexico's rural stewardship program.
i Incentives should be included for good management practices.14 Given limited SLB staffing
and the fluctuating need for range experts, the SLB should consider using the private sector
1 for the necessary expertise. For instance, a range scientist could be engaged on a contract
basis to develop standard terms to be included in a basic grazing lease for protecting long-
! term land health and to propose on a case-by-case basis special terms to add to individual
leases as they come up for renewal.
r • The State Land Board should consider selling or exchanging grazing lands that do
' not produce, over the long-term, returns comparable to investment ofthe same
assets in the permanentfund.
r In FY 1995, grazing leases on 2.47 million acres produced income of $4,629,554.
i
More income would be produced if all these grazing lands were sold for $27 per acre and the
f* proceeds invested in the permanent fund at 7 percent.13 The acreage is now carried on the
books of the SLB at an average value of $100 per acre, which would produce $17.3 million
^ per year. To equal that level of income would require grazers to pay about $7 per acre. A
decision to sell lands, however, should also consider the possible appreciation value of the
1 lands.
/ "Souder and Fairfax, at 5-40 to 5-46.
nrv IJThis figure was obtained by taking the figure of 2.47 million acres now under grazing leases, and
I determining how much per acre the land would need to be sold for in order to arrive at a figure that, at an
annual return of 7 percent, would produce income equivalent to the amount of income earned from the leases in
FY 1995 ($4,629,554).
4-27
It is not reliable to generalize based on statistical averages, but the currently meager
per acre income suggests that if parcels cannot command substantial increases in rents they :
might be sold and greater revenues produced. Though it may prove imprudent to sell all
these lands, it seems likely that there are some lands among the SLB's 2.47 million acres
now under grazing leases that might be liquidated for an amount in excess of $27 per acre to ^
secure greater annual revenues without disrupting a long-range investment strategy.
The first step in studying possible disposal of grazing lands is to determine the —
maximum revenue potential of the lands in state ownership. Besides looking at higher
grazing rates, the study should assess the potential for income from different uses and from ^
other uses compatible with grazing such as hunting and fishing and other recreational uses.
As of the end of FY 1995, the Division of Wildlife had recreational leases on 151,424 acres ^
that increase the rents from those lands (and therefore increases their value in SLB
ownership) by an average of $.54 per acre per year. ^
• The State Land Board should consider a share-crop leasing arrangement to be used **)
in selected situations.
A share-crop arrangement carries greater risks than a normal lease and may require ^
additional accounting and oversight. At the same time, it offers the potential for greater '
returns to the trust on the limited acreage (113,576 acres) now under agricultural lease." „.,
i
Washington uses such as system with high-valued products such as orchard and vineyard :
crops. The SLB would have to evaluate whether the proposal makes sense on its lands. ^
• The State Land Board should seek an Attorney General's opinion on the ownership m,
of rights to water appropriated and used on state lands.
This is a legal matter and not a question of social policy. The SLB is bound by trust
law to claim fully all of its rights and not to dispose of or waive its rights without receiving
full compensation or having a sound business reason for failing to do so. It should determine
whether its present lease conditions are adequate and what measures can be taken to correct
'*Souder and Fairfax, at 5-15 to 5-16.
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any alleged waivers of rights in the past. The SLB should also seek advice on the best way
P to monitor claims to water rights so that it may assert its own rights and claims in a timely
and effective manner.
4.3.5 Policies and practices governing decisions to develop mineral resources in
r view of the perpetual nature of the trust
The development of minerals including oil and gas resources on Colorado trust lands
r accounts for almost 60 percent of annual trust land revenues — over $12 million.17 This
revenue is generated by leases covering less than one million acres of trust lands (less than
r one-fourth of the total mineral acres managed by the SLB).18
Water development is a type of resource extraction that has recently given rise to
P controversy. The SLB has entered into a long-term contract under which a developer is to
pay a royalty for non-renewable groundwater developed on SLB land. Because the matter is
^ in litigation we refrain from any extended discussion of it. The issue illustrates, however,
the likelihood that water will be an increasingly valuable and sought-after asset for
r development and supports the need for an SLB policy for use of its non-tributary
groundwater resources.
Statement of Issue
P A major issue for the SLB is the determination of the circumstances under which it
should permit extraction of non-renewable resources and whether new mineral leases should
< be withheld during depressed markets. This determination should reflect the perpetual nature
of the trust and intergenerational concern for the beneficiaries.
i Recognizing that there is no gain in the assets of the trust when minerals or water are
extracted — only a change from mineral reserves to cash — the proceeds of royalties are
: required to be placed in the permanent fund where they earn interest from the State
"Annual Report of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners, July 1, 1993 - June 30, 1994, at 10.




Treasurer's investments. Therefore, in determining whether to permit mineral extraction, the
SLB should weigh the likelihood of increased mineral prices against the income that will
accrue to the permanent fund and the fact that principal may actually shrink because of
inflation. This does not now appear to be a factor in SLB mineral leasing decisions.
Leasing is undertaken regardless of whether markets are depressed and leases are written to
provide an incentive to produce within a certain time regardless of the current price.
For those lands that are leased, some parties interviewed questioned whether the fee
structure is appropriate, particularly whether oil and gas lease rates were comparable to
private rates, and whether a sufficient penalty was provided to discourage nondevelopment.
Another concern is that some types of mineral development (e.g., coal strip mining)
can be in conflict with protection of surface use values and public values such as protection
of areas of recreational or environmental importance. Interviews revealed that there have
been problems with the oil and gas lessee not providing sufficient notice to other surface
lessees prior to commencement of drilling activities. Relatively new requirements of the
Colorado Oil and Gas Commission mandating notice 30 days before commencement of
activities address this concern. It is not clear that the decision to lease in the first place and
the lease terms themselves reflect sufficient information and stewardship concerns for public
values.
In the case of water, the enterprise of marketing developed groundwater is sufficiently
new that it is difficult to assess the economics and wisdom of a transaction without
considerable study.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board should review and revise as necessary the mineral leasing
process and lease terms considering the perpetual nature of the trust.
The purpose of the review is to determine whether the process for opening lands to
mineral development and the terms and conditions in any resulting lease comport with the
goal of the Colorado state land trust — to provide benefits to the public schools in perpetuity.
The review must address the independent but related concerns of optimizing long-term
returns and protecting public values. As discussed earlier, this requires an investment
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strategy that pays special regard to the long-term health and productivity of the land and
P resources in the trust. As such, the trustee must be more mindful of potential values and
trade-offs that affect the benefits that future generations will get from the assets than an
f* investor whose aim is to produce short-term profits. Future income from the asset if
minerals are converted to cash (opportunity cost) is predictable since the only present
; investment option is the permanent fund. The costs in terms of public values are more
difficult to determine, but a process of identifying and inventorying them would help. The
SLB inventory of all trust lands may identify some lands where future mineral development
is or is not appropriate, considering both economic values to the trust and other values that
; may be implicated. In other cases, the identification of values would assist in the case-by-
case decision making process.
Leasing lands without regard to current, unfavorable market conditions instead of
waiting to lease and produce minerals at higher returns later may be inappropriate.
Similarly, terms in form leases that penalize delay or reward diligence in production are
favorable to the lessor only if one assumes that production will be at prices with which the
lessor is satisfied. Lease terms should be developed in light of trust obligations and not
^ necessarily from the perspective of private entrepreneurs or landowners. Our cursory review
of information on leasing terms and rates shows that Colorado has comparable or better
, -, leasing terms than other lessors in Colorado. It should be emphasized that the process and
' _ lease terms appropriate to the SLB may be different from those appropriate for private
rm landowners.
i
<m • The State Land Board should establish a task force to study and provide advice to
j the State Land Board on the opportunities and advisability ofdeveloping and
marketing non-tributary groundwater.
P It is unwise for the SLB to enter any further transactions in non-tributary groundwater
without an assessment of the economics and legalities of extracting this resource. The
Department and the Board should select a task force with strong and diverse relevant




4.3.6 Policies for environmentally sensitive lands
Statement of Issue
The SLB is frequently asked and sometimes sees advantages in withholding lands and
resources from development. With a public that is increasingly concerned about the health of
the environment, the SLB must respond to requests to withhold from development lands that
have .special environmental significance. Our investigation showed that some people feel the
SLB has a responsibility to protect environmentally sensitive areas on its lands and not to
develop some areas of special recreational or aesthetic importance to the public.
Representatives of trust beneficiaries and others observe that the SLB has an obligation to use
its assets for the benefit of public schools. Most people interviewed, however, recognized
that there are certain trust lands that should not be developed because of unique scenic,
scientific, or other values.
The SLB, in fact, has at times decided not to proceed with development in response
to major public objections. It also has agreed to set aside under the Colorado Natural Areas
Program certain natural areas that have significant biological or geological values. This
involves a voluntary obligation to manage the lands consistent with the long-term protection
of those special values.
Under Washington's Trust Land Transfer Program, trust lands identified for
protection are purchased from the school trust and moved to a special status under state law,
such as a natural area preserve or a state park. The legislature appropriates funds with
which the properties are purchased from the common school trust at fair market value. This
is accomplished through provisions incorporated into the state's biennial budgets.19
The success of this approach is tied to the uniqueness of timberlands, which makes it
difficult to duplicate with other types of trust property. Under the Washington program, the
value of the property attributed to timber, which generally represents about 85 percent of the
total land value, is deposited in the Common School Construction Account. The portion
attributable to the land value is used to purchase replacement trust lands which, by statute,
l9See R.C.W. §§ 79.08.1062; 79.08.1064 to -.1078; a summary of the program through 1993 is presented
in Washington Dept. of Natural Resources, Lands and Minerals Division, Land Management Services Section:
Transaction Types, Authorities and Sources of Policy, prepared by Julie Armbruster, Sept. 13, 1993.
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must be high quality forest land or other income producing lands for the school trust. In this
way, the schools receive the income they are entitled to from the timber, yet no trees are
harvested. Moreover, the school trust receives revenue-generating replacement lands, thus
ensuring future income for the trust. Between 1989 and 1994, the program was funded with
over $272 million in appropriations, adding about $221 million to the construction account
from timber values, and directing $45 million towards the purchase of replacement land.20
Conclusions and Recommendations
• The State Land Board has wide discretion to protect its land and resources and
withhold themfrom development, but it may not do so purely in response to public
opinion or to serve the public welfare.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the SLB has a duty to manage its assets to benefit
present and future users of public schools in Colorado. Within this duty the SLB has wide
discretion in the types of activities it undertakes to accomplish its mandate, but the mandate
implies that income will be produced. The SLB also has discretion to produce corollary
benefits from lands and resources where it can be done without imposing a significant burden
on the trust. This discretion extends to withholding land from development, production, or
use under circumstances where it comports with sound business judgment and is otherwise
consistent with the purposes of the trust. Business and trust purposes may include ensuring
long-term productivity and health of the land, anticipating public outcries that will cause high
costs or impede successful development, ensuring a margin of compliance with applicable
standards and requirements, or cooperation with governmental authorities concerning land
use and related policies. But the SLB may not withhold land from development without an
independent business or trust purpose. In other words, it may not do so solely to serve the
public interest. Where the only justification for non-development is the public interest, it is
best for the SLB to seek to exchange or sell the lands to an entity that is dedicated to
preserving the special values and willing to pay fair market value to acquire the lands.





• The State Land Board land inventory should identify parcels with significant
features that may deserve special protection.
We recommend that the SLB comprehensive inventory of trust lands identify parcels
that have significant resources and classify them for three categories of protection: protection
for greater future value; protection to comply with laws and strong indicators of public
policy; protection for other public values. The first classification recognizes that it may be
prudent to preserve the land in the long run because it could generate greater benefits for the
trust. The second classification recognizes that a decision to preserve trust lands may be
made in response to legal requirements or, in the exercise of sound business judgment, in
response to requests from government agencies or, occasionally, clear and strong expressions
of public opinion. However, it is unlikely that public opinion can be anticipated with ^
sufficient accuracy to support advance classification of a parcel for protection as a matter of
sound business judgment. The third classification embraces lands where preservation may be ^
desirable but there is no law requiring it, and the SLB has no other business justification for
forgoing development to preserve non-economic values. These are lands where the SLB,
based on public opinion or its own judgment, perceives that it would be in the public interest
to preserve the lands. These lands should be targeted for sale or exchange.21 Indeed, lands ^
in the second category may also be candidates for sale or exchange if their retention is only
marginally justified by business judgment. In some instances interests less than the fee (e.g., ^
conservation easements) may be transferred to protect the unique values. Possible buyers of
title or conservation easements include local governments, state agencies like Division of m
Parks and Division of Wildlife, Great Outdoors Colorado, federal agencies, and private non
profit organizations interested in preserving resources. A transfer mechanism such as the «-
land bank discussed above could facilitate exchanges or transfers of sensitive trust lands.
*\
fin-dnr\report4.
"See National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 38-39,
869 P.2d 909, 921 (1993) (when economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the non-economic
values, the state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school lands); see

















p 5.0 Phase II of the State Land Board Study
This report, which is Phase I of the State Land Board study of state land policies and
r practices, makes a significant number of recommendations, most of which are in the nature
of options which the Center suggests should be considered by the State Land Board and the
r Department of Natural Resources. Phase II of the study process consists of the processes
used to consider and act upon the recommendations presented in the Phase I report. It
p includes the analysis of options, development and use of public involvement activities,
decision making by the Board and implementation of those decisions. An essential initial step
r in this process should be defining what items require board action, what items require
additional budget resources, and what items require legislative consideration.
I
5.1 Analysis of Options
^ In order to begin implementation of the recommendations suggested by Phase I, the
Center suggests that an outside consultant or consultants coordinate, commission, and/or
r undertake the suggested studies. In addition, each of the recommendations should be
examined to identify statutes, policies, and guidelines needing revision in order to undertake
r* any proposed reforms or repeal or revision of antiquated portions of the law. All the tasks
should be performed in close coordination with the SLB Commissioners and staff.
H Considering the number and breadth of the recommendations suggested in the Phase I report,
it will be necessary to provide funding for SLB staff to participate in Phase n.
5.2 Public Involvement Process
I Given the high level of interest in SLB policies and practices, public involvement
should be an integral part of all efforts undertaken during Phase II. A public involvement
! process designed to facilitate consideration of the recommendations in this report and the
SLB's proposed responses to these recommendations should be identified as soon as possible
after submission of the final Phase I report.
In designing the public involvement process, it is important to consider the goals to be
achieved by the process. Possible goals include: presentation of the report's
^ recommendations and possible responses to them to stakeholders and the general public in a
i
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variety of forums designed to solicit candid, creative, and useful ideas and responses; *"t
provision of opportunities for the stakeholders to interact in a meaningful fashion with Board
members, SLB and DNR staff and perhaps an advisory group; and use of small group forums "^
to provide focused responses by key stakeholder groups. The DNR and the SLB should
consider structuring the public involvement process with guidance from the Steering "I
Committee or other advisory group and the assistance of an outside consultant with expertise
in public participation process design and facilitation. m
The first portion of the public involvement process could be a series of public
workshops around the state, centered on key issues or clusters of issues and proposed "^
responses to them. The workshops should be informal and interactive to facilitate
communication among stakeholders and between stakeholders and any presenters. Trained "1
facilitators, preferably individuals who have no direct interest in the report or the SLB's
policies and practices, should be used to conduct the workshops and to assure that all points
of view are given a fair hearing and all questions are given appropriate responses. The
workshops should include a presentation on the report's recommendations that is clear and
concise.
A second portion of the process might include smaller meetings of people selected for
their specialized knowledge and experience. The meetings should focus on issues that are
technical in nature or that have impacts on a distinct, limited area or population. It will be '
important to include a diversity of points of view in these groups.1
5.3 Actions Necessary to Implement Results of Phase n Study
To help facilitate public decision makers' consideration of the results of the Phase II
study, it will be important early in the Phase n process to develop all components in a form
appropriate for Board action or legislative consideration. Additionally, where a proposed
change will require additional funding, such as implementation of a comprehensive inventory, ^
a budget should be developed. :
'The authors acknowledge public process information provided by CDR Associates, a non-profit
organization located in Boulder, Colorado.
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5.4 Other Recommended Actions
As a result of the Phase I study, the Center has identified two additional actions that
should be undertaken to facilitate improvements of state land policies and procedures. The
two actions identified by the Center are: a request for an Attorney General's opinion on the
ownership of rights to water appropriated and used on state trust lands; and an evaluation of
the multiple use program during its fifth year. These are actions that can be undertaken
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Relevant Provisions of the
Colorado Enabling Act, Constitution, and Statutes
Enabling Act of Colorado
An act to enable the people of Colorado to form a Constitution and State Government,
and for the Admission of the said State into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States.
Paragraphs relative to the Board of Land Commissioners are quoted below:
Paragraph?. School lands.
The sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every township, and where such sections
have been sold or otherwise disposed of by any act of congress, other lands equivalent
thereto in legal sub-divisions of not more than one quarter-section, and as contiguous as may
be, are hereby granted to said state for the support of common schools.
Paragraph 8. Land for public buildings.
That, provided the state of Colorado shall be admitted into the Union in accordance with
the foregoing provisions of this act, fifty entire sections of the unappropriated public lands
within said state, to be selected and located by direction of the legislature thereof, and with
the approval of the president, on or before the first day of January, eighteen hundred and
seventy-eight, shall be and are hereby granted, in legal sub-divisions of not less than one
quarter-section, to said state for the purpose of erecting public buildings at the capital of said
state, for legislative and judicial purposes, in such manner as the legislature shall prescribe.
Paragraph 9. Land for penitentiary.
That fifty other entire sections of land as aforesaid, to be selected and located and with
the approval as aforesaid, in legal sub-divisions as aforesaid, shall be, and they are hereby
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granted, to said state for the purpose of erecting a suitable building for a penitentiary or state
prison in the manner aforesaid.
Paragraph 10. Land for university.
That seventy-two other sections of land shall be set apart and reserved for the use and
support of a state university, to be selected and approved in manner as aforesaid, and to be
appropriated and applied as the legislature of said state may prescribe for the purpose named
and for no other purpose.
Paragraph 11. Salt springs.
That all salt springs within said state not exceeding twelve in number, with six sections
of land adjoining, and as contiguous as may be to each, shall be granted to said state for its
use, the said land to be selected by the governor of said state within two years after the
admission of the state, and when so selected to be used and disposed of on such terms,
conditions and regulations as the legislature shall direct; provided, that no salt springs or
lands, the right whereof is now vested in any individual or individuals, or which hereafter
shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall by this act be granted
to said state.
Paragraph 12. Sale of agricultural lands.
That five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of agricultural public lands lying within
said state, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said state
into the Union, after deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said
state for the purpose of making such internal improvements within said state as the
legislature thereof may direct; provided, that this section shall not apply to any lands
disposed of under the homestead laws of the United States, or to any lands now or hereafter
reserved for public or other uses.
Paragraph 14. School lands-how sold.
That the two sections of land in each township herein granted for the support of common
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schools shall be disposed of only at public sale and at a price not less than two dollars and
\ fifty cents per acre, the proceeds to constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which
^ to be expended in the support of common schools.
_ Paragraph 15. Mineral lands excepted.
' That all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation and grants of this act.
!- Constitution of the State of Colorado
ir» Authorized by the Enabling Act, the Constitution of Colorado Preamble reads: We, the
1 people of Colorado, with profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, in
I-*- order to form a more independent and perfect government; establish justice; insure*
tranquillity; provide for the common defense; promote the general welfare and secure the
p blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution
for the "State of Colorado".
r
Under Article DC. Sections 3. 5. 9. and 10 apply to the Bnard of T.and Commissioners.
r
Section 3. School fund inviolate.
r The public school fund of the state shall forever remain inviolate and intact; the interest
thereon, only, shall be expended in the maintenance of the schools of the state, and shall be
r distributed amongst the several counties and school districts of the state, in such manner as
" may be prescribed by law. No part of this fund, principal or interest, shall ever be
P transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated, except as herein provided. The state
treasurer shall be the custodian of this fund, and the same shall be securely and profitably




Section 5. Of what school fund consists.
The public school fund of the state shall consist of the proceeds of such land as have




educational purposes; all estates that may escheat to the state; also all other grants, gifts or
devises that may be made to this state for educational purpose.
Section 9. State board of land commissioners.
The state board of land commissioners shall be composed of three (3) persons to be
appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, who shall have the direction,
control and disposition of the public lands of the state under such regulations as are and may
be prescribed by law, one of which persons shall at the time of his appointment be
designated as president of the board and whose office shall expire on the second Tuesday of
January, 1917, one of which persons at the time of his appointment be designated as register
of the board and whose term of office shall expire on the second Tuesday of January, 19IS,
and the third member of said board shall at the time of his appointment be designated as the \
engineer of the board and shall always be professionally a civil engineer, who, for at least m
five (S) years, has been actively engaged in the practice of his profession and whose term of
office shall expire on the second Tuesday of January, 1913; and the successor and successors
of the first members of the board shall each be appointed for the terms of six (6) years.
On the adoption of this amendment by the electors of this state, it shall not go into full ^
force and effect until the second Tuesday of January, 1911.
The members of the board shall each receive a salary of three thousand dollars ($3,000) m
per annum until otherwise provided by law; but the salary of each member of this board is to
be paid out of the income of the said state board of land commissioners. m
As amended November 8, 1910. (See Laws 1909, p. 322.)
Section 10. Selection and control of public lands.
It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location, «*?
protection, sale or other disposition of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be
granted to the state by the general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed ■*"
by law; and in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount therefor. No law
shall ever be passed by the general assembly granting any privileges to persons who may ^
have settled upon any such public lands subsequent to the survey thereof by the general
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government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such
lands, shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The general assembly shall, at the earliest
practicable period, provide by law that the several grants of land made by congress to the
state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust subject to disposal,
for the use and benefit of the respective objects for which said grants of land were made, and
the general assembly shall provide for the sale of said lands from time to time; and for the
faithful application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants.
Colorado Revised Statutes
Applicable laws, statutes, that impact the Board of Land Commissioners are contained in
various volumes of the Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.). The main volume of concern is
Volume 15, C.R.S., Title 36, Articles 1 through 7; Title 24, Article 1, Section 124(3)(d);
Article 9, Section 102(l)(c), (2), and (3); and Article 33, Section 107.
Other lesser C.R.S. references deal with normal governmental administrative procedures
applicable to the Board of Land Commissioners as an activity, but deal no differently with
them than with other organizations.
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